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Isolation thresholds for curbing SARS-CoV-2 resurgence

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21 **Summary**

22 Self-instigated isolation is heavily relied on to curb SARS-CoV-2 transmission. Accounting for
23 uncertainty in the latent and prepatent periods, as well as the proportion of infections that remain
24 asymptomatic, the limits of this intervention at different phases of infection resurgence are
25 estimated. We show that by October, SARS-CoV-2 transmission rates in England had already begun
26 exceeding levels that could be interrupted using this intervention alone, lending support to the
27 second national lockdown on November 5th.

28

29 **Main text**

30 A general population lockdown occurred in England on 23rd March 2020 to reduce SARS-CoV-2
31 transmission. This drastic intervention successfully inhibited disease spread by rapidly depleting the
32 opportunities for transmission events between infected and susceptible people remaining in general
33 circulation [1].

34 Subsequent to easing out of lockdown from July 4th 2020, infections resurged and England entered
35 its second national lockdown on November 5th 2020. The return of millions of (largely susceptible)
36 people to general circulation underlies the epidemic re-entering an exponential growth phase.

37 However, also culpable in the current public health emergency is the failure of interventions during
38 the period following lockdown's release.

39 Contact tracing endeavours to reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission have thus far proven ineffective in
40 England and so isolation is primarily instigated by those responding to symptoms' development in
41 themselves or their close associations [2]. The mechanism by which this reactive isolation operates is
42 importantly distinct from pre-emptive mass quarantine (lockdown). Symptoms-prompted, reactive
43 isolation only applies to individuals who are infected (c.f. the total population), and, more

44 specifically, to those who register symptoms. Hence infectious individuals who have not yet
45 experienced symptoms, or who will never experience them, are missed.

46 The mathematical epidemiology of reactive isolation is fairly nascent yet critical in the context of the
47 current epidemic. Here, we generate estimates for reactive isolation thresholds that account for
48 uncertainties in the latent and pre-patent period of infection as well as in the proportion of infected
49 individuals that register and respond appropriately to symptoms.

50

51 *Mathematical derivation of reactive self-isolation*

52 Beginning with the simplest derivation for physical isolation: the pre-emptive quarantine threshold
53 proportion (Q) is $Q > (1 - (1/R))$ where ' R ' is the reproduction number [3]. For reactive isolation (Q^*),
54 this threshold is inflated to account for the leaked infections occurring because of the delay between
55 becoming infectious and first exhibiting symptoms: $Q^* > (1 - (1/R)) \times [((g-1)/g)^{-(p-l)}]$. Respectively,
56 p and l are the prepatent and latent period of infection (in days), and g is the mean duration of
57 infectiousness (12 days on average [4]). If symptoms typically develop at the same time as an
58 individual becomes infectious, the square-bracket component equals one and the original threshold
59 (Q) is regained. A further modification can be made to account for the proportion of infections that
60 never give rise to symptoms (denoted ' a '): $Q^{**} > (1/(1 - a)) \times (1 - (1/R)) \times [((g-1)/g)^{-(p-l)}]$. For
61 example, if half of infections remained asymptomatic, the proportion of symptomatic infections that
62 need to be isolated to achieve an equivalent impact must be doubled. As with those who never
63 develop symptoms, individuals who fail to respond appropriately to developing symptoms – early
64 indication is that this is not a negligible proportion [5] – will continue to contribute to transmission,
65 so ' a ' could be considered a composite of these two proportions.

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
68 *Accounting for uncertainty in parametrization*

69 The latent and prepatent periods are quite variable for COVID-19 patients. Instead of single point
70 estimates for these parameters, collated data form a distribution of reported times. The latent
71 period is drawn at random from a Weibull distribution and then subtracted from the random draw
72 from a second Weibull distribution depicting the range of reported prepatent periods. Fig 1A
73 illustrates these distributions as informed by the clinical and epidemiological literature [6-8]. Also
74 shown is the distribution of times between development of infectiousness and symptoms onset as
75 fitted to 10,000 random draws. The distributions of prepatent and latent periods overlap so to avoid
76 the possibility of symptoms developing prior to infectiousness, random draws whereby
77 infectiousness trailed the day of symptoms onset were removed and resampled. 10,000 random
78 draws were then made from this newly derived distribution of the delay between infectiousness and
79 symptoms, and the isolation threshold (Q^{**}) was estimated for a range of R values and a range of
80 asymptomatic proportions (Python code: <https://github.com/lwyakob/COVIDquarantine>).

81

82 *Isolation thresholds accounting for uncertainty*

83 Fig 1B shows the mean isolation threshold required to control SARS-CoV-2 accounting for the range
84 of estimates for the prepatent and latent periods. The value for R is dynamic, varying according to
85 current intervention effectiveness and population-level susceptibility, so the isolation threshold is
86 shown for a range of plausible R values. The form of the relationship between Q^* and R shows an
87 isolation threshold that increases asymptotically with reproduction number. However, allowing for
88 uncertainty in prepatent and latent periods results in a wide 95% prediction interval. The
89 interpretation is that when accounting for both the uncertainty in estimating the population mean,
90 plus the random variation of the individual values, reactive isolation cannot interrupt transmission
91 (at least 95 times out of 100) if R already exceeds a value of ~ 2.3 .



92

93 Figure 1. A) Dashed lines indicate distributions for the latent (blue, Weibull($\alpha=4$, $\beta=2$)) and prepatent
94 period (red, Weibull($\alpha=6$, $\beta=3$)) as derived from the COVID-19 literature [6-8]. The solid line is the
95 resulting distribution for the time difference between the two from which 10,000 random draws
96 were made (inset). B) The isolation threshold (Q^*) as calculated for the 10,000 random draws along
97 with the mean (white line) and 95% predictive interval (dashed lines). The blue cross indicates the
98 theoretical maximum R number for which reactive isolation may interrupt transmission. C) The
99 maximum asymptomatic proportion of COVID-19 infections that permits transmission interruption
100 by reactive isolation for a range of R values (using the expression for Q^*). The red boxes illustrate
101 estimates for England as of October 2020 [9, 10].

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104 Reactive isolation is further limited when asymptomatic infections comprise a non-negligible
105 proportion (alternatively, when those exhibiting symptoms fail to isolate themselves to some
106 degree). Fig 1C shows the theoretical limits of the proportion of infections that can be asymptomatic
107 and yet SARS-CoV-2 transmission interrupted through isolating symptomatic individuals (using the
108 Q^{**} expression). Superimposed on this trade-off between the reproduction number and the
109 isolation threshold are estimates for R in England as of October 2020 [10], and the 95% confidence
110 and predictive intervals for the proportion of infections that remain asymptomatic as generated by a
111 living systematic review [9]. Respectively, by October 30% and 60% of these parameter spaces were
112 already beyond the level at which reactive isolation can be sufficient to interrupt transmission (i.e.,
113 these regions fall to the right of the hatched arc in Fig 1C).

114

115 *Limitations and future work*

116 One limitation of the current analysis is the consideration of transmission and control at the
117 population level rather than stratified by various risk factors. To address this, results were generated
118 for a full range of R values. It is important to note that stratification would impact the derivation of R
119 but not the population-level isolation thresholds calculated for a given R value [11]. Another
120 limitation is the implicit assumption that, in the absence of intervention, asymptotically infected
121 individuals contribute to onwards transmission as much as symptomatically infected individuals. It is
122 unclear how questionable this assumption is but clinical studies indicate that asymptomatic and
123 symptomatic individuals have similar viral loads [12]. Should evidence arise of their differential
124 contributions to transmission, the model and code associated with this study can be modified easily
125 to account for this feature.

126 Even during pre-emptive quarantine (i.e., lockdown) the formulae described here continue to apply
127 to those who remain in general circulation (e.g., essential personnel). Future work should look at
128 how isolation thresholds can be estimated to inform this intervention combination, among others.

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