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We should push for evidence based sentencing in criminal justice

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Sheila M Bird, senior scientist, MRC Biostatistics Unit, Cambridge, Ben Goldacre, research fellow, Department of Epidemiology and Population Health, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, John Strang, professor, King’s College London and National Addiction Centre, London
Correspondence to: S M Bird sheila.bird@mrc-bsu.cam.ac.uk

Formal experiments are underused in criminal justice. Disposals matter. Are they effective? And how much do they cost for what they deliver? Good intentions are not evidence of effectiveness. The same standards of evidence should apply for judges prescribing a sentence as for doctors prescribing drugs. Given the benefits of good quality research, and the cost of ignoring it, health scientists should advocate for randomised controlled trials in the criminal justice system and confront common objections.

Offenders are also patients, with problems of infection, mental health, and addictions. In dealing with offender patients, judges deserve the same quality of evidence on “what works” as doctors take for granted. There is no methodological or ethical reason why equivalent standards of efficacy and cost effectiveness should not apply in criminal justice. The barriers are cultural and political. Biomedical scientists should raise awareness about the need for formal experiments in sentencing and support their implementation. We should complain about sentencing that is untriailed and not based on evidence, just as we criticise homeopathic medicine for its lack of an evidence base.

Randomisation for fair comparison was introduced into biological experiments by Ronald Fisher in 1926 and into medicine by Austin Bradford Hill in 1947. Randomised trials in criminal justice date back half a century but today exert little influence yet the need for robust evidence in criminal justice is widely recognised.

As in medicine, interventions in criminal justice (sentencing and case management) aim to reduce harms through minimising reoffending, saving money, or saving lives. When resources are used wastefully or wrong decisions are made, people suffer, as in medicine. Offenders are harmed through their own actions or through the criminal justice system. Offenders are expensive to incarcerate and expensive to rehabilitate, and, when they reoffend, society bears the cost.

The most commonly raised objections to use of randomised controlled trials in criminal justice concern ethics and practicality. However, trials of biomedical interventions within criminal justice show that barriers to research can be overcome. For example, young offenders in Scotland are participating in a
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placebo controlled trial of 1000 volunteers to determine whether daily vitamins reduce disruptive behaviour by a quarter. Internationally, randomised controlled trials on restorative justice are setting a new standard that special drugs courts (in which judges not only sentence drug using offenders but regularly review their progress) have sidestepped.

Commonly posited objections to randomisation at the time of sentencing can be countered. Ethics approval is needed for randomisation and follow-up (to find out about reconvictions and mortality) but is a wise investment of time if the alternative is that benefits and harms remain unknown. Pilot studies to establish whether an intervention is logistically feasible are not sufficient to determine effectiveness, a different question. The widespread belief that only judges can tailor sentence to offenders is a tenet that can itself be tested by randomisation.

Major policy questions, pertinent for any jurisdiction, require major science, often needing randomised controlled trial design to assure like with like comparison and that sufficient numbers are randomised to estimate effectiveness precisely. Three examples follow.

**Early release from incarceration for prisoners assessed as being at low risk of reoffending**—This policy aimed to balance the risk of serious reoffending against the benefit of reduced costs. Its effect could easily have been quantified, and bad press avoided, through random assignment of potentially eligible inmates to either “conventional release” or “intention to manage by early release” (in England, assessment for home detention curfew).

**Court monitored treatment for a health problem such as drug dependency**—Judges lack high quality randomised evidence on the effect of court monitored treatment versus conventional sentences for offenders who depend on drugs (evidence includes numbers of deaths from overdose, costs, and reoffending rates).

**How changing mandatory powers affects decisions**—In England, the scope of mandatory testing by police for opioid or cocaine use was widened to include those arrested, but not charged, for a trigger offence (mainly acquisitive crimes or drug supply). The sooner that testing is done, the more likely that drug residues are detectable. Had those tested at arrest been initially randomised (disclosure versus non-disclosure to police of test result), the public would know how disclosure influenced the police’s decision to charge and judges' subsequent sentencing.

Progress in medicine has been hard won. The battle for experimentation was won through education and evangelism. Both Iain Chalmers and Archie Cochrane, two of the pioneers of evidence based medicine, describe past confrontations with senior doctors for whom “empirical evidence” was an

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intolerable challenge to expertise. Doctors are thus well placed to work alongside judges to explain why medicines need rigorous testing before they are licensed and that cost effectiveness needs to be appraised to ensure rational prescribing.

If doctors explained the benefits flowing from earlier (and ongoing) randomisation of thousands of patients in multicentre trials, then judges might recognise the value of, and be advocates for, establishing criminal justice trials units to run the experiments that would answer judges’ questions on sentencing. Infrastructure is desperately needed to generate high quality evidence to help answer important policy questions that confront judges, police, and politicians.

Notes

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