

1 Title: Role of local actors in WASH (water, sanitation and
2 hygiene) during disaster recovery: Policy implications from
3 evidence in Odisha, India

4

5 **Authors:** Sneha Krishnan¹, John Twigg²

6 ¹London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (sneha.krishnan@lshtm.ac.uk)

7 ²University College London (j.twigg@ucl.ac.uk)

8 **Abstract**

9 There is a paucity of empirical insights on how existing policies in disaster recovery and water,
10 sanitation and hygiene (WASH) play out during disaster recovery in the Global South. This
11 paper addresses this critical gap using the case study of 2013 Cyclone Phailin in Odisha. The
12 data was collected through participatory and learning action tools and semi-structured
13 interviews with key informants. This study found pervasive exclusion of women and local
14 actors from recovery decision-making. The policies and guidance at national and subnational
15 level lacked clear emphases on roles and responsibilities of the local governments, and did
16 not emphasise their role in setting recovery objectives and priorities. We conclude that
17 existing policies should emphasise immediate as well as longer-term WASH needs, adopt a
18 multi-hazard perspective in preparedness and WASH policies, and feature WASH during
19 recovery in the existing manuals, policies and programmes.

20

21 **Keywords:** policy analysis, disaster recovery, water, sanitation and hygiene

22 **Total words:** 7484

23 **1. Introduction**

24 Strengthening of national and local capacities for disaster risk management is a foundational
25 theme within the movement toward disaster risk reduction, articulated strongly within the
26 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (UNISDR, 2015). The strategic push
27 in disaster recovery has leaned towards heavy reliance on top-down government-centric
28 solutions and capacity enhancement of state political and administrative capacities and
29 resources (Oxley, 2013). Yet, the practical aspects, the “how-to” engage and empower local
30 actors and empower women, are areas that humanitarian agencies continue to struggle while
31 designing recovery plans.

32

33 The impact of disasters on progress of water supply, sanitation development, subsequent
34 policy revisions and role of local actors during recovery is an under-researched area. The role
35 of local actors, including the position of women and other vulnerable groups during recovery,
36 is an issue under-exposed in literature. This paper provides an on-the-ground assessment of
37 this phenomenon, which is a potentially valuable contribution to the literature. It elaborates
38 on how local actors, including local governments, engage and lead disaster recovery
39 operations, and participate in water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) programmes. It also
40 investigates women's roles during recovery, and their participation in WASH during recovery.
41 This article addresses this knowledge gap on how such relevant policies play out in on the
42 ground processes of disaster recovery using empirical evidence. The aim of this research is to
43 contribute to insights about effective disaster recovery in the global South by undertaking a
44 case study research of disaster recovery in Odisha, India.

45 The article asks, *"How do existing policies in water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and*
46 *disaster management enable local actors and women to take action during recovery?*
47 *Furthermore, how can these policies be strengthened and translated into practice effectively?"*

48 This paper will explore approaches that include local actors, organisations and women in
49 sustaining WASH behaviour change using a case study from 2013 Cyclone Phailin in Odisha,
50 India. Cyclone Phailin and subsequent floods in 2013 had affected 12 million people directly
51 or indirectly (Dash, 2013). To achieve the research aim, the following steps were taken: a)
52 developing a guiding analytical framework through review of literature; b) undertaking a case
53 study of 2013 Cyclone Phailin in Odisha using mixed methods and c) analysing and discussing
54 empirical findings in light of existing policies and drawing conclusions for wider implications.

55

56 **2. Background and context**

57 This section reviews two bodies of literature – disaster recovery studies and on post-disaster
58 WASH – to provide analytical guidance for the empirical research.

59 The current structure of the humanitarian aid system has few incentives for engaging local
60 actors and organisations. Instead the humanitarian sector’s power dynamics, culture,
61 financing and incentive structures create compelling reasons to remain closed and centralised
62 and averse to innovation, learning and transformation (Bennett, 2016). Spiegel (2017) calls
63 for a major revision of humanitarian leadership and coordination of humanitarian
64 emergencies, aiming for “minimal, efficient, and context-specific coordination, with fewer
65 processes and meetings, that leads to differentiated and effective responses and saves lives”
66 (p.17). There have been numerous studies evaluating government-NGO coordination, NGO-
67 NGO coordination, cluster approaches and consortia models for coordination (Clarke &
68 Campbell, 2018; Krishnan, 2017; Raju & Becker, 2013). During recovery from the Indian Ocean
69 Tsunami, engaging local actors was found to be challenging and time consuming, yet vital for
70 removing the confusion stemming from the rush of aid organizations – not least international
71 NGOs – to the affected areas, stepping on each other’s toes with lack of coordination
72 (Christoplos, 2006; Telford et al., 2006). Research from Pakistan shows how incentivizing from
73 donor organisations has led to break-down of community-driven action because cultural
74 expectations that the community will have near-exclusive local control over decision-making
75 and resource allocation are weighted against top-down decisions over distribution and
76 entitlement, thereby eroding the legitimacy and accountability of local organisations (Bano,
77 2012).

78

79 Globally, studies have highlighted the role of local actors and social networks in the recovery
80 process as either an enabling aspect or reinforcing barriers to vulnerable groups (Aldrich,
81 2011; Rahill et al., 2014). Twigg & Mosel (2017) draw attention towards emergence –

82 spontaneous responses by self-organising, voluntary groups and individuals – who undertake
83 search and rescue, transport and distribute relief supplies, and provide food and drink to
84 victims and emergency workers. These emergent groups form part of the social capital, and
85 have a large role to play during recovery. In coastal Andhra Pradesh, Boshier (2005) found
86 that the ‘lower’ castes being the most marginalised, powerless and poorest members
87 attempted to address their marginalisation by accessing socio-economic resources such as
88 social networks – civil society institutions such as NGOs, CBOs and informal kinship networks
89 – to increase their resilience to frequent small-scale crises. In coastal West Bengal, local
90 networks along with community leaders and local administration played an important role in
91 reducing risk during and after cyclones, and played a larger role in social reconstruction
92 processes (Misra et al., 2017). After cyclone Aila in 2009, youth club members, women’s self-
93 help groups (SHGs), farmers’ cooperatives, fishermen groups, and other business
94 cooperatives consisting of shop owners and businessmen provided common networks, thus
95 enhancing the social capital (Sanyal & Routray, 2016).

96

97 Women are often categorised as individuals vulnerable to disasters (McEntire, 2012),
98 although evidence from post-tsunami Eastern Sri Lanka indicates that pre-existing gender
99 relationships, entitlements, networks with local NGOs, and relationships with local authorities
100 distributing post-disaster aid have positively influenced gendered recovery (Thurnheer, 2009).
101 Sanyal and Routray (2016) found that women, acting as part of self-help groups (SHGs), were
102 instrumental in empowering each other, bringing other women in the community closer,
103 aiding cash flow with bank linkages and internal lending, as well as information flow through
104 their networks. A study examining the outcomes of community-led approaches in post-
105 tsunami Aceh found that livelihood interventions needed to fit with clearly identifiable local
106 networks, structures and practices if they hoped to succeed, as projects that did not build on
107 local networks tended to fall over when the NGO staff withdrew (McCarthy, 2014). Sultana

108 (2010) draws from an analysis in Bangladesh of the gendered dynamics of floods and disasters,
109 as well as of interventions, to demonstrate the differential and gendered implications of both
110 water-related hazards and the structural interventions that were envisioned to address the
111 hazards. Using evidence from multiple disasters that affect Odisha, Ray-Bennett (2009b)
112 found that women demonstrated their individual and collective agencies in order to meet
113 their cultural and biological needs under severe crisis. The idea and practice of women's
114 empowerment in the Indian context, has degenerated into a set of largely apolitical,
115 technocratic, and narrow interventions that create nothing like the radical transformation
116 envisaged by early women's movement leaders (Batliwala, 2007). Challenging the specific
117 gendered meaning, Batliwala (2007) proposes women's empowerment as the transformation
118 of the relations of power between men and women, within and across social categories of
119 various kinds.

120

121 Despite operational efforts, the evidence of roles played by local actors and networks for
122 effective WASH behaviour change during recovery is scant. It is important to assess the extent
123 to which existing policies cater to the contextual and programming challenges of recovery,
124 including demographic changes, returning populations, integration of displaced communities
125 with host communities and resettlement to safer locations (Wisner & Adams, 2002). We refer
126 to the "humanitarian aid system", which includes donor organizations like UK AID and the
127 European Commission's Humanitarian Affairs and Civil Protection Department (ECHO);
128 international NGOs like Oxfam, Christian Aid and Save the Children; national government
129 agencies like Public Health Engineering, Water Resources, Sanitation, Rural Development,
130 Revenue and Disaster Management, Land Resettlement and Rehabilitation that are involved
131 in different aspects of water, sanitation and disaster management; subnational NGOs like
132 Society for Leprosy Amelioration & Rehabilitation (SOLAR) in Puri, United Artists' Association


133 (UAA) in Ganjam and UNNAYAN in Balasore. The consortium approach in Odisha, and
134 challenges with inter-agency coordination, have been described elsewhere (Krishnan, 2017).

135 **3. Methods**

136 **3.1 Sampling strategy**

137 Oxfam's Cyclone Phailin and flood response in Odisha was used to gain a critical perspective
138 on the differences in WASH practices and recovery processes across different villages, and the
139 impact of agency support on recovery. Government's programmes and policies in Odisha were
140 analysed in light of empirical findings from Puri and Balasore districts, which were affected by
141 cyclone and floods respectively during the cyclone (See Figure 1).

Odisha Study Map



142

143 *Figure 1: Study map of districts affected by Cyclone Phailin and floods in 2013 – Puri, Ganjam and Balasore, which*
144 *were also Oxfam's intervention areas*

145

146 Data was collected from 13 villages – 8 from Puri and 5 from Balasore, where Oxfam had
147 intervened. One of the villages in Balasore – Chandanamkhana – was also affected by erosion,
148 as the river washed away the homestead land and farmland in the village. Data collection in
149 these villages reflected the changing dynamics in the response programme, and responded to
150 the emerging community needs. It followed an iterative and inductive approach.

151 **3.2 Data collection tools and analysis**

152 The first author worked in Puri from October 2013 – March 2014 with Oxfam and visited
153 Balasore in March 2014, 6 months after floods had affected the district. The data gathered
154 and reported in this article were collected using participatory learning and action (PLA) tools
155 and semi-structured interviews with key informants. PLA tools included generating actor
156 maps, undertaking transect walks and focus group discussions (FGDs) (Mikkelsen 2005 p.63).
157 Separate FGDs were held with women, men and children, and with elderly or disabled
158 members, where appropriate and feasible. 43 group discussions were held in 10 sites. An
159 actor map was generated after these discussions, regarding the sources of information and
160 networks that the respondents relied upon. 10 semi-structured interviews were held with
161 adult females in the households and 36 interviews were conducted with key informants such
162 as NGO staff, village leaders, panchayat (local government) officials, government officers, and
163 schoolteachers. The first author conducted the interviews in Odia, the local language and
164 recorded audio with permission from the respondents. She undertook manual transcription,
165 coding and analysed the data reported here. She analysed interview data and field notes using
166 mindmaps and a Framework approach (Gale et al., 2013). The Framework method is a
167 systematic and flexible approach to analysing qualitative data, especially for inductive,
168 thematic analysis of semi-structured interview transcripts, and involves rigour, reflexivity and
169 ensures quality. Following this approach, the first author manually coded emerging themes,
170 and then mapped relevant portions on roles, capacities and opportunities for local actors and

171 processes of gendered recovery and wrote up descriptions along these themes for inclusion
172 in this paper.

173 **3.3 Ethics**

174 The study followed official (and necessary) procedures as per the Ethical guidelines at
175 University College London and complied with the UK Data Protection Act 1998 II. It adhered
176 to ethical principles of informed consent and sensitivity in questioning people affected by
177 disasters, and maintained their anonymity and privacy (Few et al. 2013 p.49). We took verbal
178 consent from all the participants of focus groups and household interviews, and obtained
179 written consent from key informants who agreed to participate in the study. No compensation
180 was paid to any of the study participants. We recorded all names and kept these in a data
181 protected sheet, while maintaining physical forms in secure storage. Only the first author had
182 access to both. This research was sensitive to the ethical issues of working in a disaster
183 situation: efforts were taken that their participation did not exacerbate their vulnerability or
184 pose further difficulties.

185 **4. Findings**

186 Thematic analyses of qualitative data and interpretation of gaps in existing policies have been
187 organised to understand the types and extent of local actors involved in post-disaster recovery
188 in WASH, the opportunities and limitations of involving these actors and networks, and
189 relevant policy implications.

190 **4.1 Study setting and context**

191 In India, there is strong focus on WASH and DRR sectors in existing government policies and
192 schemes, such as Disaster Management Act (2005; revised 2016), National Rural Water

193 Drinking Programme, and Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (2014)¹. 33% membership is reserved for
194 women in formal institutions and government bodies related to water and sanitation
195 (Routray et al., 2017). Odisha faces multiple hazards such as floods, cyclones and droughts, as
196 well as poverty, unemployment, and low per capita income (Ray-Bennett, 2009a). It has the
197 lowest level of household toilet access in India: an 84.7 per cent open defecation rate (MHA,
198 2011 cited in Mommen and More, 2013). Between 1993 and 2011, toilet coverage in Odisha
199 increased from 1.4 per cent to 14 per cent – an annual increase of around 0.7 per cent
200 (Mommen and More, 2013).

201 **4.2 Role of local actors, institutions and other stakeholders**

202 The actor maps generated during the FGDs provided useful information about various forms
203 of support received during disasters by the local actors. Table 1 presents a typology of actors
204 involved post disasters in Puri and Balasore.

¹ Swachh Bharat Abhiyan, re-launched in 2015 is a national flagship program which aims to completely eliminate open defecation in India by 2019 through construction of household toilets and emphasizing village cleanliness campaigns.

205

Table 1: Type of actors involved in WASH and recovery in Puri and Balasore

206

Type of actors	Puri cyclone-affected villages	Balasore (flood and erosion-affected villages)
Local service providers	School/Anganwadi teacher Community health workers (ASHA, ANM) Village Water and Sanitation Committee members	School/Anganwadi teacher Community health workers (ASHA, ANM) Women's cooperatives
Local government institutions	Ward Member Panchayat President Member of Legislative Assembly	Ward Member Panchayat President Block Officer Member of Legislative Assembly
Government line departments	Public Health Department & Public Health Engineering Department officials Odisha State Disaster Management Authority	District Water and Sanitation Mission Revenue Department
Non-governmental actors	Oxfam India & SOLAR NGO	Oxfam India & UNNAYAN NGO
Community based organisation	Youth Facilitators Masonry groups	Self Help Group (SHG) members Youth groups Local businessmen and traders

207

Local service providers: after the cyclone the local education and health service providers

208

played a crucial role in hygiene behaviour changes at the community level. They formed an

209

interface with humanitarian agencies including Oxfam and Action Aid, who were working in

210

schools and health centres to promote awareness on hand washing, safe defecation practices

211

and prevention and response measures for diarrhoea and other water-borne diseases. School

212

teachers and government frontline workers such as Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHA),

213

Anganwadi workers and auxiliary nurse midwives (ANMs), all locally hired female members,

214

were part of community hygiene promotion campaigns. Oxfam incorporated the existing

215

committee members from Village Water and Sanitation Committee into post-disaster village-

216

level WASH committees for construction of shared latrines and communal bathing units. For

217

instance in Gopinathpur, Puri, the existing committee had received government training and

218

funds prior to the disaster:

219 *“The members of the Village Water and Sanitation Committee play a key role in the*
220 *implementation of the government sponsored sanitation development programmes*
221 *[Swachh Bharat Abhiyan]. They participate in mason training, have access to funds for*
222 *setting up a rural sanitation production centre that produces sanitary slabs and mats.”*
223 *(KII, 2, 2013)*

224 Oxfam and local NGOs provided shared family latrines for immediate access in 6 villages. For
225 provision of materials and construction of latrines, the local household members relied on
226 local masons; and they relied on ward members for enlisting their names for awarding
227 financial support as per the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan scheme as instalments for the latrines.
228 Across coastal villages in Krushnaprasad block, school and Anganwadi teachers engaged with
229 children on hygiene education programmes conducted by the NGOs in their village. There
230 were sport activities, handwashing demonstrations, games and competitions for students to
231 promote safe hygiene behaviour.

232

233 *Community based organisations and Local NGOs:* After the 1999 Supercyclone, the civil
234 society organisations had come together to form pre-disaster preparedness networks in both
235 the districts consisting of local NGOs, community based organisations, women’s self-help
236 groups and cooperatives. In Cyclone Phailin these networks were activated again. As soon as
237 the media circulated warnings, Oxfam, along with its local partner NGOs – UNNAYAN in
238 Balasore, United Artists Association (UAA) in Ganjam and Society for Leprosy Amelioration &
239 Rehabilitation (SOLAR) in Puri – deployed rescue boats and mobilised contingency stocks from
240 their warehouses, such as tarpaulin sheets and hygiene kits, in all three districts. Community-
241 based organisations led the mobilisation and search and rescue activities in the villages. An
242 official from a local NGO reported,

243 *For us, community resilience can be achieved through community-based*
244 *organisations, and groups, by strengthening their capacities, and encouraging them*

245 *to work closely with women [...] Livelihoods and improving productive assets is equally*
246 *important during recovery. For this, organisations have to build new or strengthen*
247 *existing community-market access (KII, 3, 2014)*

248 In Puri, Gopinath Juvak Sangh, a youth network, collaborated with SOLAR for community
249 mobilization and activating a network of women's groups for livelihood and cash-for-work
250 projects in the affected villages and island villages in Chilikha lake. For hygiene promotion
251 efforts, Oxfam and local NGOs mobilised youth facilitators at the community level to impart
252 hygiene messages with the help of village rallies, slogans, and local language messages
253 painted as murals on walls of latrines. In Balasore, Oxfam and its partner NGO UNNAYAN
254 launched a response programme for 3 months. UNNAYAN had already mobilised women's
255 self-help groups (Mayurbhanj Mahila Association: MMA) and youth groups (Subarnarekha
256 Suraksha Sena) which were functional even during 2007-2008 floods in the district. These
257 community-based organisations (CBOs) were instrumental in ensuring displaced populations
258 living in relief camps were provided with food packages and water supply. They also organised
259 community kitchens in the relief camps for the flood-affected families. However, during the
260 recovery phase the affected communities did not get any support from Oxfam or UNNAYAN
261 as recovery efforts were focused on cyclone-affected villages. Oxfam and UNNAYAN engaged
262 in advocacy for land allocation for erosion-affected households in Chadanamkhana village in
263 Balasore, as government organisations had the mandate for provision of services and land
264 allotments during the recovery phase.

265

266 *Local Government Officials:* The Panchayat President, or Members of Legislative Assembly
267 were higher up in the hierarchy of legislative powers to ensure households received
268 compensation for household damage and repair. Panchayat members, revenue circle officers
269 and *Zilla Parishad*² leaders played a crucial role in the aftermath of cyclone and floods, they

² District Council or Zilla Parishad or District Panchayat , is the third tier of the Panchayati Raj system

270 mobilised communities during the cyclone, disseminated early warning messages, evacuated
271 them to the nearest cyclone- and flood-shelters, and organised emergency food and water
272 supplies. They are also mandated with responsibilities as per the government schemes and
273 policies.

274 *“Since Nirmal Bharat Abhiyan Programme (and recently Swachh Bharat Abhiyan),*
275 *sanitation is integrated under MGNREGS (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural*
276 *Employment Guarantee Scheme) and District Drinking Water Supply (DDWS) Scheme.*
277 *The officials were involved in hygiene promotion activities providing Information,*
278 *Education and Communication (IEC) materials and promoting use of latrines through*
279 *construction of model toilets.” (KII, 2, 2014)*

280 Line department officers also played a crucial role in both districts. These departments and
281 their roles in WASH and recovery are listed as follows:

- 282 • **Department of Water and Sanitation Mission:** It is a society formed of various line
283 departments who are in-charge of monitoring and evaluation of financial and
284 physical performance of the water supply and sanitation services. They are
285 responsible for convergence of the various departments as mandated by national
286 policy. For WASH services, communities relied on Department of Water and
287 Sanitation Mission (DWSM) for financial incentives to install hand pump and latrines
288 at the household level.
- 289 • **Rural Development Department** undertook water supply measures in rural Odisha;
290 it houses the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation (RWSSS) to provide safe drinking
291 water to all the coastal saline affected habitations and ensure piped water supply in
292 villages
- 293 • **Public Health Engineering Department** is the key government body implementing
294 national and state-level water supply and sanitation schemes and programmes

- 295 • **Odisha State Disaster Management Authority (OSDMA)** played an active role
296 during the rehabilitation by taking proactive measures in resource mobilisation,
297 database management, and coordination with different departments and affected
298 districts, donors and NGOs.
- 299 • **Revenue and Disaster Management Department (R&DM)** is mainly involved with
300 land entitlements and also provide relief compensation for households affected by
301 natural calamities. It is in-charge of implementation of the Odisha Relief Code (ORC)
302 during disasters (Government of Odisha 1996).

303 Since the revamping of the sanitation programme, there has been a larger focus on promotion
304 and construction of latrines, and village cleanliness programmes. Yet, it emerged that the
305 component of disaster risk reduction is largely missing. Odisha Relief Code, the only existing
306 disaster policy document for Odisha, explicitly mentions ‘sanitary arrangements’ just once in
307 the context of restoration activities post-disasters.

308 **4.3 Local actors’ capacities and activities undertaken**

309 Table 2 characterises these localised efforts by listing the type of actors, their activities related
310 to WASH and recovery and the challenges they faced in improving access and use of WASH
311 systems during recovery. These are analysed to assess strengths and weakness of existing
312 policies and schemes related to WASH and disaster recovery.

313 Table 2: Local actors, their activities in WASH and recovery and challenges faced

No	Categories	Type	Actors involved	Activities relevant to WASH and recovery	Challenges
1	Local service providers	Health	ASHA, ANM, traditional midwives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Involved by NGOs in recovery programming- WASH training and capacity building - Provision of chlorine tablets and preventive health 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Limited human resources - Difficulties in outreach activities during disasters
		Education service providers	School and <i>Anganwadi</i> teachers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Managing School WASH committees set up by the NGOs - Awards for best students in cleanliness awareness of handwashing, nail cutting - Schools act as first space for hygiene education 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Limited resources in schools affected by disasters themselves - Primary focus is on education - Lack of maintenance of school facilities
2	Government bodies	Three –tier governance (Zilla Parishad, Block and Gram Panchayat)	Revenue Circle officer, Ward Member, Panchayat President	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Relief provision to displaced households - Damage assessment and compensation with the district administration - Allotment for schemes on housing, handpumps and latrines - Land allocation for erosion-affected households 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Limited role and mandate for recovery solutions - Lack of coordination and guidelines for recovery for local govt officials - Unclear role in longer-term recovery -
		Line Department	DWSM official, Rural Development Department, Health Officers Public Health Engineers and R&DM officials	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Damage assessment and allocation of subsidies for household latrine construction - Behaviour change communication for sanitation uptake and provision of safe water and safe water storage - Relief compensation to affected households 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Hard-to-reach areas were overlooked in water supply and sanitation service delivery - Lack of convergence of activities between disaster-related impacts on WASH and damage compensation - Incongruence between house damage and damaged to latrines or household hand pumps - Minimal coverage in the villages through piped water supply schemes in rural areas

3	Community based organisations	Youth facilitators	Agency –recruited local paid-volunteers	Trained for supporting programme implementation - Relief distribution and Hygiene promotion, - Household surveys and monitoring - Construction and Facilitation skills	- Limited role within programme - Lack of appropriate skills and knowledge of public health promotion or no prior experience of working in disaster affected areas - Active only during the programme duration
		Community-Based Organisations	Disaster preparedness networks	- Training in DRR - Search and rescue, shelter management committees - Village task forces (TFs)	- Limited funding and informal organised efforts in responding to disasters, no clear role in longer-term recovery
		Village Water and Sanitation Committees and Gaon Kalyan Samiti (Village Development committee)	WASH groups either constituted by government or Oxfam and village development	- Committee generally comprises of local government representatives, schoolteacher, kindergarten (Anganwadi) worker, community health worker (Accredited Social Health Activist, ASHA), villager elders, Self-help group members. - Mandated to identify beneficiaries, support latrine construction and responsible for operation and maintenance of latrines and communal handpumps - Attended training organised by Oxfam and received toolkits to repair and maintain handpump	- In villages where government committees were not functional Oxfam facilitated development of new committees called Water and sanitation user groups - Require handholding and training for understanding technical aspects of operation and maintenance of WASH systems - Lack in technical understanding of repairing and maintenance of WASH systems - Potential for motivating and generating demand for latrine use was not exploited
4	Local NGOs	Development and DRR	UNNAYAN, SOLAR and Gopinath Juvak Sangh	- Prior experience of 1999 super cyclone - Humanitarian objectives and relief distribution - Partnerships and networks for response	- Funding for longer-term recovery programmes - Expertise and mandate for WASH and resilience programming

315 Rural Development Department (RDD) organised 234 tankers, 345 mobile vans, 29 lakh water pouches
316 and deployed generators to restart piped water supply in 18 affected districts through the Rural Water
317 Supply and Sanitation (RWSS). RDD response included disinfection of 58,100 tubewells and
318 distribution of 1,661 (25-kg) bags of bleaching powder. The financial costs included INR 122.34 lakh
319 for emergency drinking water and additional INR 27.61 crores for repairing 3040 rural piped water
320 systems and 1,62,170 damaged tubewells. Despite above measures, sanitation facilities were lacking
321 in the cyclone shelters, and in the affected villages. There were gaps in outreach measures by the RDD
322 as they had limited capacities in the face of multiple disasters. Self-employed mechanics (SEMs) were
323 deployed for hand pump disinfection, but they could not access the remote, waterlogged and isolated
324 villages. Similarly, mobile water tankers catered to the roadside villages and ignored the farthest
325 hamlets and island villages. During a RDD meeting for INGO coordination in WASH support, it emerged
326 that subsequent rains and floods had stretched the Department's limited resources, and greater
327 flexibility was needed in the humanitarian WASH response for the changing conditions and the local
328 context. RDD officials encouraged NGOs to undertake disinfection of water sources, water treatment,
329 storage and testing, (re)construction of water sources and raised platforms, hygiene promotion
330 among communities and schools, assessments and trainings. 246 Issues pertaining to WASH response
331 raised during the meeting were:

- 332 • Disinfection of water sources: It was decided that INGOs should focus on disinfection of
333 private water sources and wells, while RDD disinfected the government-installed tubewells.
334 All sources, including ponds, should be disinfected, but messages should be given to avoid
335 drinking pond water.
- 336 • Household versus community-level focus: RDD encouraged NGOs to focus on households
337 while government could focus on the community level for hygiene promotion.
- 338 • Sanitation options: The prevalent open defecation practice, near water sources, was
339 recognised as a major health threat; there was a need for stronger evidence for the suitability
340 and appropriateness of trench toilets in the context of Odisha. During the meeting, RDD

341 encouraged sharing of experiences by agencies on trench toilets and sanitation promotion
342 approaches to continue beyond the emergencies.

- 343 • Tankers, pumps and treatment units: RDD welcomed the deployment of tankers, generators/
344 solar pumps by INGOs to support supply, treatment and distribution of water.

345 The World Bank funded and supported a \$1.45 billion programme in the cyclone-affected districts
346 of Ganjam, Puri and Khorda for building disaster resilient houses, improving slums and city
347 infrastructure, and strengthening disaster risk management capacities. Additionally, \$313 million
348 funds were pledged by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank: \$55 million for
349 construction of 162 cyclone shelters, \$152 million for reconstruction of damaged households
350 within a 5 km radius of the coastline, and slum redevelopment. These proposals did not factor
351 WaSH interventions into the resettlement plans.

352 Table 3 summarises following policies and schemes in WASH and recovery for understanding critical
353 gaps in implementation.

- 354 - Water supply schemes: National Rural Drinking water programme
- 355 - Sanitation schemes: Total Sanitation Campaign
- 356 - Disaster Management Policy (2009) and Act (GoI, 2005) and state plans and relief manuals
357 (Revenue Department 1976; Government of Odisha 1996; OSDMA 2013)

358
359 The Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation, Government of India oversees national programmes
360 such as the Total Sanitation Campaign (which includes Nirmal Gram Puraskar, later renamed as Nirmal
361 Bharat Abhiyan, and addressed as Swachh Bharat Abhiyan since October 2014) and National Rural
362 Drinking Water Programme for ensuring safe drinking water and sanitation. In Odisha, this is under
363 the mandate of Rural Development Department.

364

365 **4.4 Opportunities for strengthening local action**

366

367 Having described the roles and activities undertaken by various actors in localised disaster recovery,
368 the following table enlists the gaps and opportunities for improving local action.

369 Table 3: Gap Analysis of WASH and disaster management policies in Odisha and India (Source: Author)

Policy/ Scheme	Institutional and funding features	Challenges
<p>National Rural Drinking water programme</p> <p><i>* National Implementer:</i> Ministry of Drinking Water and sanitation (MDWS)</p> <p><i>* State bodies:</i> Water supply and support organisation (WSSO) & Department of Rural Development, Odisha.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Funds are under-utilised and only 52.28 % habitations are fully covered, 47.71% are partially covered and only 2.27% PWSS are reported to be managed by the rural population. • Decentralised and Public-private partnership between Gram Panchayat and PHED; • Shift the focus from handpumps to PWSS, focuses on avoiding reliance on single water sources, which can be contaminated during natural calamities, and promotes integrated use of traditional systems • Convergence with TSC and MGNREGA for ponds construction, drainage, latrines • ASHA Workers shall be paid an incentive of INR 75 per water supply connection. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Only 2% for natural calamities with 100% allocations by the central government as per policy, which limits the funds available from the state to address rural drinking water after disasters. 2. Policy emphasises water security but lags in implementation; knowledge generation is top-down. 3. Gender-blind policy approach: Nominal representation of women at village-level committees or those who are trained and employed as mechanics

<p>Swachh Bharat Mission (SBA/SBM) Clean India Mission, 2014 <i>* National Implementers:</i> MDWS with two Sub-Missions, the Swachh Bharat Mission (Gramin) and the Swachh Bharat Mission (Urban) <i>* State bodies:</i> Department of Rural Development, Odisha</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National flagship programme to provide access to individual household latrines (IHHL) to all rural households, schools, anganwadis and public institutions • Yearly list of beneficiaries is generated, finalised through verification, and approved by Gram Sabha and Panchayat Samiti for eventual approval by Zilla Parishad for IHHLs • For subsequent years it shall be placed to Gram Sabha in usual manner during preparation of labour budget of total MGNREGS works. • Convergence with MGNREGS with INR 4,500/- for labour, INR 4600/- NBA, beneficiary contribution of INR 900/- for SC/ST, small marginal farmers, landless labourers physically handicapped women-headed families 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Annual beneficiary identification, subsidies provision, convergence with MGNREGA, which has abysmal records of implementation in the state are deterrents in sanitation development. 2. In the context of disaster recovery, the opportunity for advocating changes and generating demand for sanitation is missed. 3. Lack of support for Households/habitations interested in constructing latrines post-disasters and lack of provision of latrines within the disaster shelters for children, elderly and disabled
---	---	---

<p>Disaster Management Act (2005) and Policy (2009)</p> <p><i>* National Implementers:</i></p> <p>National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM)</p> <p><i>* State bodies & policy:</i></p> <p>(OSDMA)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emphasises provision of drinking water supply, and recovery measures by line departments post-disasters, however completely missed sanitation • Policy refers to reconstruction to build disaster resilient structures and advocates for speedy, owner driven, linking with safe development and livelihood restoration • Odisha Relief Code (1996) • OSDMA is not the implementing authority, their main role is in coordination and overseeing disaster risk reduction and reconstruction programmes 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Erosion is not acknowledged as a natural disaster, hence affected families do not receive relief or rehabilitation support. 2. Lack of emphasis on restoration of WASH facilities, sanitation is missed in relief manuals 3. No provision for damage compensation for water and sanitation facilities 4. Lack of guidelines for tackling open defecation in a post-disaster context, especially strategies for demand generation and approaches for increasing uptake of sanitation services
---	---	--

371 **5. Discussion**

372 The findings indicate that WASH during recovery remains a critical gap in existing policies, schemes and
373 programming strategies, and often ignores post-disaster sanitation and hygiene. Arguably, an opportunity
374 available during recovery, to instil and sustain changes in WASH, is often missed by the agencies.

375 a) Post disaster WASH is often relief-centric and ignores longer-term recovery: The government officials
376 and line departments focused on short-term, relief-centric water supply, ignoring the longer-term
377 recovery needs of the disaster-affected and displaced populations. The provision of water supply and
378 food provisioning was limited to the relief camps and accessible villages. It was observed that the affected
379 populations living in the relief camps, multi-purpose shelters, and villages had inadequate water sources
380 and sanitation facilities during recovery. The government measures did not reach out to the remote
381 villages, which were worst hit by floods and cyclones, where the most vulnerable groups had limited
382 access to WASH facilities. The PHED restored piped water supply schemes (PWSS) and disinfected spot
383 sources (handpumps and tubewells) along the roads, and townships but the rural areas did not have
384 PWSS, and remained under-served. The hygiene promotion efforts by government were limited in the
385 post-disaster context, they did not concern with uptake of latrine use, health risks associated with unsafe
386 practices in water handling and open defecation. These challenged the effectiveness and impact of
387 hygiene promotion efforts carried out by NGOs, as a result hygiene behavioural changes were difficult to
388 sustain without committed longer-term efforts in addressing the attitudinal changes by the government
389 post-disasters.

390 b) Existing policies lack focus on WASH during recovery: the Disaster Management Act (2005), and the
391 Amendment Bill (2016) have paid little attention to issues related to WASH during recovery and these
392 issues are not supported through other policies and guidelines. Sanitation provision during response is
393 not mentioned in the outdated Odisha relief code manual, and did not feature in the OSDMA
394 reconstruction programme funded by World Bank. The State relief codes and manuals were found to be
395 inadequate as a guiding document for Government relief: the provisions in the codes lay down the

396 process to be established before, during and after a disaster, and assign duties but leave it open for the
397 District administration on the specifics of how to perform those duties, to protect the basic rights and
398 entitlements of the affected population. The line departments follow the Odisha Relief Code, 1980
399 (updated in 1996), which is an out-dated relief manual for post-disaster action, and does not reflect the
400 complexities of recurring, 'localised' and multiple disasters or provide clear, adequate emphasis on
401 recovery of WASH and related systems for longer-term, as reflected in other studies undertaken in
402 Odisha (Ray-Bennett, 2009a). When the line departments initiated immediate water provisioning
403 measures and convened the NGO coordination meetings they chose to not take action on prevalent open
404 defecation practices in the region. Sanitation was not included in preparedness measures, as all the
405 measures constituted by OSDMA and RDD focused on raised handpumps, stockpiling of water
406 purification tablets, and purchase of water treatment units only. The affected households did not receive
407 any financial support as they bore the cost of raising platforms for hand pumps and were not provided
408 with any technical assistance for operation and maintenance of newly installed water facilities.

409 c) Lack of attention to local actors and women in WASH during recovery: The local actors, service providers,
410 and Panchayati Raj institutions (PRIs) implementing the schemes had limited capacities, resources and
411 power. In order to sustain behavioural changes post-disasters, the involvement of community leaders
412 needs to be systematised in hygiene promotion efforts. The PRIs have limited resources to allocate
413 annual subsidies for post-disaster toilet construction and hand pump installation. There is potential to
414 involve the health and education service providers in hygiene education through outreach programmes.
415 However, their existing responsibilities in sector-specific roles do not encourage them to undertake
416 hygiene education activities during recovery. Furthermore, the existing village water sanitation and
417 hygiene committees can be systematically involved in post-disaster WASH programmes, in decision-
418 making and strengthening linkages between response and recovery actions and development
419 programmes. There is also potential to enhance livelihood opportunities along with sanitation
420 improvement in rural areas, which could be explored during recovery phase. Consequently, this study
421 underscores the importance of training and technical expertise to strengthen the community capacities

422 through local institutions and institution-building (Manyena, 2009). By this we do not mean conducting
423 training as events, but looking at these as part of a larger process of capacity development, by which
424 people, organisations and societies strengthen and sustain their abilities to take effective decisions and
425 actions to reduce disaster risk' (Scott & Few, 2016). Women faced privacy and security issues due to lack
426 of latrines, difficulties during open defecation and water collection, and problems in attending to
427 menstrual hygiene needs during disasters. The manuals, policies and programmes do not incorporate
428 women's needs and challenges faced during disasters, and are blind to gender sensitivities during relief
429 distribution. There are no separate WaSH facilities for women, or privacy in the relief camps and cyclone
430 shelters. Gender aspects in WASH during recovery were overlooked by the government actions, an
431 aspect noted in other research (Krishnan & Twigg, 2016; Krishnan et al., 2015; O'Reilly, 2010; Sommer,
432 2012).

433 d) Policies in WASH and disaster risk reduction fail to consider multi-hazard perspective: The WASH
434 preparedness measures lacked a multi-hazard perspective, as different disasters had different impacts
435 on WASH facilities – cyclones caused structural damages to the water facilities during storm surge while
436 floods caused submergence and inundation resulting in groundwater contamination and erosion caused
437 WASH facilities to be washed away. Although OSDMA was lauded for its coordination efforts with local
438 and international NGOs and multinational organisations during disasters, for implementing disaster
439 preparedness and mitigation measures, recovery and reconstruction from multiple disasters was missing
440 from the recent policy shift from a reactive response to proactive prevention approach in the Disaster
441 Management Act of 2005 and the Policy, 2009. These do not consider erosion as a natural disaster,
442 thereby preventing the government and NGOs from providing relief and rehabilitation support to
443 erosion-affected households in Odisha.

444 e) Local action and measures for WASH during recovery are fragmented and siloed: Local actors and
445 community-based organisations such as youth networks and women's self-help groups play crucial role
446 in search and rescue, evacuation, community mobilization, early warning dissemination and emergency
447 food and water provisioning during the cyclone. Local actors are themselves affected by cyclone, yet as

448 seen in Balasore they can champion themselves collectively and organise community kitchens for
449 providing cooked food to flood-affected populations living in camps. Thus, community-based
450 organisations (CBOs) were instrumental in ensuring displaced populations living in relief camps were
451 provided with food packages and water supply. However, these sporadic efforts fall short due to lack of
452 resources for income generation activities to address emerging livelihood needs during recovery.
453 Different line depts - DWSM, RDD, PHED, OSDMA and R&DM are responsible for related aspects in WASH
454 and recovery. This division of disaster management functions in the government, for relief coordination
455 and undertaking recovery, results in a fragmented approach. For instance, OSDMA focused on
456 preparedness and coordination during disasters, while the Revenue and Disaster Management
457 Department focus on recovery and rehabilitation. Although OSDMA coordinated reconstruction planning
458 and implementation it was limited in its focus and mandate for WASH, and acquisition of safer land for
459 reconstruction which was looked after by the R&DM department.

460 Our study had strengths and limitations. Our empirical research from two districts in Odisha provides
461 indicative guidance on why it is important to focus on WASH during recovery from a multi-hazard perspective.
462 It provides insights from the ground on how local capacities and strengths can be utilized to formulate a
463 cohesive action for WASH post-disasters and what challenges they face. It adds to the growing bodies of
464 literature on disaster recovery, that largely focuses on shelter, and on WASH during recovery. It also provides
465 an understanding of how programmes and policies can be designed and implemented in an inclusive, and
466 participatory manner. There were some limitations in the study as well. In FGDs, group dynamics could have
467 influenced responses as participation was not uniform and some members were more vocal than others.
468 Since it is informed by a case study approach, generalising findings to other settings should be done
469 cautiously. The conclusions drawn from the empirical research, especially regarding role of state disaster
470 management bodies, inclusion of local actors and women in disaster recovery planning is relevant to other
471 states in India, and can be useful to inform further research in low-middle income countries in Global South.

472 **Conclusions**

473 This research argues that provision of WASH facilities during recovery is a critical gap, which requires policy
474 attention. It is argued that there is a potential for strengthening local actors' role in WASH during recovery
475 through devolution of power and authority, and strengthening attention to incorporate women's roles in
476 WASH to reflect the dynamism of women's capacities and needs during recovery. This will allow for WASH
477 systems damaged by multiple disasters to be restored and improved for resilience to future disasters. Based
478 on the findings some of the critical conclusions this paper offers are as follows: a) existing policies should
479 emphasise immediate as well as longer-term WASH needs, and equally invest in learning and innovation in
480 water, sanitation and hygiene behaviour changes. b) a multi-hazard perspective in preparedness, restoration
481 and compensation for damages at the household level through the schemes will ensure households living in
482 extreme poverty are supported in their recovery processes irrespective of the nature of the hazard – cyclone,
483 flood or erosion; c) development WASH schemes, namely the National Rural Drinking Water Programme
484 (NRWDP) and Total Sanitation Campaign, should consider WASH service provision to disaster-affected
485 households by providing additional subsidies for construction of household latrines and water supply
486 systems; d) existing manuals, policies and programmes should incorporate women's needs and challenges
487 faced during disasters, and be sensitive to women's immediate as well as longer-term needs – for instance
488 providing for safe spaces, latrines and bathing cubicles in the cyclone shelters.

489 Thus, this paper calls for a new research agenda to address post-disaster recovery concerns through the
490 capacities and importance of local actors and how they can bridge the gap between disaster relief and
491 development objectives.

492 **Acknowledgements**

493 This work would not have been possible without the inputs and participation of the villagers in this study.
494 The author would like to thank staff and officials from Oxfam India who supported this work. Most
495 importantly, this work would not have been possible without Dr Cassidy Johnson, who co-supervised the
496 PhD research.

497 **Declaration of interests**

498 The authors declare no conflict of interest in this research

499 **References**

- 500 Aldrich, D. P. (2011). The power of people: social capital's role in recovery from the 1995 Kobe earthquake.
501 *Natural Hazards*, 56(3), 595–611. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-010-9577-7>
- 502 ASDMA. (2012). *Assam State Disaster Management Plan*. Guwahati, India: Assam State Disaster
503 Management Authority, Government of Assam.
- 504 Bano, M. (2012). *Breakdown in Pakistan. How Aid is Eroding Institutions for Collective Actions*. Redwood
505 City, CA: Stanford University Press.
- 506 Batliwala, S. (2007). Taking the power out of empowerment - An experiential account. *Development in
507 Practice*, 17(4–5), 557–565. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09614520701469559>
- 508 Bennett, C. (2016). *Time to let go: Remaking humanitarian action for the modern era*. London.
- 509 Boshier, L. (2005). “*The Divine Hierarchy*”: *The social and institutional elements of vulnerability in South
510 India* (No. 0). Flood Hazard Research Centre, School of Health and Social Sciences, Middlesex
511 University.
- 512 Chambers, R. (1994). Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA): Challenges, Potentials and Paradigm.
513 *Development Studies*, 22(10), 1437–1454.
- 514 Christoplos, I. (2006). *Links between relief, rehabilitation and development in the tsunami response: A
515 synthesis of initial findings*. Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, London. London. Retrieved from
516 http://www.niaslinc.dk/gateway_to_asia/nordic_webpublications/x400249110.pdf
- 517 Clarke, P. K., & Campbell, L. (2018). Coordination in theory, coordination in practice: the case of the
518 Clusters. *Disasters*. <https://doi.org/10.1111/disa.12282>
- 519 Dash, S. P. (2013). How Odisha Managed the Phailin Disaster. *Economic and Political Weekly*, XLVIII(44), 15–
520 18.
- 521 Few, R., McAvoy, D., Tarazona, M., & Walden, V. M. (2013). *Contribution to Change: An approach to*

522 *evaluating the role of intervention in disaster recovery.*

523 Gale, N. K., Heath, G., Cameron, E., Rashid, S., & Redwood, S. (2013). Using the framework method for the
524 analysis of qualitative data in multi-disciplinary health research. *BMC Medical Research Methodology*,
525 13, 117. <https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2288-13-117>

526 Gol. (2005). The Disaster Management Bill. *Government of India.*

527 Government of Odisha. (1996). *Odisha Relief Code.*

528 Krishnan, S. (2017). Humanitarian consortia approaches: evidence from Eastern India. *Environment and*
529 *Urbanization*, 29(2). <https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247817718430>

530 Krishnan, S., Purwar, D., & Borah, B. (2015). Sanitation and disasters: A case study of community and
531 institutional response to Cyclone Phailin, Odisha 2013. *Waterlines*, 34(4), 412–423.
532 <https://doi.org/10.3362/1756-3488.2015.034>

533 Krishnan, S., & Twigg, J. (2016). Menstrual hygiene: A “silent” need during disaster recovery. *Waterlines*,
534 35(3). <https://doi.org/10.3362/1756-3488.2016.020>

535 Manyena, S. B. (2009). *Disaster resilience in development and humanitarian interventions.* Doctoral Thesis,
536 School of Applied Sciences, University of Northumbria.

537 McCarthy, J. F. (2014). Using community led development approaches to address vulnerability after
538 disaster : Caught in a sad romance. *Global Environmental Change*, 27, 144–155.
539 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.05.004>

540 McEntire, D. A. (2012). Understanding and reducing vulnerability: from the approach of liabilities and
541 capabilities. *Disaster Prevention and Management*, 21(2), 206–225.
542 <https://doi.org/10.1108/09653561211220007>

543 MHA. (2011). *Census of India, 2011.* New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 2011.

544 Mikkelsen, B. (2005). *Methods for Development Work and Research: A New Guide for Practitioners* (2nd
545 ed.). Thousands Oaks, CA and London: Sage Publications.

546 Misra, S., Goswami, R., Mondal, T., & Jana, R. (2017). Social networks in the context of community response
547 to disaster: Study of a cyclone-affected community in Coastal West Bengal, India. *International Journal*

548 of *Disaster Risk Reduction*, 22(February), 281–296. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.02.017>

549 Mommen, B. A., & More, P. S. (2013). Open defecation free Odisha: achievable or a pipe dream? An
550 analysis of sanitation promotions in Odisha, India. In *Delivering Water, Sanitation And Hygiene*
551 *Services In An Uncertain Environment in 36th WEDC International Conference* (p. 6). Nakuru, Kenya.

552 O'Reilly, K. (2010). Combining sanitation and women's participation in water supply: an example from
553 Rajasthan. *Development in Practice*, 20(1), 45–56. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09614520903436976>

554 OSDMA. (2013). *State Disaster Management Plan*. Retrieved from
555 http://www.osdma.org/Download/State_Disaster_ManagementPlan_Aug2013.pdf (Accessed 1
556 February 2015)

557 Oxley, M. C. (2013). A “People-centred Principles-based” post-Hyogo framework to strengthen the
558 resilience of nations and communities. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, 4(2013), 1–9.
559 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2013.03.004>

560 Rahill, G. J., Ganapati, N. E., Clérismé, J. C., & Mukherji, A. (2014). Shelter recovery in urban Haiti after the
561 earthquake: The dual role of social capital. *Disasters*, 38(S1), 73–93.
562 <https://doi.org/10.1111/disa.12051>

563 Raju, E., & Becker, P. (2013). Multi-organisational coordination for disaster recovery: The story of post-
564 tsunami Tamil Nadu, India. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, 4, 82–91.
565 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2013.02.004>

566 Ray-Bennett, N. S. (2009a). Multiple disasters and policy responses in pre- and post-independence Orissa,
567 India. *Disasters*, 33(2), 274–290. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7717.2008.01074.x>

568 Ray-Bennett, N. S. (2009b). The influence of caste, class and gender in surviving multiple disasters: A case
569 study from Orissa, India. *Environmental Hazards*, 8, 5–22. <https://doi.org/10.3763/ehaz.2009.0001>

570 Revenue Department. (1976). *The Assam Relief Manual*. Guwahati, India: Government of India.

571 Routray, P., Torondel, B., Clasen, T., & Schmidt, W. (2017). Women's role in sanitation decision making in
572 rural coastal Odisha, India. *PLoS ONE*, 12(5), 1–17. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0178042> Editor:

574 Sanyal, S., & Routray, J. K. (2016). Social capital for disaster risk reduction and management with empirical
575 evidences from Sundarbans of India. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, *19*, 101–111.
576 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2016.08.010>

577 Scott, Z., & Few, R. (2016). Strengthening capacities for disaster risk management I: Insights from existing
578 research and practice. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, *20*, 145–153.
579 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2016.04.010>

580 Sommer, M. (2012). Menstrual hygiene management in humanitarian emergencies: Gaps and
581 recommendations. *Waterlines*, *31*(1–2), 83–104. <https://doi.org/10.3362/1756-3488.2012.008>

582 Spiegel, P. B. (2017). The humanitarian system is not just broke, but broken: Recommendations for future
583 humanitarian action. *The Lancet*, *6736*(17), 1–8. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(17\)31278-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)31278-3)

584 Telford, J., Cosgrave, J., & Houghtoun, R. (2006). *Joint Evaluation of the international response to the Indian*
585 *Ocean tsunami: Synthesis report*.

586 Thurnheer, K. (2009). A house for a daughter? Constraints and opportunities in post-tsunami Eastern Sri
587 Lanka. *Contemporary South Asia*, *17*(1), 79–91. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09584930802624687>

588 Twigg, J., & Mosel, I. (2017). Emergent groups and spontaneous volunteers in urban disaster response.
589 *Environment and Urbanization*, *29*(2), 443–458. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247817721413>

590 UNISDR. (2015). *Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 - 2030*. Geneva.

591 Wisner, B., & Adams, J. (2002). Recovery and sustainable development. In B. Wisner & J. Adams (Eds.),
592 *Environmental health in emergencies and disasters: a practical guide*. Geneva: World Health
593 Organization.

594

