Chain pharmacies are expanding in many low and middle-income countries (LMICs). Historically practices of independent pharmacies in these settings have been poor, and there is a need to understand how these new organisational arrangements are affecting the functioning of pharmacies, and the implications for public health. Drawing on economics literature, we develop a set of hypotheses as to how chains could address the quality failures that typify LMIC retail pharmacy markets, and explore these hypotheses using a set of 38 in-depth interviews, conducted in Bengaluru, India between 2014 and 2015. We look specifically at how being organised in a chain affects several key behaviours: employment of qualified staff; the ability of government authorities to focus regulation on central management structures; the propensity for firms to self-regulate; and the impact of the potentially lower-powered incentives faced by chain employees compared to independent owners. In practice, few differences were identified between chain and independent organisations in these areas. Not all chains were operating with a qualified pharmacist (akin to independent shops). Drug control authorities did not take advantage of the existing chain architecture to enforce regulation. Chains did heavily self-regulate but their focus was on customer service, rather than aspects of quality relevant to health outcomes. Additionally, widespread bribery in the sector was a barrier to effective drug control. Finally, the incentives faced by chain employees were not low-powered due to rewarding sales targets and pressure to increase sales. We observed that chains exerted strong influence over their staff but the potential to exploit this to improve quality of care is not currently being realised. A shift in focus from customer satisfaction to outcomes of public health concern is unlikely without either financial incentives or strengthened external regulation.