

Atte Oksanen ORCID iD: 0000-0003-4143-5580

Original article

## Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions Reduce the Incidence, and Mortality of COVID-19: A Study based on the Survey from the International COVID-19 Research Network (ICRN)

Seung Hyun Park<sup>1†</sup>, Sung Hwi Hong<sup>1†</sup>, Kwanghyun Kim<sup>2,3†</sup>, Seung Won Lee<sup>4,5</sup>, Dong Keon Yon<sup>6</sup>, Sun Jae Jung<sup>3\*</sup>, Ziad Abdeen<sup>7</sup>, Mohamed Lemine Cheikh Brahim Ahmed<sup>8</sup>, Abdulwahed Al Serouri<sup>9</sup>, Waleed Al-Herz<sup>10</sup>, Kannan Subbaram<sup>11</sup>, P. Shaik Syed<sup>11</sup>, Sheeza Ali<sup>11</sup>, KOSAR ALI<sup>12</sup>, Humaid O. Al-Shamsi<sup>13</sup>, Oidov Baatarkhuu<sup>14</sup>, Henning Bay Nielsen<sup>15,16</sup>, Enrico BERNINI-CARRI<sup>17</sup>, Anastasiia Bondarenko<sup>18</sup>, Ayun Cassell<sup>19</sup>, Akway Cham<sup>20</sup>, Melvin LK Chua<sup>21,22</sup>, Sufia Dadabhai<sup>23</sup>, Tchin Darre<sup>24</sup>, Hayk Davtyan<sup>25</sup>, Elena Dragioti<sup>26</sup>, Barbora East<sup>27</sup>, R. Jeffrey Edwards<sup>28</sup>, Martina Ferioli<sup>29,30</sup>, Tsvetoslav Georgiev<sup>31</sup>, Lilian Ghandour<sup>32</sup>, Harapan Harapan<sup>33</sup>, Po-Ren Hsueh<sup>34</sup>, Aamer Ikram<sup>35</sup>, Shigeru Inoue<sup>36</sup>, Louis Jacob<sup>37,38</sup>, Slobodan Janković<sup>39</sup>, Umesh Jayarajah<sup>40</sup>, Milos Jesenak<sup>41</sup>, Pramath Kakodkar<sup>42</sup>, Nathan Kapata<sup>43</sup>, Yohannes Kebede<sup>44</sup>, Yousef Khader<sup>45</sup>, Meron Kifle<sup>46</sup>, David Koh<sup>47</sup>, Višnja Kokić Maleš<sup>48</sup>, Katarzyna Kotfis<sup>49</sup>, Ai Koyanagi<sup>50</sup>, James-Paul Kretchy<sup>51</sup>, Sulaiman Lakoh<sup>52</sup>, Jinhee Lee<sup>53</sup>, Jun Young Lee<sup>53</sup>, Maria da Luz Lima Mendonça<sup>54</sup>, Lowell Ling<sup>55</sup>, Jorge Llibre-Guerra<sup>56</sup>, Masaki Machida<sup>36</sup>, Richard Makurumidze<sup>57</sup>, Saad Mallah<sup>58</sup>, Ziad A Memish<sup>59</sup>, IVAN MENDOZA<sup>60</sup>, Sergey Moiseev<sup>61</sup>, Thomas Nadasdy<sup>62</sup>, Chen Nahshon<sup>63</sup>, SILVIO A. NAMENDYS-SILVA<sup>64</sup>, Blaise Nguendo Yongs<sup>65</sup>, Amalea Dulcene Nicolosora<sup>66</sup>, Zhamilya Nugmanova<sup>67</sup>, Hans Oh<sup>68</sup>, Atte Oksanen<sup>69</sup>, OLUWATOMI OWOPETU<sup>70</sup>, Zeynep Ozge Ozguler<sup>71</sup>, Gonzalo Emanuel Perez<sup>72</sup>, Krit Pongpirul<sup>73</sup>, Marius Rademaker<sup>74</sup>, Nemanja Radojevic<sup>75</sup>, Anna Roca<sup>76</sup>, Alfonso J. Rodriguez-Morales<sup>77,78</sup>, Sandro G. Viveiros Rosa<sup>79</sup>, Enver Rosh<sup>80</sup>, Khwaja Mir Islam SAEED<sup>81</sup>, Ranjit Sah<sup>82</sup>, Boris Sakakushev<sup>83,84,85</sup>, Dina Ebrahim Sallam<sup>86</sup>, BRIJESH SATHIAN<sup>87</sup>, Patrick Schober<sup>88</sup>, Zoran Simonović<sup>89</sup>, Tanu Singhal<sup>90</sup>, Natia Skhvtaridze<sup>91</sup>, Marco Solmi<sup>92,93,94,95</sup>, kalthoum Tizaoui<sup>96</sup>, JOHN THATO TLHAKANELO<sup>97</sup>, Julio Torales<sup>98</sup>, Smith Torres-Roman<sup>99</sup>, Dimitrios Tsartsalis<sup>100</sup>, Jadamba Tsolmon<sup>101</sup>, Duarte Nuno Vieira<sup>102</sup>, Guy Wanghi<sup>103</sup>, Uwe Wollina<sup>104</sup>, Ren-He Xu<sup>105</sup>, Lin Yang<sup>106</sup>, Kashif Zia<sup>107</sup>, Muharem Zildzic<sup>108</sup>, Jae Il Shin<sup>109\*</sup>, Lee Smith<sup>110</sup>

1. Yonsei University College of Medicine, Seoul, Republic of Korea
2. Department of Preventive Medicine, Yonsei University College of Medicine, Seoul, Korea.
3. Department of Public Health, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea
4. Department of Data Science, Sejong University College of Software Convergence, Seoul, South Korea
5. Department of Precision Medicine, Sungkyunkwan University School of Medicine, Suwon, Republic of Korea
6. Medical Science Research Institute, Kyung Hee University College of Medicine, Seoul, South Korea
7. Department of Emergency Medicine, Augusta Victoria Hospital, Address: Al Tour, East Jerusalem
8. University of Nouakchott Al Aasriya & The Mauritanian Association for Scientific Research Development (AMDRS)
9. Yemen Field Epidemiology Training Program
10. Faculty of Medicine, Kuwait University
11. School of Medicine, The Maldives National University School of Medicine, Maldives
12. University of Sulaimani college of medicine
13. Burjeel Cancer Institute, Burjeel Medical City, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
14. Department of Infectious Diseases, Mongolian National University of Medical Sciences
15. Department of Anesthesia and Intensive Care, Zealand University Hospital Roskilde, Roskilde, Denmark
16. Department of Nutrition, Exercise and Sports, Faculty of Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark
17. CEMEC- Council of Europe

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18. Shupyk National Healthcare University of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine
19. John F. Kennedy Medical Center
20. University of Juba, School of Medicine
21. National Cancer Centre Singapore
22. Duke-NUS medical school
23. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health; Blantyre, Malawi
24. Department of Pathology, University of Lomé, Togo
25. Tuberculosis Research and Prevention Center
26. Pain and Rehabilitation Centre, and Department of Health, Medicine and Caring Sciences, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden
27. 3rd Department of Surgery, 1st Medical Faculty of Charles University, Motol University Hospital, Prague, Czech Republic
28. Medical Research Foundation of Trinidad and Tobago
29. IRCCS Azienda Ospedaliero Universitaria di Bologna, Respiratory and Critical Care Unit, Bologna, Italy
30. Department of Clinical, Integrated and Experimental Medicine (DIMES), Alma Mater Studiorum University, Bologna, Italy.
31. Medical University - Varna, Varna, Bulgaria
32. American University of Beirut
33. Medical Research Unit, Universitas Syiah Kuala, Banda Aceh, Indonesia
34. Departments of Laboratory Medicine and Internal Medicine, China Medical University Hospital, China Medical University, Taichung, Taiwan
35. National Institute of Health, Pakistan
36. Tokyo Medical University, Department of Preventive Medicine and Public Health
37. Research and Development Unit, Parc Sanitari Sant Joan de Déu, CIBERSAM, **ISCIH**, Dr. Antoni Pujadas, 42, Sant Boi de Llobregat, Barcelona 08830, Spain
38. Faculty of Medicine, University of Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, 78180 Montigny-le-Bretonneux, France
39. University of Kragujevac, Faculty of Medical Sciences
40. Postgraduate Institute of Medicine, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka
41. Department of Pediatrics, Jessenius Faculty of Medicine in Martin, Comenius University in Bratislava, University Teaching Hospital in Martin
42. National University of Ireland, Galway, Galway, Republic of Ireland
43. Zambia National Public Health Institute
44. Department of Health, Behavior and Society, Jimma University, Ethiopia
45. Jordan University of Science and technology
46. Centre for Tropical Medicine and Global Health, Nuffield Department of Clinical Medicine, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
47. Saw Swee Hock School of Public Health, National University of Singapore
48. Clinical Hospital Centre Split, School of medicine, Split, Croatia
49. Department of Anesthesiology, Intensive Therapy and Acute Intoxications, Pomeranian Medical University in Szczecin, Poland
50. Parc Sanitari San Joan de Deu, ICREA, CIBERSAM, ISCIH
51. Public Health Unit, School of Medicine and Health Sciences, Central University, P. O. Box 2305, Accra, Ghana
52. College of Medicine and Allied Health Sciences, University of Sierra Leone
53. Yonsei University Wonju College of Medicine
54. National Public Health Institute of Cape Verde
55. The Chinese University of Hong Kong
56. National Institute of Neurology
57. University of Zimbabwe Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences; Family Medicine, Global and Public Health Unit
58. Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland - Bahrain
59. Director Research and Innovation Center, King Saud Medical City, Ministry of health
60. Tropical Cardiology. Central University of Venezuela
61. Sechenov First Moscow State Medical University
62. St. Parascheva Infectious Disease Hospital
63. Department of Gynecologic Surgery & Oncology, Carmel Medical Center, Haifa, Israel
64. Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Medicas y Nutricion Salvador Zubiran; Instituto Nacional de Cancerologia, Mexico City, Mexico
65. IFORD-Universit of Yaoundé II
66. Molecular Biology Laboratory, Research Institute for Tropical Medicine, Alabang, Muntinlupa City, Philippines, 1781

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67. Asfendiyarov Kazakh National Medical University
  68. University of Southern California
  69. Faculty of social sciences, Tampere University, Finland.
  70. Department of Community Medicine, University College Hospital, Ibadan, Nigeria
  71. General Directorate of Public Health, Turkey
  72. Cardiology Division, Clínica Olivos, Buenos Aires, Argentina
  73. Chulalongkorn University Faculty of Medicine
  74. Marius Rademaker Waikato Clinical Campus, University of Auckland Medical School, Hamilton, New Zealand
  75. Clinical Centre of Montenegro
  76. MRC Unit The Gambia at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, The Gambia
  77. Grupo de Investigación Biomedicina, Faculty of Medicine, Fundación Universitaria Autónoma de las Americas, Pereira, Colombia.
  78. Universidad Científica del Sur, Lima, Peru.
  79. Instituto Nacional da Propriedade Industrial, Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
  80. University of Medicine, Tirane
  81. Afghanistan National Public Health Institute (ANPHI)
  82. Tribhuvan University Teaching Hospital, Institute of Medicine
  83. RIMU/Research Institute of Medical University Plovdiv
  84. Chair of Propedeutics of Surgical Diseases.
  85. University Hospital St George Plovdiv
  86. Pediatrics & Pediatric Nephrology Department, Faculty of Medicine, Ain Shams University, Cairo, Egypt
  87. Geriatrics and long term care department, Rumailah Hospital, Doha, Qatar
  88. Amsterdam UMC location Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Department of Anesthesiology, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
  89. National Institute of Public Health
  90. Kokilaben Dhirubhai Ambani Hospital and Medical Research Institute
  91. National Center for Disease Control and Public Health
  92. Department of Psychiatry, University of Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.
  93. Department of Mental Health, The Ottawa Hospital, Ontario, Canada.
  94. Ottawa Hospital Research Institute (OHRI) Clinical Epidemiology Program University of Ottawa Ottawa Ontario
  95. Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Charité Universitätsmedizin, Berlin, Germany
  96. Laboratory of Microorganisms and Actives Biomolecules, Faculty of Sciences of Tunis, University Tunis El Manar
  97. University of Botswana
  98. National University of Asunción, School of Medical Sciences, Paraguay
  99. South American Center for Education and Research in Public Health, Universidad Norbert Wiener, Lima, 15108, Peru
  100. Department of Emergency Medicine, Hippokration Hospital, Address: Leof Vasilissis Sofias 80, 11527 Athens, Greece
  101. Mongolian National University of Medical Sciences (MNUMS)
  102. University of Coimbra
  103. University of Kinshasa Faculty of Medicine
  104. Department of Dermatology and Allergology, Städtisches Klinikum Dresden – Academic Teaching Hospital, Dresden, Germany.
  105. Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Macau
  106. Department of Cancer Epidemiology and Prevention Research, Cancer Care Alberta, Alberta Health Services; School of Medicine, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada
  107. School of Health and Wellbeing, University of Glasgow, U.K
  108. Academy of medical science in B&H
  109. Department of Pediatrics, Yonsei University College of Medicine, Seoul, Republic of Korea
  110. Centre for Health Performance and Wellbeing, Anglia Ruskin University, Cambridge, UK, CB1 1PT
- † Co-first authors, these authors contributed equally to this work.

**\*Corresponding Authors:**

Sun Jae Jung, M.D., Ph.D.

Address: Department of Preventive Medicine, Yonsei University College of Medicine, 50-1 Yonsei-ro, Seodaemun-gu, Seoul 03722, Korea

E-mail: sunjaejung@yuhs.ac

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Jae Il Shin, M.D., Ph.D.

Address: 50 Yonsei-ro, Seodaemun-gu, C.P.O. Box 8044, Department of Pediatrics, Yonsei University College of Medicine, Seoul 120-752, Republic of Korea

Tel: +82-2-2228-2050; Fax: +82-2-393-9118; E-mail: shinji@yuhs.ac

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## Abstract

**Background:** The recently emerged novel coronavirus, “severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2)”, caused a highly contagious disease called coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). It has severely damaged the world’s most developed countries and has turned into a major threat for low- and middle-income countries. Since its emergence in late 2019, medical interventions have been substantial, and most countries relied on public health measures collectively known as nonpharmaceutical interventions.

**Aims:** To centralize the accumulative knowledge on non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) against COVID-19 for each country under one worldwide consortium.

**Methods:** International COVID-19 Research Network collaborators developed a cross-sectional online-survey to assess the implications of NPIs and sanitary supply on incidence and mortality of COVID-19. Survey was conducted between January 1 and February 1, 2021, and participants from 92 countries/territories completed it. The association between NPIs, sanitation supplies and incidence and mortality were examined by multivariate regression, with log-transformed value of population as an offset value.

**Results:** Majority of countries/territories applied several preventive strategies including social distancing (100.0%), quarantine (100.0%), isolation (98.9%), and school closure (97.8%). Individual-level preventive measures such as personal hygiene (100.0%) and wearing facial mask (94.6% at hospital; 93.5% at mass transportation; 91.3% in mass gathering facilities) were also frequently applied. Quarantine at a designated place was negatively associated with incidence and mortality compared to home quarantine. Isolation at a designated place was also associated with reduced mortality compared to home isolation. Recommendations to use sanitizer for personal hygiene reduced incidence compared to recommendation to  
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use soap did. Deprivation of mask was associated with increased incidence. Higher incidence and mortality were found in countries/territories with higher economic level. Mask deprivation was pervasive regardless of economic level.

**Conclusion:** NPIs against COVID-19 such as using sanitizer, quarantine, and isolation can decrease incidence and mortality of COVID-19.

**Keywords:** Non-pharmacologic interventions, COVID-19, Mask, Quarantine, Isolation, Sanitizer.

## Introduction

In December 2019, several cases of pneumonia of unknown origin were reported in Wuhan City, China. A novel strain of virus, later named as severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV2) was isolated from some of the patients <sup>1</sup>. Since then, the disease caused by the new coronavirus infection, later labeled as COVID-19, has infected more than 500 million people worldwide, with more than 6 million deaths until 15 April, 2022 <sup>2</sup>.

Although a vaccination program is currently in progress, several SARS-CoV2 variants that can evade acquired immunity have risen <sup>3</sup>. Strategies for prevention inevitably still depend on non-pharmacologic interventions (NPIs), including preventive behaviors of individuals such as wearing facial masks and personal hygiene, simultaneously as governments continue their efforts to roll out vaccination for variants of SARS-CoV2 <sup>4,5</sup>.

It has been demonstrated that lockdown is an effective NPI to fight against the pandemic <sup>4,6</sup>. For instance, a recent study across 11 European nations indicated that lockdowns have significantly reduced COVID-19 transmission <sup>7</sup>. A study on the transmission of COVID-19 and influenza in Hong Kong also presented the effectiveness of staying at home during the pandemic against disease transmission <sup>4</sup>. However, not all nations have observed the benefits of NPIs, and the detailed policies

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for lockdown were also differed by nations. An analysis of effects of physical distancing policies in 149 countries or regions showed that although the policies effectively decreased the incidence rate of COVID-19, nations with the higher gross domestic product (GDP) and higher health security index are more likely to have benefited from such policies; NPIs, seemingly, are more likely to be effective in nations with better economic status and governance capacity against public health crisis <sup>8</sup>.

Besides the application of NPIs, other factors could have affected the rate of propagation of COVID-19. For instance, there was worldwide shortage of facial masks during the early stage of the pandemic, which is one of the most important sanitary supplies for the prevention <sup>9</sup>. Although it is well known that wearing facial masks can prevent the spread of infectious disease <sup>10</sup>, there are no estimates on whether the nationwide experience of mask shortage compromised the preventive measures against COVID-19 and ultimately affected the incidence and mortality. It is well known that there are heterogeneities in the national capacity of applying adequate NPIs against COVID-19 and controlling its propagation. There are inequalities in the spreading of COVID-19 <sup>11</sup> due to differences in governance capacity <sup>12</sup> and systematic resilient during crisis <sup>13</sup>.

Most previous studies have investigated a single NPI within a single city or country level, and the results of them remained controversial. Few studies compared the efficacy of different NPIs <sup>14-16</sup>. To the best of our knowledge, no global-scale research has examined and compared the effect of multiple NPIs and supply shortages on the spread and death of COVID-19. As such, we designed and established a scientific consortium called the International COVID-19 Research Network (ICRN). One of the central projects of ICRN is to build a database that would congregate the

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disease characteristics, various treatment modalities used and their outcomes, case fatality rates, policy responses, and socioeconomic impacts of COVID-19. As part of this effort, we investigated the effectiveness of eight of NPIs (organization, COVID-19 screening, wearing facial masks, social distancing measures, school closure, facility closure, quarantine and isolation, personal hygiene) and shortages in personal hygiene items, on the transmission of COVID-19 in 92 countries/territories between 1 January and 1 February 2021.

## Methods

### Study population - International COVID-19 Research Network

As of June 2020, ICRN collaborators include 172 participants representing 160 countries/territories. Detailed information on the ICRN and which countries/territories are in the network is presented in Supplementary Table S1, Supplementary Table S2, and Supplementary Figure S1. In this study, we tried to investigate the factors that affect incidence and number of deaths of COVID-19, including governmental policies, individual-level NPIs, economic status, and supply shortages, by analyzing nationwide COVID-19 status through ICRN collaborators.

### Survey Method

ICRN and its expert panels developed a cross-sectional online-survey called Life and Policy Interventions during the Era of COVID-19. Detailed information is presented in Supplementary Figure S2. The first part of the survey consists of questions on demographic information of countries/territories included in the survey. The second part of the survey was information on country-specific guidelines and screening for COVID-19. The subsequent sections were specific for data regarding masks, social distancing, changes, and adaptation of the educational system and facilities in

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response to COVID-19. Additionally, the survey assessed the country-specific quarantine and personal hygiene guidelines. Finally, it inquired about the presence of protective supplies shortage. On average, the questionnaire needed 30 mins to self-complete. Our data team was responsible for collecting the data and the analysis. This team was supervised by the co-first authors and corresponding authors.

Data collection mainly took place between January 1 and February 1, 2021. Additional responses were gathered afterwards. As a result, we were able to synthesize data from 92 countries/territories. Once the data collection was complete, all the answers and results were entered into a secure, and password-protected Excel sheet. Since any personal data from each collaborator was not asked, collected data was strictly secondary.

The research was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Severance Hospital in October 2020. (IRB No. 4-2020-0998).

### **Data Collection**

COVID-19 status of countries and territories including number of cases, number of deaths, and the number of diagnostic tests for COVID-19 were retrieved from: <https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus> which is published online at OurWorldInData.org<sup>17</sup>. Population of participating countries/territories were extracted from the Worldometer, accessed 26 February 2022, <https://www.worldometers.info/population/><sup>18</sup>. Information on economic status was classified into four categories according to classification of the World Bank classification on 2020; low-income countries (LIC), middle-low-income countries (MLIC), middle-high-income countries (MHIC), high-income countries (HIC)<sup>19</sup>. Geographical classification of each countries/territories was in line with the classification given by Global Burden of Disease (GBD)<sup>20</sup>.

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Information on NPIs against COVID-19 was collected via the self-completed online survey. The questions for policies and situations were classified into nine categories: organization, COVID-19 screening, wearing facial masks, social distancing measures, school closure, facility closure, quarantine and isolation, personal hygiene, and shortages in personal hygiene items.

### **Statistical analysis**

For descriptive analysis, we provided means and standard deviations of log-transformed values for continuous variables and frequency and proportion for categorical variables. Kruskal-Wallis H test and Fisher's exact test was used to compare descriptive statistics between subgroups. For trend analysis, the linear-by-linear method was performed for categorical variable, and the Jockheere's trend test for continuous variables <sup>21</sup>.

The effects of variables on incidence and the number of deaths of COVID-19 were analyzed by multivariate regression analysis after adjusting for income, population, and number of tested individuals <sup>22</sup>. Log-transformed values of confirmed cases and number of deaths were used as main outcome variables of linear regression with log-transformed value of total population as an offset value. To test short-term and long-term effect, we set two different time points for evaluation: 14 days after implementation and 28 days after implementation.

In all statistical analyses except the binomial test, a two-tailed p-value of < 0.05 was considered significant. Statistical analyses were performed using the SPSS for Windows version 25.0 (SPSS Inc., IBM Corporation, Chicago, Illinois, USA) and R version 4.0.2 (R Core Team, Vienna, Austria).

## **Results**

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### **General characteristic of countries and territories included in the survey**

Among 172 ICRN collaborators, 98 collaborators filled out the survey. Two survey responses were obtained from Bulgaria, and three were from Italy. Survey data for Japan, Mongolia, and Korea were filed out by two collaborators each. Therefore among 160 countries/territories in ICRN, 92 countries/territories replied completed the online survey, which covered almost all regions classified by GBD except for Oceania (Table 1). The average confirmed COVID-19 case among them was 953,574 at 2 weeks after index date, and 1,011,936 at 4 weeks after index date. The mean value of confirmed death due to COVID-19 was 20,374 at 2 weeks after index date, and 21,920 at 4 weeks after index date. Most countries/territories were classified as HIC (43.5%), followed by MHIC (26.1%), MLIC (18.5%), and LIC (12.0%).

Most countries/territories had central organization responsible for COVID-19 control (90.2%). Also, most of countries/territories had screening guidelines (89.1%) and screening center (88.8%) for COVID-19. Item shortage was pervasive during COVID-19 pandemic: more than half of the respondents reported personal protective equipment (P.P.E.) shortage (68.5%), and mask shortage (62.0%). Food and drink shortage (14.1%) and shortages in other materials (13.0%) were relatively less common than shortages in P.P.E. and facial masks.

All countries/territories applied enforcement of social distancing (100.0%), personal hygiene (100.0%), and quarantine (100.0%). Isolation, (98.9%), school closure (97.8%), wearing facial mask (94.6% at hospital; 93.5% at mass transportation; 91.3% in mass gathering facilities), and facility closure (57.6% for mass transportation; 46.8% for hospital; 90.2% for mass gathering facilities) were commonly applied (Table 1). Majority of countries/territories implemented forced social distancing in large gatherings (76.1%), while social distancing in friends  
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(Forced; 20.0%, Recommended; 80%), and others (Forced; 46.2%, Recommended; 53.8%) were often recommended only rather than forced. The quarantine was more likely to be forced in most countries/territories (63.7%). Most countries/territories considered 2 weeks or more (75.8%) as an adequate quarantine duration. Isolation policy was more likely to be forced in most countries/territories (69.6%), and only one nation did not apply isolation (1.1%; Yemen). Most countries/territories considered more than 2 weeks (72.5%) as adequate isolation duration. For personal hand hygiene, more than half of countries/territories recommended washing hand with soap (50.5%), while some recommended using soap or sanitizer (29.7%), or sanitizer only (19.8%; Table 1).

Since many countries/territories started school closure (97.8%), most of them started alternative learning course through online class (83.5%), while only few of them prepared no alternative class (11.0%) or depended on education by parents (5.5%; Table 1).

### **Association between national economic status, NPIs and incidence and mortality of COVID-19**

The incidence and number of deaths due to COVID-19 were differed by national economic status: incidence and number of deaths were the highest in MHIC and the lowest in LIC (Table 2). The number of individuals who underwent screening tests was also associated with economic status: the number of tested individuals was the highest in HIC and the lowest in LIC (Table 2).

Majority of MLIC, MHIC, and HIC implemented mask policy at mass transportation, at hospital, and at mass gathering facilities, while relatively few countries/territories in LIC implemented mask policy at mass transportation and at mass gathering facilities (Table 2).

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The policy for hospital closure was heterogeneous by economic status (p-value < 0.050). Many MHIC and MLIC closed hospital regardless of COVID-19 patient visit (closed without visit; 64.7% and 54.2% respectively). However, most of LIC and HIC did not close hospital regardless of COVID-19 patient visit (not closed; 63.6% and 67.5% respectively). The quarantine policy also showed difference by economic level (p-value = 0.015). There was no significant difference in the implementation of isolation, but the place for isolation showed significant difference (p-value = 0.028).

Item shortage, especially lack of P.P.E. (p-value for trend = 0.042) and other goods (p-value for trend = 0.003) was more prominent in countries/territories with lower economic status, while mask deprivation was pervasive regardless of income groups (LIC 81.8%; MLIC 52.9%; MHIC 54.2%; HIC 65.0%). There was no significant difference at presence of central organization, screening protocol, social distancing, and personal hygiene.

#### **Association between national characteristics, preventive measures, sanitary item supply and incidence of COVID-19.**

Incidence of COVID-19 was higher in countries/territories with higher economic status: MLIC, MHIC and HIC showed significantly higher incidence compared to LIC (Figure 1). Countries/territories implementing social distancing policy of 1.5 m and 2 m or more showed higher incidence than countries/territories with social distancing policy of 1 m (Figure 1,  $\beta = 0.154$ , p-value = 0.024;  $\beta = 0.156$ , p-value = 0.034 at social distancing policy of 1.5 m;  $\beta = 0.155$ , p-value = 0.023;  $\beta = 0.167$ , p-value = 0.023 at social distancing policy of 2 m or more, Supplementary Table S3). Closing mass gathering facilities after COVID-19 patient visit was associated with increased cases compared to not closing (Figure 1,  $\beta = 0.193$ , p-value = 0.024;  $\beta = 0.212$ , p-

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value = 0.021, Supplementary Table S3). Quarantine policy at designated place was negatively associated with incidence (Figure 1,  $\beta = -0.124$ , p-value = 0.031;  $\beta = -0.128$ , p-value = 0.038, Supplementary Table S3), compared to home quarantine. Lack of mask supply was linked with increased incidence of COVID-19 (Figure 1,  $\beta = 0.176$ , p-value = 0.030;  $\beta = 0.229$ , p-value = 0.008, Supplementary Table S3).

### **Association between preventive measures, sanitary item supply and mortality of COVID-19.**

Deaths from COVID-19 was higher in countries/territories with higher economic status: MHIC and HIC showed significantly higher incidence compared to LIC (Figure 2). Quarantine and isolation at designated place were associated with lower percentages of deaths compared to home quarantine/isolation (Figure 2,  $\beta = -0.224$ , p-value = 0.019,  $\beta = -0.226$ , p-value = 0.018 at Quarantine;  $\beta = -0.445$ , p-value < 0.001,  $\beta = -0.458$ , p-value < 0.001 at Isolation, Supplementary Table S4). The isolation at home or designated place was also negatively associated with death compared to isolation at home (Figure 2,  $\beta = -0.189$ , p-value = 0.025;  $\beta = -0.190$ , p-value = 0.027, Supplementary Table S4).

## **Discussion**

In this study, we found that widely introduced NPIs in 92 countries/territories were negatively associated with incidence, number of deaths, and case fatality rate of COVID-19. Active testing resulted in an increase in the incidence and the number of deaths of COVID-19, but not in case fatality rate (Supplementary Figure S3, Supplementary Table S5). Countries/territories with higher income were more likely to report more cases and deaths but did not show a higher case fatality rate compared to countries/territories with lower income. Countries/territories with quarantine at

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designated place presented lower incidence, number of deaths, and case fatality rate compared to countries/territories with quarantine at home. Using sanitizer was negatively associated with confirmed cases but using soap did not decrease the incidence. Deprivation of mask was also associated with increased incidence.

These results are concurrent with previous studies that indicated the effectiveness of public health interventions against COVID-19<sup>5,7,8</sup>. It has been proven that physical distancing interventions, including quarantine<sup>23,24</sup> are effective in decreasing the incidence of infectious diseases. Before the initiation of the vaccination program, physical distancing was the most effective preventive intervention against emerging infectious diseases<sup>4,25</sup>. Our results reaffirm previous evidence that suggests the effect of NPIs during the pandemic of emerging infectious diseases.

The implementation of quarantine and isolation with prepared designated station were significantly associated with a reduction in incidence, the number of deaths, and case fatality rate. Quarantine and isolation strategy are not homogeneous across the countries/territories, with differences in duration, location, and detailed method of quarantine and isolation<sup>26</sup>. In our study, we compared home restrictions to staying in designated facilities, and the effect of inhibiting the spread of infection was significant when using designated facilities than when using a home. Despite some arguments that compulsory quarantine or isolation may do more harm than good<sup>27</sup>, our result claims that these policies can be very effective if they are along with designated place. Therefore, quarantine and isolation should be coupled with prepared designated place since these combinations are essential approach in dealing with contagious diseases like COVID-19.

The shortage of masks was one of NPIs which diversely presented among GBD regions (p-value < 0.009, Supplementary Table S6). Some regions had no lack

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of mask supply, nevertheless more than half of the countries/territories complained the shortage of masks, regardless of their economic status (Table 2). Although numerous countries/territories experienced mask shortages during the early stage of the pandemic, only few of them with central organizations for controlling COVID-19 have established strategies to expand their supply procurement capacities. For instance, the South Korean government initiated a ‘dynamic response system’, which includes demand planning and management, production capacity planning and expansion, and strategic production planning, which relieved supply shortages and prevented further propagation of COVID-19<sup>28</sup>. Due to the continuous lack of masks occurring in most countries/territories, the mask policy may not be enough to suppress the spread of disease. It could be interpreted from our results that albeit implementing the mask policy, the effect of it on the suppression of disease propagation was limited unless the mask shortage is not resolved. In addition, because the mask was not worn properly, implementing a mask policy may not have shown any effect on preventing the spread of infection. During the spread of COVID-19, people often reused masks and studies on reusing it were also frequently conducted<sup>29,30</sup>. However, a comprehensive review of mask wearing policy emphasizes that masks alone is not effective and citizens should be accompanied by other preventive measures such as adequate personal hygiene to see the effect of wearing a mask<sup>31,32</sup>. Therefore, in a global epidemic situation, it will be important to ensure that masks are sufficient and to guide them to wear masks correctly.

The COVID-19 virus transmission is primarily through the droplets in the air, which are usually generated from speaking, coughing, or sneezing<sup>33,34</sup>. The transmission is also possible via respiratory droplets, which refers to the droplets of 5–10  $\mu\text{m}$  or less<sup>35</sup>. Droplets with sizes of 1-5 mm can usually be dispersed up to 2 m

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from the origin of infection<sup>36</sup>. Since droplets of 30  $\mu\text{m}$  can spread up to 2.5 m away from the cougher, the respiratory droplets may even reach more than 2 m. The spread of the virus droplets can be prevented with a social distance of 2 m. But for the respiratory droplets, the social distancing of 2 m only is not sufficient<sup>37</sup>. In this case, wearing a mask is necessary since it can effectively diminish the generation of infectious aerosol from speaking or coughing. Therefore, the proper protection of a mask with a social distance of at least 2 m is reasonable to be regarded as effective protection<sup>38</sup>.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has recommended not only using soap and water but also using alcohol-based (at least 60%) sanitizer<sup>39</sup>. Hand sanitizer products with alcohol-based formulation can inactivate viruses and denature proteins<sup>40</sup>. While the effect of hand sanitizer in non-enveloped viruses differs by the type of alcohol used, both isopropyl alcohol and ethyl alcohol are effective against enveloped viruses<sup>41</sup>. Therefore, using alcohol-based sanitizer can effectively prevent the spread of COVID-19, since coronavirus is an enveloped virus<sup>42</sup>.

When the occurrence of infectious diseases is viewed as an interaction between the host and the pathogen, the spread of infectious diseases is determined by the infectious reservoir, transmission path, and the pathogen's infectivity<sup>43</sup>. Eventually, from this point of view, measures to prevent the spread of infectious diseases are divided into four patterns; the elimination of the reservoir (isolation, quarantine), the reduction of infectivity (treatment of patients), disconnection of transmission pathways (social distancing, school closure, facility closure), and protection of sensitive people (personal hand hygiene, vaccination, mask wearing). Several studies have argued that measures taken regardless of symptom onset, such as masks wearing, social distancing, and reducing operating hours of public

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transportation, are effective<sup>32,44</sup>. In contrast, quarantine and isolation, which considers the symptom development, are treated as the most controversial public health measure<sup>45</sup>. Given the serious deprivation of personal freedom in the name of public health, quarantine and isolation expose tensions between social interests to protect citizens' health and individual civil liberties, such as privacy and prohibition of discrimination. These coercive public health measures can be only justified if the benefit to the public is greater than the burden or harm that quarantine or isolation can inflict on individuals' freedoms. Therefore, these policies, should only be used if the disease is known to be contagious through extensive scientific research and should be limited to only people who are exposed to the disease.

What is noteworthy in the results of the study is that the elimination of the reservoir was the most effective preventive policy compared to other policies. This implies that the quarantine and isolation may be a legitimate option rather than coercive measure. This findings are in line with other previous studies claims that screening and examining people with symptoms faster, and isolate those with symptoms is more important to than to implement meaningless distancing policies<sup>46,47</sup>. For effective quarantine and isolation, it is important to treat the symptomatic group, the likely group to be infected, and the unexposed group differently. Therefore, faster examination of symptoms and appropriate measures for those who show symptoms should be taken with more emphasis rather than measures to alleviate COVID-19 regardless of symptom onset. An example of a policy that prioritizes presence or risk of symptoms or can be suggested in the mask policy. Howard et al. had argued that a limited number of masks should be provided first to those classified as risk groups showing symptoms<sup>44</sup>. These policies considering symptoms will be

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very effective in the time of the spread of infectious diseases because mask shortages are frequently repeated.

Our study provides a comprehensive understanding of factors that are related to the incidence rate and the number of deaths of COVID-19 by analyzing data from 92 countries/territories. This is one of few studies that analyzed the association between multiple factors, including national characteristics, preventive policy implementation, supply shortages, and disease propagation during the current pandemic. Moreover, this policy is meaningful in that it reviewed the impact of NPIs worldwide before vaccination was widely implemented, and how it was effective to respond initially during the pandemic crisis.

However, our study has several limitations. First, as this study utilized a multivariate regression model for analyzing effects, reverse causation might have taken place. For instance, social distance depth and closure of mass gathering were positively associated with incidence rate. This association could be explained by reverse causation: countries/territories with an increasing number of confirmed cases are more likely to implement stronger policies on social distancing and facility closure.

Moreover, the effect we have estimated might not fully represent the trend of changing COVID-19 infections status, since numerous variants have emerged, which show different patterns of transmission and fatality from the original pathogen<sup>48</sup>. As behaviors of new variants are not fully understood, careful interpretation of our results is needed. Not only the variants, but also sometimes different non-pharmaceutical interventions were applied within a country, and the interventions also changed over time. Further studies with more detailed data would help to reveal the relationship between non-pharmaceutical interventions and COVID-19.

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Finally, since low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) had difficulty in managing the COVID-19 pandemic due to their lower resilience and capability for governance<sup>49</sup>, estimated number of cases and death cases in LMICs might not be accurate. Our results show that countries/territories with higher income and higher number of tests is positively associated with incidence and number of deaths, but not the case fatality rate. This phenomenon could be explained by LMICs' lack of capability to test and cure COVID-19 patients, as the healthcare system of LMICs lacked the capability to withstand the current pandemic<sup>50</sup>. As they were not able to prioritize testing, quarantining, and curing suspected and confirmed COVID-19 patients, incidence rate estimated from LMICs are not likely to fully represent real-world status of COVID-19 infection.

## **Conclusion**

Our survey on 92 countries/territories provided comprehensive understanding on implementation of preventive strategies against COVID-19 and their effect on incidence and the number of deaths of COVID-19. Our results from collaborative network suggested that NPIs effectively decrease incidence and the number of deaths of COVID-19, highlighting the importance of NPI implementation during earlier stage of novel infectious disease. Further studies on efficacy of NPIs against new variants of COVID-19 would provide better understanding on appropriate preventive strategy against emerging variants.

## **Declarations**

### **Author contributions**

SHH, and JIS designed this study. SHH, and JIS collected the data, and SHP, KHK performed the statistical analysis. SHP, SHH, KHK and JIS wrote the first draft of the

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manuscript. All authors had full access to all the study data. All authors reviewed, wrote, and approved the final version. The corresponding authors had final responsibility for the decision to submit for publication. ICRN collaborators are co-author for this article.

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### Disclosures

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
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
**Figure 1. Association between preventive measures, sanitary item supply and number of confirmed COVID-19 cases.**

Short-term effect and Long-term effect represent confirmed COVID-19 cases after 14 days and 28 days from intervention implementation, respectively. Detailed values are described in Supplementary Table S3.



**Figure 2. Association between preventive measures, sanitary item supply and mortality of COVID-19.**

Short-term effect and Long-term effect represent confirmed COVID-19 cases after 14 days and 28 days from intervention implementation, respectively. Detailed values are described in Supplementary Table S4.



**Table 1. General characteristics of countries and territories included in the survey**

	Total	
	N/mean	(%)/sd
<b>Total (n=92)</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>(100)</b>
<b>Log(Case) (n=92)*</b>		
14 days after index date	5.054	1.056
28 days after index date	5.092	1.055
<b>Log(Death) (n=91)*</b>		
14 days after index date	3.269	1.137
28 days after index date	3.310	1.138
<b>Log(Test) (n=63)*</b>		
14 days after index date	6.526	0.729
28 days after index date	6.561	0.752
<b>Log(Population) (n=92)</b>	7.131	0.704
<b>Income (n=92)</b>		
Low Income	11	(12.0)
Middle Low Income	17	(18.5)
Middle High Income	24	(26.1)
High Income	40	(43.5)
<b>GBD regions (n=92)</b>		
Central Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia	17	(18.5)
Central Asia	4	(4.3)

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Central Europe	11	(12.0)
Eastern Europe	2	(2.2)
High Income	24	(26.1)
Australasia	1	(1.1)
High-income Asia Pacific	4	(4.3)
High-income North America	2	(2.2)
Southern Latin America	1	(1.1)
Western Europe	16	(16.3)
Latin America and Caribbean	8	(8.7)
Andean Latin America	1	(1.1)
Caribbean	2	(2.2)
Central Latin America	3	(3.3)
Tropical Latin America	2	(2.2)
North Africa and Middle East	15	(16.3)
North Africa and Middle East	15	(16.3)
South Asia	3	(3.3)
South Asia	3	(3.3)
Sub-Saharan Africa	17	(18.5)
Central Sub-Saharan Africa	1	(1.1)
Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa	5	(5.4)
Southern Sub-Saharan Africa	2	(2.2)
Western Sub-Saharan Africa	9	(9.8)
Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Oceania	8	(8.7)
East Asia	3	(3.3)
Southeast Asia	5	(5.4)
Oceania	0	(0.0)

\* Index date means the date when each survey results were received. Index dates are dispersed between 2020.12.26. to 2021.02.05.

**Table 2. Association between Income and other factors**

	Total		Low-Income		Middle-Low-Income		Middle-High-Income		High-Income		p-value*	p for trend**
	N or (%) or mean	(%) or sd	N or (%) or mean	(%) or sd	N or (%) or mean	(%) or sd	N or (%) or mean	(%) or sd	N or (%) or mean	(%) or sd		
<b>Total (n=92)</b>	92	(100)	11	(12.0)	17	(18.5)	24	(26.1)	40	(43.5)		
<b>Log(Case)</b>												
<b>(n=92) *</b>												
14 days after index date	5.054	1.056	3.886	0.633	5.023	0.869	5.364	0.739	5.201	1.184	<0.001	0.001
28 days after index date	5.072	1.055	3.931	0.637	5.061	0.859	5.409	0.721	5.236	1.192	<0.001	0.001
<b>Log(Death)</b>												
<b>(n=91) *</b>												
14 days after index date	3.268	1.136	2.306	0.767	3.147	1.089	3.588	0.981	3.397	0.467	0.006	0.014
28 days after index date	3.310	1.137	2.342	0.771	3.188	1.089	3.631	0.968	3.437	0.485	0.006	0.011
<b>Log(Case Fatality rate)</b>												
<b>(n= 91) *</b>												
14 days after index date	-	0.384	-	0.469	-	0.374	-	0.339	-	0.371	0.135	0.123
28 days after index date	-	0.387	-	0.472	-	0.392	-	0.339	-	0.374	0.185	0.164

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index date	1.820	1.588	1.872	1.778	1.890							
<b>Log(Test)</b> <b>(n=63) *</b>												
14 days after index date	6.526	0.729	5.811	0.656	6.463	0.783	6.356	0.666	6.680	0.732	0.093	<b>0.022</b>
28 days after index date	6.562	0.752	5.536	0.690	6.482	0.785	6.458	0.643	6.741	0.742	<b>0.033</b>	<b>0.008</b>
<b>Log(Population)</b> <b>(n=92)</b>	7.131	0.704	7.067	0.500	7.438	0.803	7.134	0.727	7.016	0.678	0.300	0.251
<b>Organization</b> <b>(n=92)</b>												
Central Organization	83	(90.2)	9	(81.8)	16	(94.1)	20	(83.3)	38	(95.0)	0.286	0.322
<b>Screening</b> <b>(n=92)</b>												
Screening Guideline	82	(89.1)	10	(90.9)	16	(94.1)	20	(83.3)	36	(90.0)	0.810	0.876
Screening Center	81	(88.8)	10	(90.9)	16	(94.1)	20	(83.3)	35	(87.5)	0.777	0.653
<b>Mask (n=92)</b>												
Mask place												
Mass Transportation	86	(93.5)	8	(72.7)	17	(100.0)	24	(100.0)	37	(92.5)	<b>0.022</b>	0.234
Hospital(pat ient)	87	(94.6)	9	(81.8)	17	(100.0)	24	(100.0)	37	(92.5)	0.106	0.670
Mass Gathering Facilities	84	(91.3)	7	(63.6)	16	(94.1)	24	(100.0)	37	(92.5)	<b>0.009</b>	<b>0.035</b>
Mask type in General											0.177	0.828
No Guideline	44	(47.8)	7	(63.6)	6	(35.3)	10	(41.7)	20	(52.5)		
Cloth	9	(9.8)	1	(9.1)	3	(17.6)	3	(12.5)	2	(5.0)		
Dental	29	(31.5)	2	(18.2)	4	(23.5)	9	(37.5)	14	(35.0)		
FFP1	1	(1.1)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	1	(2.5)		
FFP2	7	(7.6)	1	(9.1)	4	(23.5)	2	(8.3)	0	(0.0)		
FFP3	2	(2.2)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	2	(5.0)		
Mask for Healthcare worker ε											0.264	0.217
No Guideline	31	(33.7)	5	(45.5)	3	(17.6)	8	(33.3)	14	(37.5)		
Cloth	6	(6.5)	1	(9.1)	2	(11.8)	1	(4.2)	2	(5.0)		
Dental	16	(17.4)	0	(0.0)	1	(5.9)	6	(25.0)	9	(22.5)		
FFP1	11	(12.0)	1	(9.1)	2	(11.8)	2	(8.3)	6	(15.0)		
FFP2	4	(4.3)	0	(0.0)	3	(17.6)	0	(0.0)	1	(2.5)		
FFP3	24	(26.1)	4	(36.4)	6	(35.3)	7	(29.2)	7	(17.5)		
<b>Social Distance</b>												
Social Distance Promote (n=21)	92	(100.0)	11	(100.0)	17	(100.0)	24	(100.0)	40	(100.0)	NA	NA
Social Distance Type Friends (n=90)											0.979	0.898
Recommended	72	(80.0)	7	(77.8)	14	(82.4)	20	(83.3)	31	(77.5)		
Forced	18	(20.0)	2	(22.2)	3	(17.6)	4	(16.7)	9	(22.5)		
Large Gatherings											0.459	1.000

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(n=92)											
Recommended	22 (23.9)	3 (27.3)	5 (29.4)	3 (12.5)	11 (27.5)						
Forced	70 (76.1)	8 (72.7)	12 (70.6)	21 (87.5)	29 (72.5)						
Others										0.116	0.401
(n=39)											
Recommended	21 (53.8)	6 (75.0)	4 (66.7)	3 (25.0)	8 (61.5)						
Forced	18 (46.2)	2 (25.0)	2 (33.3)	9 (75.0)	5 (38.5)						
Social distance										0.525	0.622
Depth (n=91)											
1m	18 (19.8)	3 (27.3)	5 (31.3)	3 (12.5)	7 (17.5)						
1.5m	15 (16.5)	0 (0.0)	3 (18.8)	4 (16.7)	8 (20.0)						
2m or more	58 (63.7)	8 (72.7)	8 (50.0)	17 (70.8)	25 (62.5)						
<b>School Close</b> $\epsilon\epsilon$											
School Stop	90 (97.8)	11 (100.0)	17 (100.0)	24 (100.0)	38 (95.0)					0.771	0.340
School Alternative										<b>0.029</b>	<b>0.047</b>
(n=91)											
No											
Online/Offline class	10 (11.0)	2 (18.2)	0 (0.0)	3 (12.5)	5 (12.8)						
Online class	76 (83.5)	6 (54.5)	16 (94.1)	21 (87.5)	33 (84.6)						
Education by parents	5 (5.5)	3 (27.3)	1 (5.9)	0 (0.0)	1 (2.6)						
<b>Facility Close</b>											
(n=92)											
Closed Mass Transportation										0.203	0.478
Not Closed	39 (42.4)	5 (45.5)	6 (35.3)	7 (29.2)	21 (52.5)						
After COVID patient Visit	4 (4.3)	0 (0.0)	2 (11.8)	2 (8.3)	0 (0.0)						
Without Visit	49 (53.3)	6 (54.5)	9 (52.9)	15 (62.5)	19 (47.5)						
Closed Hospital										<b>0.050</b>	0.175
Not Closed	49 (53.3)	7 (63.6)	5 (29.4)	10 (41.7)	27 (67.5)						
After COVID patient Visit	2 (2.2)	0 (0.0)	1 (5.9)	1 (4.2)	0 (0.0)						
Without Visit	41 (44.6)	4 (36.4)	11 (64.7)	13 (54.2)	13 (32.5)						
Closed Mass Gathering Facilities										0.386	0.652
Not Closed	9 (9.8)	3 (27.3)	1 (5.9)	1 (4.2)	4 (10.0)						
After COVID patient Visit	15 (16.3)	0 (0.0)	4 (23.5)	4 (16.7)	7 (17.5)						
Without Visit	68 (73.9)	8 (72.7)	12 (70.6)	19 (79.2)	29 (72.5)						
<b>Quarantine and Isolation</b>											
Quarantine Rules (n=91)										<b>0.015</b>	<b>0.027</b>
No Rules	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)						
Recommend	21 (23.1)	5 (45.5)	5 (29.4)	2 (8.3)	9 (23.1)						

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ed													
ed and Forced	Recommend	12 (13.2)	2 (18.2)	5 (29.4)	3 (12.5)	2 (5.1)							
	Forced	58 (63.7)	4 (36.4)	7 (41.2)	19 (79.2)	28 (71.8)							
	Quarantine						0.576	0.640					
	Duration (n=91)												
	1 week	22 (24.2)	3 (30.0)	3 (17.6)	4 (16.7)	12 (30.0)							
	2 weeks or more	69 (75.8)	7 (70.0)	14 (82.4)	20 (83.3)	28 (70.0)							
	Quarantine						0.583	0.141					
	Place (n=91)												
	Home	32 (35.2)	3 (30.0)	3 (17.6)	8 (33.3)	17 (45.0)							
	Designated	18 (19.8)	2 (20.0)	5 (29.4)	4 (16.7)	7 (17.5)							
	Place‡												
	Home, Designated Place	41 (45.1)	5 (50.0)	9 (52.9)	12 (50.0)	15 (37.5)							
	Isolation Rules (n=92)						0.354	0.170					
	No Rules	1 (1.1)	1 (9.1)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)							
	Recommend	17 (18.5)	3 (27.3)	3 (17.6)	3 (12.5)	8 (20.0)							
	ed and Forced	10 (10.9)	1 (9.1)	4 (23.5)	2 (8.3)	3 (7.5)							
	Forced	64 (69.6)	6 (54.5)	10 (58.8)	19 (79.2)	29 (72.5)							
	Isolation						0.716	1.000					
	Duration (n=91)												
	1 week	25 (27.5)	4 (36.4)	4 (23.5)	5 (20.8)	12 (30.8)							
	2 weeks or more	66 (72.5)	7 (63.6)	13 (76.5)	19 (79.2)	27 (69.2)							
	Isolation Place (n=91)						<b>0.028</b>	<b>0.206</b>					
	Home	24 (26.4)	0 (0.0)	4 (23.5)	4 (16.7)	16 (40.0)							
	Designated	23 (25.3)	5 (50.0)	7 (41.2)	5 (20.8)	6 (15.0)							
	Place‡												
	Home, Designated Place	44 (48.4)	5 (50.0)	6 (35.3)	15 (62.5)	18 (45.0)							
	<b>Personal Hygiene</b>												
	Hand hygiene (n=92)	92 (100.0)	11 (100.0)	17 (100.0)	24 (100.0)	39 (100.0)	NA	NA					
	Hand hygiene type (n=91)						0.804	1.000					
	Soap	46 (50.5)	5 (50.0)	9 (52.9)	14 (58.3)	18 (45.0)							
	Sanitizer	18 (19.8)	1 (10.0)	2 (11.8)	5 (20.8)	10 (25.0)							
	Soap or Sanitizer	27 (29.7)	4 (40.0)	6 (35.3)	5 (20.8)	12 (30.0)							
	<b>Item Shortage (n=92)</b>												
	Mask	57 (62.0)	9 (81.8)	9 (52.9)	13 (54.2)	26 (65.0)	0.370	0.762					
	P.P.E.	63 (68.5)	9 (81.8)	15 (88.2)	15 (62.5)	24 (60.0)	0.130	<b>0.042</b>					
	Food and Drink	13 (14.1)	4 (36.4)	1 (5.9)	5 (20.8)	3 (7.5)	0.056	0.088					
	Other	12 (13.0)	5 (45.5)	2 (11.8)	3 (12.5)	2 (5.0)	<b>0.009</b>	<b>0.003</b>					

\* Index date means the date when survey were received. Index dates are dispersed between 2020.12.26. to 2021.02.05.

\* Kruskal wallis test or Fisher's exact test were conducted

\*\* Jockheere's trend test or Linear by linear method were conducted.

‡ Home is not considered as Designated place.

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ε When asked if there were any other guidelines for wearing a mask other than the above-mentioned places (Mass transportation, hospital, mass gathering facilities), the recommendation of a mask to be worn in general cases was used instead.

εε There were some cases where online education and education by parents both exist and in this case, it was considered an online class.