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Book Reviews

**Property and Freedom.** By Richard Pipes.  

**Eigentum im internationalen Vergleich, 18.–20. Jahrhundert.** Edited by Hannes Siegrist and David Sugarman. Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, volume 130. Edited by Helmut Berding et al.  

It would be hard to imagine two more dissimilar approaches to the history of the ideas and institutions of property than those represented by the books considered in this review. This fact is all the more surprising because both begin from the proposition that historians have neglected this important topic, to the detriment of scholarly understanding. In the end, however, the juxtaposition is fruitful, for it demonstrates the vitality and excitement of one approach, and the exhaustion, tendentiousness, and intellectual bankruptcy of the other.

Richard Pipes, emeritus professor of Russian history from Harvard, offers in *Property and Freedom,* funded by the conservative John M. Olin Foundation, an essay that seeks to rectify a shortage he perceives in all previous historical literature: there has been no attempt to demonstrate the connection between liberty and property based on historical evidence (p. xiii). Starting from the hypothesis that there is an intimate connection between public guarantees of ownership and individual liberty and that while property in some form is possible without liberty the reverse is inconceivable, he sets out in two chapters (pp. 3–120) to trace the history of the idea and institution of property, defined as “the right of the owner or owners, formally acknowledged by public authority, both to exploit assets to the exclusion of everyone else and to dispose of them by sale or otherwise” (p. xv). Then in two chapters (pp. 121–208) he examines the role of property in the histories of England and Russia as the limiting cases of European development. His book culminates (pp. 209–81) in a chapter titled “Property in the Twentieth Century,” which is a jeremiad that provides a laundry list of violations, largely in the United States, of the rights of property, and hence of individual freedom, that have been visited on society by the triple evils of the welfare state, Enlightenment belief in the perfectibility of humankind, and civic forgetfulness of the priority of property to all other freedoms.

Pipes contends that private property is immutable, timeless, and grounded in the Law of Nature, with a moral rather than a merely pragmatic existence, but nevertheless has suffered assault throughout time. From the Stoics to Jean Bodin, the best account of private property has been that it is a fundamental norm rooted in (human) nature and therefore binding on all humankind in all times and places. Property rights antedate the state and, indeed, call the state and law into being to protect them. But this account always had challenges: from Plato’s *Republic* to More’s *Utopia,* all utopias necessarily limit property rights in order to limit freedom in the name of enforcing equality. Seventeenth-century England saw the apogee of private property theory, attaining in the thought of John Locke its rightful scope of including one’s *person,* hence life and...
liberty, as well as property more narrowly defined. Dialectically, the assault on property began in earnest with the Enlightenment in eighteenth-century France, with its “outright rejection of Original Sin” (p. 40). Although the nineteenth century saw property triumphant, for the first time it came under widespread fundamental attack by the heirs of the Enlightenment, so that the second half of the nineteenth century saw a “general assault on the very institution of property” (p. 46). Seduced by illusory notions of “primitive communism,” liberal intellectuals, even economists, shifted their defense of property from moral to pragmatic bases, even as by the end of the twentieth century pragmatism triumphed over utopia.

Shifting from ideas to institutions, Pipes seeks to root his assertion that private property is part of human nature, the “Law of Nature,” in ethology, sociobiology, developmental psychology, and his own peculiar account of history. Property defined as territory is instinctual in animals, so property is biological; humans are animals with instincts, as a two-year-old’s cry of “It’s mine” shows, so property is part of human nature. Thus, private property is part of the Law of Nature, and to limit absolute dominion over private property is to deprive humans of their freedom to be fully human. After this philosophical anthropology, Pipes provides his history of possession and property from “primitive peoples” through hunters and gatherers to agricultural societies, antiquity (largely ancient Greece, and clearly Athens rather than Sparta), feudal Europe, medieval cities, to the apogee of early modern Europe, when property fell fully outside the scope of state authority and served as the chief sanction of citizenship (pp. 111–16). This history merges into the chapter “England and the Birth of Parliamentary Democracy,” in which Pipes cheerfully embraces the Whig interpretation of English history (with an attack on Butterfield’s revisionism) and crafts a tale in which private property properly interpreted led not only to the birth of Parliament but to low taxes, the impoverished and small state, the property franchise, and thus to freedom.

The contrary example is Pipes’s familiar narrative of patrimonialism in Russia, the failure of private property to develop leading to the failure of freedom to emerge. The absence of property in land meant that the concept of sovereignty antedated that of private property; Muscovy and its subjection of private property conquered Pskov and Novgorod, where private property had developed as it had in medieval European cities, and after 1650, land, and all property, was held not in absolute dominion, alienable and disposable at will, but on conditional tenure, subject to forfeiture to the tsar either for failure to render state service or on arbitrary whim. While Catherine the Great moderated the abject subordination of property in Russia with her Charter of the Nobility in 1785, it was too late; serfs were so stamped with hostility to property that they failed to embrace it for themselves, even when offered to them fifty years postemancipation in the Stolypin reforms after 1907 (pp. 201–7).

Pipes’s concluding chapter, “Property in the Twentieth Century,” begins: “Of all ages in history, the twentieth century has been the least favorable to the institution of private property” (p. 209). Communism, defined as totalitarianism, was the most obvious and brutal challenger, although David Hume had foreseen its downfall (p. 216)! Fascism and National Socialism, contrary to Communist propaganda, really only tolerated property, making it more conditional tenure than absolute dominion, and thus no basis for freedom. “But the well-intentioned measures of democratic social welfare have also encroached on both property and freedom—more elusively and certainly less violently, but in the long run perhaps no less dangerously.” The welfare state, in Pipes’s view, has violated private property in so many ways that it increasingly approximates conditional tenure (p. 232). Taxation impermissibly takes from one individual property to redistribute it to the propertyless; environmental regulation amounts to a “taking”
without compensation; social insurance violates freedom by breeding dependence; and freedom of contract has been derogated in manifold ways since 1937, resulting in evils such as the minimum wage, rent control, the Community Reinvestment Act, and especially affirmative action, which violates the basic human freedom of the power to discriminate. Although the twentieth century saw democracy’s victory over totalitarianism, “even in democratic societies the concept of property has undergone substantial revision, transforming it from absolute dominion into something akin to conditional possession, and . . . as a result, the rights of individuals to their assets have been and continue to be systematically violated” (p. 279).

Viewed as a work of history, *Property and Freedom* is fatally flawed. It suffers from the conceptual slipperiness of conflating concepts such as state and society, possession and ownership, acquisitiveness and property, the tendentious equation of Stalinism and the National Socialist 1920 party program with the welfare state, the annoying and unpersuasive practice of argument by apodictic assertion, and the ritual incantation of the sparseness of evidence for his case while moving directly to claims of breathtaking breadth. Pipes further undercuts his argument by concentrating on either older historical literature or ideologically idiosyncratic sources while ignoring entire bodies of historical and other scholarly literature that do not support his argument: the sociology of law, particularly Max Weber on the formal nature of modern, rational legal systems; the “New Legal History” that has emerged in the last twenty years in the United States; the modern history of property in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England, as exemplified by Edward Thompson and Douglas Hay (and also by David Spring and Eileen Spring in their studies of nineteenth-century strict settlement as a voluntary abridgment of absolute dominion in land); and modern histories of early modern cities and of the police power (*Polizei*) on the European continent, particularly the work of Mack Walker and, in the United States, that of William J. Novak. Finally, he employs the full panoply of tropes identified by Albert Hirschman in *The Rhetoric of Reaction* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991): perversity, futility, and jeopardy, and his belated defense in a footnote (p. 284) fails to make up for his evidentiary shortcomings.

In sharp contrast, *Eigentum im internationalen Vergleich* offers an exemplary call to historical investigation of private property. Edited by two leading historians of the legal profession, the volume includes twelve essays originally presented in Berlin in 1997 at a conference entitled “Property, Personhood, and Citizenship in a Comparative Perspective.” Written by jurists, historians, and social anthropologists, the essays together give far more nuanced insight into the legal-, cultural-, and social-historical implications of how to return property to a central place in historical analysis.

Hannes Siegrist and David Sugarman open the research agenda in an introduction that they call “History as a Historical-Comparative Science of Property,” echoing earlier work by the law professor Peter Häberle. Together with all the other essays in the volume, they share Pipes’s conviction that property plays a central role in understanding the history of the modern era and of human freedom; they differ in the historical methodology that they propose to apply. The agenda proposed is to investigate property as a historical, social, legal, and cultural construct, investigated at a symbolic and social level; property is understood as a “bundle of rights and entitlements” (p. 11). The essays introduce to Germans the Anglo-American “New Legal History” through Sugarman’s contribution and essays by four prominent American law professors; and they also unite the sometimes hermetically separate fields of German legal history and cultural, conceptual, and social history, all in a Western comparative perspective. In pursuing this goal, the editors aim to transcend the constricted view of property rights expounded
by the economists and law and economics scholars on whom Pipes exclusively relies, as well as to overcome ossified approaches found in Marxist theory (p. 21).

The first group of essays explores the relations of property, person, and family: Morton Horwitz explores limiting cases such as the right to sell one’s own organs, while Lawrence Friedman presents new interpretations of American inheritance law in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The second set showcases Robert Gordon’s work on the relationship of property and citizenship rights in the United States and that of Dieter Gosewinkel on Germany in the same era. The third group of essays treats property in land and the means of production, with comparative studies of agricultural land regimes in the two Germanies after 1945 (Arnd Bauerkämper) and of farmers’ relationship with land in socialist and postsocialist systems; it also includes the essay “Conceptions of Private Property in Russia and the Soviet Union,” by Stephan Merl (pp. 135–59), whose nuance and sensitivity to difference and variation provide a useful corrective to Pipes’s broad-brush account, while agreeing on the continuity in Russia into the 1990s of the conception of property as deriving from the state. Other essays treat the social and cultural meaning of property in housing, including landlord-tenant relations (Karl Christian Führer) and two important essays on intellectual property and the history of its legal protection (Elmar Wadle and William W. Fisher III).

Altogether, the essays in this volume make a powerful effort to use the historical study of property as a means of transcending what David Abraham has called “the (Isaiah) Berlin Wall” between negative and positive liberty. While Pipes sees positive liberty as the constant enemy of negative liberty, so that any invocation of social purpose by government is a threat to liberty (of property and contract), the essays in this volume see a more complex picture, a balancing of interest inevitable if democracy is to be embraced. Their historical picture of complexity and contingency rings far more true than assertions of property as a timeless moral absolute. Historians more sensitive to the nuance of their evidence than Pipes is recognize that for every celebration of liberty contained in the slogan “City air makes one free” (“Stadtluft macht frei,” invoked by Pipes, p. 109), some anticompetitive, antiliberty hometownsman defends his property rights by seeking to exclude the newcomer from “city air” and thus from property and freedom; “No shit-hen flies over the town wall” (“Keine Misthenne fliegt über die Stadtmauer,” quoted in Mack Walker, German Home Towns: Community, State, and General Estate, 1648–1871 [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971], pp. 31, 118). These essays’ historicist attention to detail and willingness to listen to evidence, together with their openness to newer and wider bodies of scholarship, make them a far superior model for scholars genuinely interested in investigating the history of private property.

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Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871–1914.

This book is based on a conference held in Augsburg in 1994, the second in a projected series of five on the subject of total war. The original purpose of the meetings was, on the one hand, to analyze the impact of changes in technology and social organization
on the conduct of war, and, on the other, to determine the impact of war on social, political, and cultural developments in the United States and Germany. The first volume, *On the Road to Total War*, published in 1997, focused on the American Civil War and the Wars of German Unification. The volume under review here asks two more pointed questions: Did the mid-nineteenth-century experiences of war influence later consideration of and planning for war in either Germany or the United States? Did anyone in either system reasonably anticipate the nature of war making after 1914? The answers given in the book’s twenty chapters are case studies in the limits of imagination.

Roger Chickering introduces the volume with a general essay warning against careless use of the “total war” concept. He argues instead for developing a model based on the planned, systematic integration of civilians into the war effort. Irmgard Steinisch complements Chickering by establishing positive points of comparison between Germany and the United States. Both countries, she argues, incorporated imperial ambitions and exceptionalist ideologies. Both suffered domestic dislocations caused by rapid industrialization on a capitalist model. Steinisch might have added such often overlooked constitutional similarities as a federal system and an independent executive. She nevertheless segues effectively into a part 2 that addresses the relationship of war and society in Germany and the United States.

None of its eight chapters are written from a comparative perspective. Instead the authors address either a German or an American subject, with the editors juxtaposing the essays whenever possible. Thus Paul Koistinnen argues that, prior to 1914, American elites failed to foresee a conflict involving extended domestic mobilization. Gerald Feldman, using Hugo Stinnes as a case study, makes a similar point for the Second Reich. Bruce White demonstrates that debates over military issues fostered intolerance of ethnic diversity in the United States. Gangolf Huber uses religious confessions to make the same point, showing how Catholic reluctance to embrace nationalism and militarism led to Protestant stigmatizing of Catholics as second-class citizens even after the dismantling of Bismarck’s *Kulturkampf*. David Macleod and Derek Linton examine premilitary training and indoctrination. Macleod concludes that, in the United States, team sports and youth groups promoted competition and aggressiveness. Linton connects the militarization of German youth activities with middle-class anxiety at the success of Socialist youth activities.

The final essays of part 2 stand alone. Thomas Rohrkraemer argues that German veterans’ associations played a significant role in preparing the population for the “next great war.” The force of his argument makes it correspondingly unfortunate that the book does not include a complementary essay on the influence of American Civil War veterans’ organizations, in which nostalgia and pressure-group activities far overshadowed militarist posturing. Jean Quataert closes off the section with a chapter on war as providing a public sphere for German women as caregivers. Again, a chapter from the U.S. perspective, where women were increasingly seen as professionals as well as nurturers, would have been a welcome addition to the volume.

Part 3 of *Anticipating Total War* focuses on culture. John Chambers mines leading national magazines to demonstrate that acceptance of war was widespread in American culture—albeit based on significant misunderstanding of the nature of the Civil War. Alfred Kelly shows that the events of 1870–71 had a similar obfuscating impact in Germany. Volker Berghahn reprises a familiar line of argument in presenting support for constructing a German battle fleet as a touchstone for membership in the German national community. Turning directly to the armed forces, David Trask describes the lethargy of U.S. strategic thinking between 1865 and 1914, and the galvanic shock
administered by President Woodrow Wilson, who in three years established an enduring paradigm for American national security policy. Stig Förster presents a similar fisticness among German military planners who, despite foreseeing the growing risks of a long war Germany had no hope of winning, did little to prepare for it and nothing to avert it. Finally, Raimund Lammersdorf links Förster to John Chambers in a case study of Theodore Roosevelt as a popular militarist whose embrace of war was unshadowed by any real understanding of its changed nature.

The contributions to part 4 evaluate German and American involvement in small-scale imperial wars at the turn of the century. Robert Utley rejects the currently fashionable argument that American Indians were victims of genocidal policies. Both sides, however, targeted—and were perceived as targeting—each others' civilian infrastructures. The result was a mutual escalation and expansion of violence. Trutz von Trotha's account of German troops in Africa takes Utley's point further and describes an "unlimited war of pacification" that distinguished between combatants and noncombatants in neither principle nor practice. Glenn May argues for a similar pattern in America's conquest of the Philippines, while Sabine Dabringhaus emphasizes the ideological and racist elements shaping the behavior of German troops in China during the Boxer revolution. None of the case studies of imperialism, however, suggests the existence of plans to wage total war against non-Western peoples. If anything, they indicate the reverse: a commitment to ending the respective conflicts quickly, and with as little destruction as might be necessary given contemporary standards of war making.

In that context Germany's China expedition, as Dabringhaus suggests, was an anomaly. Burdened with extravagant expectations, yet arriving too late to win whatever glory was to be had, the expedition reacted by improvising actions that were defined post facto as victory. And in a wider sense that improvisation prefigured a Great War fought with neither plan nor design. A particular strength of this volume is its demonstration that the conflict that defined the twentieth century had no tangible matrix in what were arguably the polar cultures of Western civilization. One regarded war as a norm and the other as an anomaly, yet the essays in Anticipating Total War indicate that Germany and the United States addressed the subject from the same paradigm, which was no paradigm at all. Was that pattern common in the West? If so, what were its consequences? The project's intellectual and financial sponsors merit corresponding praise for expanding the scope of the remaining conferences to address total war in European and global contexts.

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National identities and ethnicity have been the hot political words internationally during 1999. In Great Britain, the Labour government has granted (limited) devolution to both Scotland and Wales and has attempted a constitutional settlement of the ethnic and religious divisions in Northern Ireland, in the process provoking its critics to charge that the government is hell-bent on destroying the United Kingdom and the whole concept of "British" identity. No contemporary background could be more fortuitous for Colin Kidd's present volume.
British Identities before Nationalism, as Kidd makes clear from the outset, is an intellectual rather than a political history, “an attempt to demonstrate the secondary place [of ethnic identity] in political argument” (p. 287). The Mosaic explanations of Genesis, specifically that the world was populated by the descendants of Noah, were severely challenged by the results of the voyages of discovery in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. As European knowledge of the peoples and civilizations of Asia and the Americas broadened, the intellectual and theological coherence of the Christian world was threatened, as was the credibility of the Bible as a historical source. Apart from scripture, tradition was the other source of legitimation of institutions, whether they be monarchies, aristocracies, parliaments, or legal and ecclesiastical systems. As Kidd remarks, “While ethnic consciousness played a relatively minor role in politics, pedigrees—of families, peoples, nations, institutions, church practices and doctrines—clearly mattered a great deal” (p. 287).

In England, the search for tradition from the mid-sixteenth century centered largely on the need to legitimize the Church of England and to demonstrate that Christianity had been introduced into Anglo-Saxon England long before Saint Augustine and independently of any sponsorship by the See of Rome. “Tradition was the watchword of both Protestant and Roman Catholic controversialists” (pp. 164–65). In the ensuing debates, truth was often the first casualty. The search for tradition in Ireland was made more difficult by its division among three distinct groups: the Celtic “Old Irish,” the “Old English” descendants of medieval settlers, and the “New English” colonizers of the Tudor and Stuart periods: “the undisputed reality of ethnic division and hostility is fueled in Ireland as elsewhere by a large measure of invention” (p. 146). In early modern Scotland, Gaeldom, represented by the ancient Highland kingdom of Dalriada, stood proxy for the early history of the whole Scottish nation. Yet at the same time there was a “conscious design” on the part of Lowland intellectuals to extirpate contemporary Gaeldom and to establish Lowland standards and values in every sphere of life (p. 123).

The most important result of this search for identity in tradition was what Kidd labels “Gothicism,” a return to and an increasing emphasis on Anglo-Saxon history and traditions of the Dark Ages and a conscious rejection of the Conqueror, his successors, and the medieval feudalism which they brought in their wake. The concept of the Goths of northern Europe populating all parts of the British Isles gave their inhabitants an ethnic cohesion which contemporary seventeenth- and eighteenth-century national antagonisms seemed to belie. Nowhere did Gothicism have greater impact than in British North America, where Thomas Jefferson and John Adams argued that all that was best in British civilization, including the common law, was directly derived from Saxon civilization, which had subsequently been tainted by the “tyranny” introduced by the Normans. They saw the American colonists as defenders of Saxon liberties and the “natural rights of free-born Englishmen.” The “tyrannical” actions of George III and his governments not only violated those rights but also seemed to negate the increasing tendency of colonists to regard themselves not as inhabitants of Virginia or Massachusetts but as free-born Englishmen residing abroad. As Kidd puts it, “eventually, Gothicism was to prove one of the few ideas capable of binding the various colonies together in an intercolonial opposition to the British government during the 1760s and 1770s” (p. 262).

British Identities is the result of prodigious research, calling not only on secondary commentaries but also including a wide range of primary printed sources. While concentrating on the British world, Kidd does not neglect the European context, pointing out, for example, that the work of the Breton scholar the abbé Paul-Yves Pezron (whose treatise, L'antiquité de la nation et de la langue des Celtes [Paris, 1703], was published
in English translation in London in 1706) “had an enormous influence on the construction of Celtic patriotisms in Wales and Scotland, and on the attitudes of English scholars to the Celtic peoples of the British Isles” (p. 66). Kidd presents the results of his research with remarkable clarity and not without a touch of humor. His work will be of considerable use to anyone interested in the formation of national identities in the English-speaking world.

Edward Gregg


Paul D. Halliday’s book offers a new insight into the electoral politics of corporate English towns in the unstable decades of the English monarchy between the execution of King Charles I and the confirmation of the Hanoverian succession. His contribution comes in the use of the manuscript records of one of the London-based central courts of the English judicial system, Kings Bench, and of printed law reports. The importance of his work lies in the fact that corporate towns elected most of the members of parliament in these decades. My estimate is that Halliday’s work needs to be read by political historians of England. Those interested in parliament and party, and urban historians, should buy it.

Three points dim my liking for this book. First, I wonder how many historians of pre-1660s towns will be easy with Halliday’s introductory portrayal of them. Politics is essentially consensual in the model Halliday uses. But in the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, town corporations were frequently rent by faction, so that outside courts, or the Privy Council itself, had to intervene and remodel to restore order (e.g., Sandwich or Ludlow). Sometimes new charters changed membership of corporations (e.g., Kendal in 1636). By emphasizing the unity of the pre-1650 corporation, Halliday strengthens his portrayal of divided corporations after 1660. Second, though the chapters are peppered with fascinating accounts of political battles, occasional references leave one wondering about how much Halliday knows of his exemplar towns beyond the partisan struggles. Thus with Chester (p. 227), given the long-standing disputes over jurisdiction between corporation and cathedral, one would want to know that the dean was doing more than maintaining alignment against an old enemy in supporting a quo warranto. My point here is that Halliday’s book, the title Dismembering the Body Politic notwithstanding, is written by a historian of national politics rather than a historian of towns. This leads me into my third concern, namely, that in the book the only urban political issue is that of splits between factions originating in the Civil War and developing into church and dissent, Tory and Whig. If there were other disputes to diversify local politics, perhaps between guildsmen and nonguildsmen, they are barely mentioned (Chester in 1732 stand outs; p. 346). And the economic and social background of the participants in the chronicled events is apparently of no relevance to their disputes, for it is very largely absent from the book (though there is a mention, again in the context of Chester, on pp. 287–88).

Halliday argues that the Civil War was the harbinger of party in towns because of the expulsion of members from corporations by the two sides. Parliament’s eventual victory was followed by counterexpulsions after the Restoration. In these maneuvers,
the origins of political parties in England is to be found in towns, that is, in the localities. Party is thus something that spread to the center rather than originated there. The Corporations Act of 1661, which should have removed division and left the towns to be governed by “one body politic,” failed to achieve the old stability presumed in corporate ideology, and factional disputes followed. Majorities of one persuasion expelled their enemies or tried to get new charters to change the membership of the corporation, as at Gloucester in 1672. In the early 1680s the Privy Council preferred to allow disputes within corporations to go to law than to settle them itself. This detachment, combined with zest for a new competence from an otherwise declining court of Kings Bench, and for new work from lawyers, forged a law of judicial review of corporation activities, in which the main weapon was the writ of mandamus. Halliday also argues, in chapter 6, that local squabbles taught the crown the use of quo warranto proceedings. Not until after the quo warranto case against London did the government’s officers become generally interested in using quo warranto as a weapon. The subsequent surrender and regrant of charters under Charles II and James II attacked the independence of towns. Again Halliday places emphasis on local initiatives but, unlike J. R. Jones, draws back from a view of urban complicity with James II, and instead argues that towns refused to comply with his orders under the new charters to place and displace corporation men. Once James reversed policy and, in most cases, restored older charters, partisan politics could resume, free of crown interference.

Towns spent most of the 1690s engaged in sorting out the local winners and losers of the Glorious Revolution. The battles were now fought in court by lawyers, and the court was more concerned with matters of procedure than it was with the political intent behind acts of parliament. The court’s concentration on procedure let dissenters into political life. Parliament did once more try to keep them out, with an act of 1711, apparently not enforced, against those who occasionally took the sacrament to qualify for corporation membership. But the judicial workings of the court had calmed the fierce religious conflict of partisan politics. In acts of 1718–19 and 1726 parliament recognized the fait accompli, which the courts had created, and allowed dissenters to participate in corporate life. Efforts to use charters to control a corporation continued after 1688. The attempt for Bewdley in 1708 was attacked because it was portrayed as resurrecting James II’s tactics to purge corporations. Only four more town charters were granted up to 1730, and Halliday has advanced an explanation for the eighteenth-century demise of a characteristic of urban government dating back to early medieval times.

Perhaps chapters 5 and 6 could have been shorter, but this is a well-planned and well-argued book. It is easy, even compelling to read. It places more emphasis on local initiatives in politics, and if the approach is accepted, then Charles II and James II emerge as lesser demons in corporation history than has hitherto been claimed.

C. B. PHILLIPS

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While studies of the diverse impact of Christian missions in various imperial contexts are now legion, historians have until now largely neglected the significance of popular enthusiasm for foreign missions in the shaping of metropolitan imperial cultures. Susan
Thorne’s provocative book begins to rectify this omission and is of added interest through its dual focus on support for both the London Missionary Society (LMS) and the home missions of English Congregationalism. This dual focus is integral to her argument, for the shifting relationship between perceptions of the “heathen” overseas and the “heathen” among the domestic poor was, in Thorne’s view, determinative, not merely of the fortunes of the missionary enterprise but also of the nature of the imperial vision itself.

Thorne properly contests the suggestion that empire meant little to those excluded from the gentlemanly capitalist elite most directly implicated in the fortunes of the empire. Overseas concerns mattered a great deal to large sections of the British public, primarily because of the popularity of Christian missions. Missionary support was not limited to the middle classes; indeed, missionary fund-raisers frequently insisted that working-class people gave with much greater liberality proportionately to their means. The public face of missionary philanthropy, as represented by Exeter Hall and the large provincial auxiliaries of the missionary societies, was, however, eminently respectable. Such auxiliaries, as Thorne demonstrates in the case of the Leeds LMS auxiliary, were liable to class tensions, as working-class or lower-middle-class elements in the less affluent chapels contested the control exercised by textile magnates over committee positions and public platforms. Thorne’s emphasis on the role of missionary philanthropy in promoting association and hence wider corporate identity in the individualistic polity of English Congregationalism is also welcome, though not original: historians of the English Free Churches have for some time recognized the significance of both foreign and domestic missionary societies as the architects of denominational identity.

There is much stimulating and perceptive analysis in this book. Yet it is fundamentally flawed. Thorne writes from a perspective that avows the centrality of “the master narratives of gender, race, and class” (p. 92). The force of religious and moral motivation is sporadically acknowledged, yet ultimately such motivation has to be explained in terms of the functional agendas of the collectivities that make history: “agendas,” she admits, “are thus, far, all that is on our analytical table” (p. 123). Religious dissent is itself explained in functional terms (p. 40), while missionary philanthropy is deemed to have been required by the needs of the nineteenth-century British empire to govern large indigenous populations. Thorne thus struggles to explain the origins of British evangelical missions in the 1790s, when enthusiasm for the acquisition of new colonies was at a singularly low ebb, and says little about India, where East India Company objectives were far from requiring the presence of those bent on converting Hindus. Thorne’s Marxian functionalism teeters on the brink of reductionism: thus early nineteenth-century evangelical opposition to the privileging of civilization over Christianity becomes a “language” through which to voice opposition to the hegemony of the corrupt and unregenerate landed elite in Britain (pp. 76–77); the increasing involvement of late Victorian middle-class women in “the empire” (by which Thorne means support of missions) is similarly interpreted as a vehicle for women to promote their own suffrage under philanthropic cover (p. 101).

This tendency to dissolve the motivation of nineteenth-century Christians into categories deemed to be meaningful engines of social behavior is compounded by a dependence at crucial points in the argument on impressionistic assertions. Thorne believes that, for the first half of the nineteenth century, foreign missions were vastly more popular among Congregationalists than were domestic ones. To a degree this may have been so, but she relies too heavily on a claim by K. S. Inglis (actually made with reference only to Methodism) that support for home missions remained “negligible” in
this period (Churches and the Working Class in Victorian England [London, 1963], p. 11). Home missionary activity was expressed through a variety of different agencies, many of them informal. Its dimensions are accordingly hard to establish precisely, but, if they were as limited as Thorne suggests, it becomes highly problematic to explain why Congregationalism, along with other sectors of English nonconformity, expanded so markedly in the period from 1790 to 1840. Conversely, the later part of the century, when she argues that home missions displaced foreign ones in middle-class enthusiasm, in fact saw a stagnation of nonconformist church growth.

The argument becomes most speculative in its delineation of trends in late Victorian and Edwardian Congregationalism. Thorne maintains that the incorporation of working-class members in the social imperial missionary project (notably through the Sunday schools) proved counterproductive, as middle-class Congregationalists lost interest in missionary auxiliaries that were now sullied by working-class influence. Ultimately the middle classes jumped ship, not simply from support for foreign missions but from organized religion altogether owing to its increasingly distasteful social complexion (p. 153). This is an extraordinary claim to make in respect of a denomination that became more and more middle-class in its social constituency from the late Victorian age onward. Even Congregational Sunday schools were, by the early 1900s, far from being the predominantly working-class institution that Thorne supposes. It is also hard to credit her assertion that by the end of the century Congregational enthusiasm for foreign missions was at a low ebb in comparison with its supposed peak in the 1830s and 1840s. The LMS sent 380 missionaries to the field between 1890 and 1909, but only 222 between 1830 and 1849.

There are, in addition, some errors of fact. It is hardly surprising that Jemima Thomp-son and Jemima Luke held similar views (p. 100), since they were the same person. Mary Slessor was not a missionary of the Church Missionary Society (p. 118). Frank Lenwood was not forced to resign as LMS foreign secretary because of the publication of Jesus: Lord or Leader (p. 162): he resigned of his own volition in 1924, six years before the appearance of the book making public the modernist views he had held in private since 1922.

University of Cambridge

BRIAN STANLEY


By Christopher Hamlin. Cambridge History of Medicine. Edited by Charles Rosenberg and Colin Jones.


Ten or more years ago, when I briefly surveyed the historical literature on public health as part of a broader look at writing on health and medicine, most of the texts in the field were still recognizably in the tradition of George Rosen’s History of Public Health, first published in New York in 1958. Public health activity had been driven by need and by simple humanitarianism. Sanitarianism, the creed of Edwin Chadwick and his followers, was historically unproblematic. A characteristic presentation on the history of public health would concentrate on piling horrific detail on horrific detail, moving from living conditions to policy remedies. There was a need for a remedy, so ultimately it came to be provided. The dominant mode was one of progress.

This view of nineteenth-century public health history is still common in professional
public health circles; Rosen is still the most widely known history text. Yet there has also arisen in the intervening period a more complex and challenging history of public health. Christopher Hamlin’s contributions to that revisionism have been significant, not least in his study of the battles over water purity and the opposing political and scientific interests involved. His latest book brings together work on Chadwick and his circle.

Hamlin recognizes the significance of the period in the 1830s and 1840s that saw the initial public health inquiries, preeminently Chadwick’s own report *On the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population*, published in London in 1842. On the basis of that report, the first modern public health agency, the General Board of Health, was founded in 1848. Chadwick’s subsequent failure nevertheless presaged an era of sanitary improvement in the last half of the nineteenth century, which saw local government heavily involved in the introduction of sanitary improvement.

This much is well known. Hamlin’s historical aim is to make problematic and contingent that rather comfortable and well-known story of nineteenth-century public health. His central thesis is that the “juggernaut of sanitarianism” (p. 83) not only conquered the Malthusian view that the operation of misery and disease was the working of beneficial natural law. It also blanked from subsequent historical view—or at least significance—differing views from another stance, those which linked inextricably the relationship between poverty and disease and sought a public health policy that alleviated both. The victory of Chadwickian sanitarian ideology therefore marked a narrowing of the potential boundaries of public health, removing the social dimension from the public. The “technical fix” of better drains and public sanitation works substituted for a broader idea of public health. Hamlin sees the narrowing of the public health mandate, which other commentators have related to the advent of bacteriology in the late nineteenth century, as essentially part of its initial definition under conditions of industrial capitalism.

Hamlin thus rescues from Edward Thompson’s “enormous condescension of posterity” the medical writers and investigators who made an alternative case. Of particular importance were the views of William Pulteney Alison and the general Scottish dimension to the emergent medical critique of industrialism and capitalism—a recurrent theme in British health policy. Some of Chadwick’s own investigators likewise saw poverty and living conditions as inextricably linked, but Chadwick’s view, that the most important causes of fever were incidental rather than essential to poverty, was what prevailed in the final 1842 report. Hamlin reproduces a telling illustration from a Preston poor law medical officer’s report that drew attention to the role of living conditions and of nutrition. Chadwick has marked the passage and made a note to query the claim (p. 138).

The 1842 report gave the veneer of empiricism and the presentation of “results”—of investigations into local health conditions—for an essentially political purpose. Hamlin rightly reminds us of the political situation in 1842 in England, when revolution, via Chartism, appeared a greater danger than ever before. Chadwick’s report gave the authority of science to a wider political project, the survival of the state. The new Tory administration under Peel saw public health as a key theme in neutralizing the “dangerous classes.” The 1842 report, while initially heightening fear, also served to neutralize it through linking revolutionary feeling with dirt and filth. Within two years, sanitarianism would also become a popular movement.

The Chadwickian view finally triumphed in the work of the Royal Commission on the Health of Towns in 1843–45, which outlined a framework for public health action for the next half century that was also reflected in the 1848 act. That act, permissive
only, then “sold sanitation” locally through the initiatives of its inspectors. Here too Hamlin is revisionist, showing how local political and other struggles often decided whether or not sanitary improvements were adopted. The most important legacy of the failed act was “to establish a coherent local government with responsibility for the urban environment” (p. 301). Chadwick’s final fall from power in 1854 was closely allied to technological controversy. The “pipe and brick sewers war” of 1852–55 with the engineers and the “Croydon scandal” of 1852, where a new sewage system did nothing to prevent a large fever outbreak, left him fatally undermined.

This account, according to Hamlin, is under- rather than overdetermined history, where the historian visits the level playing field of 1838, sees the world from the protagonists’ viewpoint, and lets the story of what public health might have been unfold (p. 338). He is less than reflexive about what his own role in the unfolding to us of this particular interpretation might be. In my view, his purpose in this well-researched and written book is admirable. He contributes an important reassessment to the history of a central period of British public health, one which is still widely cited on the international as well as the national stage. He opens up important dimensions to the “politics of expertise” and to the rise of science as an apparent neutral authority in policy making. He also reminds contemporary public health practitioners that the debates of the mid-nineteenth century represent a set of choices reflecting profound and permanent questions which still need, or ought, to be confronted.

Virginia Berridge


David Vincent’s Culture of Secrecy deals with virtually every imaginable aspect of secrecy, confidence, subterfuge, espionage, and silence produced officially or privately in Britain from the time of the Great Reform Bill until the end of the Thatcher era. Vincent also includes an afterword that brings the study up to 1998 with a discussion of Tony Blair’s repudiation of official secrecy and his push for the Freedom of Information Act following his landslide victory against the Tories. In this way, as Vincent argues, his study is remarkably complete: it begins with the apparatus of secrecy in the newly reformed British state and ends with the official move to dismantle—or at least severely restrict—the very category of what constitutes an “official secret” in Britain.

According to Vincent, “the culture of secrecy is . . . the other side of the coin of the growth of literacy and of later technologies of communication, the obverse of the process by which the minds of the mass of the population were opened to unprecedented resources of knowledge and imagination.” Indeed, Vincent goes so far as to argue that “secrecy is as integral to a liberal democracy as openness” since the latter “could not exist either as a concept or a practice without the former.” Attempting to untangle the theory and practice of secrecy from the negative connotations that have obscured its workings, Vincent states that he wishes “to recapture the logic and function of arrangements whose survival merits at least the respect if not the approbation of those who study them. The task is to understand the forces which created the particular configurations of blocked communication which characterize the making of modern Britain” (p. vii).

The greatest virtue of this book is surely its thoroughness. In addition to covering
in great detail the covert and mysterious operation of the civil service, the theory and action of spies and spymasters in various periods, and the range of legislation and legislative discussions regarding secrecy. Vincent deals with a number of fascinating sociohistorical questions that relate to Britain’s culture of secrecy. As Vincent argues, the British government and British society have traditionally depended on “blockages of communication” to maintain the patina of respectability and to reinforce systems of authority and control. Examining everything from the government’s clandestine practice of letter opening—revealed in 1844 by the Italian patriot Giuseppe Mazzini after he unsuccessfully posted poppy seeds to himself—to the implicit injunction to silence the British upper classes placed on their servants and governesses, Vincent’s book combines political, institutional, social, and cultural history. Side by side with discussions of official acts of secrecy such as letter opening, secret service regulations, and home visits conducted by social workers and other minor officials—themes that unify the book and are treated in each chronological chapter—Vincent examines such issues as homosexuality, gossip, birth control, and clandestine love affairs, particularly the infamous liaison between H. H. Asquith and Venetia Stanley where Asquith substituted government secrets for sex in the seduction of his young mistress.

In approaching this encyclopedic treatment of secrecy and secrets, the reader will fare best if he is willing to pick and choose those morsels of information most satisfying to his own curiosity or area of expertise. Indeed, since the chapters are arranged chronologically rather than thematically, the book experiences rather abrupt changes of topic and direction every few pages as the author moves from political to social history and back again. The chapter covering the period from 1832 to 1874, for example, discusses secrecy codes, the Mazzini affair, gentlemanly codes, civil service qualifications, anonymous publications, and the image of the law and lawyers. In many of the chapters there is no clear attempt to link the topics discussed and no apparent reason why the various discussions are placed where they are within the chapter. For this reason, the book reads like multiple individual entries rather than as a seamless narrative with a strong, driving thesis carried through from beginning to end. Despite this tendency toward overinclusiveness, however, the book is clearly written and functions well both as a reference work for those with specific questions about the operation of secrecy and as a more general account of the management of information in modern Britain.

While Vincent’s book is very useful in its chronological treatment of government secrecy, it is perhaps best in its slightly less detailed accounts of the social history of restricted information. One of Vincent’s best sections, for instance, deals with Marie Stopes and her campaign to publicize knowledge about birth control in an era when official, medical, and religious authorities all proscribed the communication of modern contraceptive knowledge to working-class women. Here Vincent sensitively deals with the outrage many working-class mothers felt as they witnessed upper-class families shrink, while they themselves lacked the information necessary to avoid the risk and financial hardship of consecutive, unwanted births.

This book will be of tremendous use to anyone wishing to unravel the intricate codes and laws that underlay Britain’s 150-year commitment to the idea of secrecy—an idea ironically embedded in the administrative structure of an expanding liberal democracy. By looking at secrecy not only as something controlled by the government but as a phenomenon that permeated society and social relations as a whole, however, Vincent goes one step further to reveal that official attitudes are rarely forged in a vacuum and that, once instituted, they permeate private as well as public life, creating a secret history of their own.

NICOLETTA F. GULLACE

University of New Hampshire

If an Englishman’s home is his castle, it was a citadel under siege during the latter half of the nineteenth century. An advance guard of district visitors was followed in quick succession by legions of truancy officers, “cruelty inspectors,” and medical officers of health. These foot soldiers, eager to moralize households, educate children, vaccinate infants, and prosecute abusive parents, represented to their detractors nothing less than an assault on the sanctity of private property and the liberty that flowed therefrom. For their supporters, the measures to regulate the household were necessary to prevent industrial society from descending into moral, social, and racial anarchy. The battle over family values had begun.

In *Friends of the Family*, George Behlmer investigates the history of the family as a “subject of political discussion” in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He recounts the encroachment of outside agencies on the perceived domestic idyll of the household and the prerogative of parental authority. Through several chapters he explores the regulation, policing, and surveillance of the family through an examination of such seemingly disparate activities as district and home visiting, compulsory vaccination, school attendance, and professional child-rearing techniques. The last three chapters, by contrast, rely heavily on archival research, particularly records of local magistrates’ courts. Here the author explores legislation designed to resolve marital difficulties, supervise child guidance, and arrange adoption.

Several dominant themes unite Behlmer’s wide-ranging book. First, he illustrates not only how the family was regulated but also how that regulation was internalized. Second, he emphasizes the tension between traditional ideas of domestic “privacy” and an evolving concept of citizenship that required the relinquishing of some familial freedoms. Families that refused to allow their children to attend school or be vaccinated, according to this new paradigm, forfeited some authority over the raising of their own offspring. Last, the author delineates what he sees as the origins of a public discourse over familial dysfunction. Child guidance professionals and family counselors adopted the role of the family friend, seeking to shore up the central unit of modern society.

The regulation of family life became increasingly more litigious during this period, as successive marriage and child custody acts attempted to adjudicate on familial disputes. Married women’s acts forced deserting husbands to pay maintenance to their wives and steadily widened the grounds for “separation orders.” The Victorian era of reformatories and industrial schools was superseded in 1908 by the Children’s Act and the establishment of juvenile courts. This legislation expanded the prerogative of local authorities to investigate the familial environment of children judged to be “in need of care and protection.” The discourse of delinquency, and panics over English urban “hooligans,” fed into popular anxiety about the decline in law-abiding working-class youth. By the middle of the twentieth century, summary justice was dispensing decisions on domestic violence, juvenile criminality, child abuse, and illegitimacy, sparking a debate over the responsibilities of the state and of families for ensuring social order.

Needless to say, the slow encroachment on the domestic idyll did not go unchallenged. Popular movements against compulsory vaccination and universal schooling were partly successful in moderating the impact of overzealous reformers. Despite exhortations to seek help from experts, centers such as the Tavistock Clinic in London remained relatively exclusive. Even though police courts sought to become the “arbiters of working class marriage,” laboring men and women managed to manipulate the legal system to their own benefits. Behlmer, for instance, suggests that some poor women...
used judicial separation orders as a way of “warning their husbands” (p. 206). Thus, as with most examples of the extension of state power, new interventions were mediated by social institutions and groups.

*Friends of the Family* has many strengths and weaknesses. The latter chapters—those based on extensive research on trial sources—make for compelling reading. Behlmer approaches, with sensitivity, the work of Edwardian magistrates and their attempts to solve insolvable domestic disputes. His compelling use of the proceedings of summary jurisdiction puts a human face on the rising phenomenon of marital breakdown and the myriad solutions imposed by a sometimes sympathetic, but usually detached, court magistrate. He juxtaposes effectively the progressive justices with those who used the law merely to uphold patriarchal authority. By contrast, the first three chapters of the book appear muddled, more thematically incongruent, and based on secondary research too vast to be synthesized in such a limited space. Indeed, those familiar with the literature on the history of childhood and the social history of medicine will find the treatment of various subjects rather perfunctory and disjointed. In summary, therefore, the strength of this book lies in its treatment of marital discord and family breakdown in the first decades of the twentieth century rather than as a synthetic work on the regulation of the modern family.

**David Wright**

McMaster University


Was Britain the world’s greatest power in 1900? It was not! The next year it could not even subdue a guerrilla war by Afrikaner farmers, while in the following decade Britain and France together could not defeat Germany without the assistance of first Russia and then the United States. Britain did have the world’s greatest empire, however, and by 1900 many Britons were busy convincing themselves that the latter implied the former—that, in the words of Sir Mancherjee Bhownaggree, the Indian M.P. for Bethnal Green North-East, if they “resigned their dependencies . . . they would be reduced to a fourth or fifth rate nation” (p. 246). In *London 1900: The Imperial Metropolis*, Jonathan Schneer seeks to show the pervasive influence of both the imperialism and the empire that were at the root of this view of British greatness.

Imperial London in 1900 was just as one would expect: full of racists, sexists, jingoists, antisemites, sanctimonious politicians, and greedy capitalists. At the same time there were those who resisted the status quo—women, workers, anti-imperialists, and immigrants from the empire. Resistance, however, was usually ambiguous and contradictory in nature. Most of the women and workers were British chauvinists, while most socialists and critics of empire were as racist as its supporters. Nor were the resisters very extreme. Virtually none challenged the existence, or even the benevolence, of the British Empire. The women in Schneer’s story hardly count as resisters at all; none of the four on whom he focuses challenged traditional ideological conceptions of women’s role in society. The political radicals, too, tended to moderation. H. J. Hyndman of the Social Democratic Federation (SDF) would have been happy to see the whole British Empire overthrown, but SDF Marxism was marginal to British socialism. Most of the leaders of socialism and of Irish, Indian, and African nationalism operated within the nineteenth-century tradition of gradual liberal reform.
Their moderation did them little good, however. No one had much luck breaking through the traditional social and political constraints imposed in London in 1900. Change, however, was coming. Schneer’s picture captures London at a moment when the preoccupation with imperialism was peaking and about to wane. Ten years later, the national focus would be on domestic issues, and women, workers, Irishmen, and even Tory politicians were rejecting the conventions of Victorian moderation. Schneer’s narrative is infused with the premonition of this future, as he seeks out the sources of future revolution (except, curiously, the women’s revolution) in 1900 London. However, he is not entirely happy that the socialists and colonial nationalists with whom he sympathizes were merely harbingers of the future. He wants desperately for it to be true that “imperialists shaped London in 1900, but anti-imperialists . . . helped shape it too” (p. 202). Yet he is too fine a historian to push this claim far, for all his evidence indicates otherwise. The future may have lain with “possibly a thousand Indians” (p. 184) and “only a small black population” (p. 203) from Africa and the Caribbean who were in London at the time, but their immediate influence was nil. The book works best as a pregnant portent of what is to come rather than as evidence of the remaking of imperial London in 1900, and Schneer ultimately recognizes this fact: “The immediate influence of anti-imperial London was not large . . . [however,] anti-imperial London’s most advanced spirits planted the seeds of a movement which would permanently alter British history” (p. 226).

Similarly, Schneer wants his working-class resisters to have been actively engaged in seeking to remake imperial London in their own interests. For the well-to-do, empire and self-interest clearly coincided. The laborers, however, saw little direct economic benefit from the empire, however much politicians told them otherwise, and however much they shared in British chauvinistic pride. Schneer argues that they therefore sought to reshape London into an imperial city that would benefit them when they promoted social reform or stole from the docks and ships housing colonial imports. Yet the former involved a direct rejection of imperialism (though not of empire) by most working-class social reformers, while the latter, though clearly reflecting a desire for more self-benefit, had no obvious link to the workers’ thinking about empire. Schneer speculates that dockers’ looting may have been a “never precisely articulated attempt to redefine the imperial metropolis in their own interest” (p. 50), then later concludes that the “evidence suggests that the nature of the dockers’ workplace helped to shape their attitudes toward private property and authority” (p. 62). The speculation is fair enough, but the conclusion is not justified by the evidence he presents.

This concern to emphasize the power and importance of those who were marginalized weakens a book that is inherently strong when it leads the author to claim more than is there. The book works best when Schneer lets his accounts of London and of representative men and women from both sides of the imperial divide speak for themselves. The strength of the book is in the inherent interest of most of the people whom he has chosen, and in Schneer’s ability to use their stories to incorporate all facets of British imperialism (but especially the economic and racist sides of it) and the nascent Indian and African diasporas that had begun to organize against it. My personal favorites are his descriptions of crime and punishment on the London docks; of the City and the “gentlemanly imperialism” of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation; of Flora Shaw, the remarkable colonial editor of the Times who helped push a more aggressive policy in South Africa after 1895; and of Celestine Edwards, a West Indian who was an exceptionally attractive and articulate critic of scientific racism and economic imperialism. From these many narratives, Schneer has constructed a powerful picture of both British imperialism and the opposition to it—with all their nuances, complexities,
and contradictions—in 1900, and so a persuasive impressionistic portrait of London at the apogee of the imperial era.

GEORGE L. BERNSTEIN

Tulane University


The jacket cover to this richly detailed life of Andrew Bonar Law tells us that the author “has looked forward to writing this biography for much of his career”—a career that has generated several excellent academic studies in twentieth-century British political history. What biographical impulses have drawn the author to Law, and what can he offer readers beyond the existing comprehensive treatment of The Unknown Prime Minister (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1955) by a master British political biographer, Robert Blake? Fresh findings of new research? Revised interpretive perspectives in light of the passage of time and the thematic patterns identified in ongoing historiography? Innovative biographical methodologies, perhaps assisted by the theoretical constructs of psychology or the creative impulses of postmodern literary criticism?

Readers will be disappointed or relieved, according to preference, that there are few signs of psychobiography or postmodern literary license in this classically conceived and thoroughly academic study. Neither does the author offer much by way of revisionist interpretive perspective. The strength of the book, and its justification, lies primarily in the careful assembly and communication of detail, old and new, to accomplish the standard objectives of political biography: to narrate a political career; to explain the chosen character’s principal motives, roles, and behavior; and to illuminate the political circumstances and relationships that provided the context for the historical dramas.

It was Herbert Asquith, Liberal prime minister 1908–16, who allegedly uttered the pejoratively intended epitaph after Law’s internment service in Westminster Abbey: “It is fitting that we should have buried the Unknown Prime Minister by the side of the Unknown Soldier.” Law, prime minister for but 209 days before succumbing to throat cancer (likely induced, according to the author, by some fifty years of tobacco addiction), would not become “known” as a result of factors that have attracted biographers and readers to the likes of Benjamin Disraeli, William Gladstone, David Lloyd George, Winston Churchill, or Margaret Thatcher—political charisma, heroic leadership, ideological innovation. Rather, as both his biographers attest, Law’s claim on memory derives primarily from his engagements in seminal episodes of modern British and imperial history, and his role in directing the Unionist or Conservative Party, in opposition, coalition, and eventual electoral victory, during the turbulent years from 1911 to 1923—years which presented the vital challenges of tariff reform, Irish nationalism, world war, wartime coalition status, peacemaking, and then increasing bondage under the Lloyd George coalition, before liberation and recovered identity in the Conservative electoral victory in late 1922. Not only had the Conservatives survived all these hazards under Law’s leadership, they would go on to function as Britain’s dominant political party for the rest of the century.

Born in 1858 in New Brunswick, Canada, son of a Presbyterian minister of Ulster ancestry, Law was raised in Scotland by wealthy relations and pursued a career in
business, rising quickly by talent and good connections to a partnership in a Glasgow
ing firm of iron merchants. Adams gives fine detail on Law’s early life and political inter-
ests, leading to his election in 1900 to the House of Commons as a Conservative
committed to the Chamberlainite program of imperial tariff protection, or “tariff re-
form” as it was presented as a remedy for British economic decline. The author depicts
Law’s development and deployment of superb, if pugnacious, parliamentary skills, and
the personal qualities that would earn him the leadership of the party in the wake of
Balfour’s resignation in 1911. Readers are given a richly textured analysis of Law’s
challenge in forging a policy that would keep the party united (or at least prevent
splintering) while suffering in long-term opposition and facing the controversies over
tariffs and food taxes. Since Law eschewed any quest for philosophical or ideological
formulation, the substance of his leadership lay in the shaping and control of political
tactics. In this he seldom faltered; but Adams gives full treatment to a major political
blunder in late 1912, when Law precipitously abandoned Balfour’s Referendum
Pledge—a previous device to keep the tariff reform “Whole Hoggers” and the “Free-
Food” factions of the party together by promising no tariff legislation in a Unionist
government without a confirming referendum. Adams adds some new information on
the embarrassing retreat forced on Law, as friends in the party extricated him from this
bad mistake.

Before the war, Law claimed to care passionately about only two political issues:
tariff reform and Ulster. The tariff reform program would recess in the crises and
economic transformations of the Great War; not so the passionately charged and deadly
competition of Irish nationalism and Ulster unionism. Reflecting faithfully the principal
engagement of Law’s career, Adams narrates in full and dramatic detail Law’s masterful
direction of the campaign of resistance to the Liberals’ Home Rule Bill, resistance that
encompassed rebellion and mutiny before the coming of the war resulted in the tem-
porary suspension of the hated legislation. In the postwar period, if it was Lloyd
George’s cunning energy which drove through the 1921 Irish settlement, this study
amply affirms that it was Law’s determined role which ensured that Ulster remained
excluded and would never be subordinated to rule from Dublin—a legacy that endures
to the present.

The exigencies of war brought Bonar Law and the Unionists into coalition, first
under Asquith and then Lloyd George. Adams’s analysis emphasizes Law’s devotion
to the national interest under both leaders and his willing subordination to Lloyd
George’s war leadership in 1916, when the premiership could have been his. Law and
Lloyd George, so different and yet complementary in temperament, functioned as an
excellent partnership in wartime and the peacemaking, with Law exhausting himself
as government leader in the Commons while directing domestic and war finance as
chancellor of the exchequer. A kingmaker in December 1916, it was Law who also
brought Lloyd George down in October 1922, when the coalition and its leader pre-
vented too many liabilities to the interests of the Conservative Party. Bonar Law would
have the premiership and lead the Conservatives to electoral victory in late 1922; but
the satisfactions of political success soon gave way to the personal tragedy of cancer,
unsuccessful treatment, necessary resignation, and a painful death in October 1923.

Bonar Law’s life had been marked by repeated tragedy: the early death of his beloved
wife and the loss of two sons in the war. A skeptic, Law faced these losses and his
own mortal illness unconsolated by religious faith. Often driven to melancholy and de-
pression, Law found relief in relentless work, the devoted love of his children, and the
companionship of a small circle of friends, Lord Beaverbrook above all others. The
author of this fine biography conveys his admiration for the personal qualities of Law,
his modesty, constancy, integrity, and determined stoicism—the same qualities that
moved his political cohorts, across all divisions of party, to insist on his burial in Westminster Abbey. Fully informed, clearly written, and fair in its judgments, this is the biography to read to know Bonar Law.

GEORGE EGERTON

University of British Columbia


Nearly two generations have passed since Charles Loch Mowat’s observation that the Lloyd George coalition’s downfall in 1922 “ended the reign of the great ones” and heralded “the rule of the pygmies” or “second-class brains” (Britain between the Wars, 1918–1940 [London, 1955], p. 142). Consensus among historians of Mowat’s era, with antiappeasement sentiment running strong, was that Stanley Baldwin epitomized those “pygmies” who led Britain through the agonizing interwar years. Revisionist treatments since the 1960s, including the monumental biography by Keith Middlemas and John Barnes and the Conservative Party history by John Ramsden, have provided more favorable assessments, but few scholars regard Baldwin as a great figure beyond his party. Philip Williamson, through his unique study of Baldwin as a political leader, offers an almost total rehabilitation of this much maligned figure.

Williamson’s approach is rooted in the history school associated with Peterhouse, Cambridge, and the works of Maurice Cowling. The impact of this Cowlingite clerisy is obvious in the author’s relentless pursuit of a moral purpose and public doctrine as an explanation for Baldwin’s politics. Williamson introduces his subject first by dismissing all previous studies that have dealt with him in a conventional biographical manner and then by writing a quite conventional short biography of Baldwin himself! The book comes to life with chapter 2, on political leadership, which contradicts traditional assumptions that Baldwin was lethargic and complacent. Unlike most British statesmen, Baldwin did not leave extensive personal papers, thus leaving him vulnerable to misinterpretations by historians who have often relied on the more voluminous remains of his detractors. Williamson compensates for this void by examining a heretofore unexplored source—speeches. Baldwin’s word-of-mouth approach not only allowed him to perfect indirect methods—“co-ordination, arbitration, and trouble-shooting” (p. 67)—in Parliament but enabled him to become the first head of state to utilize radio as an effective means of communication.

Especially frustrating to Baldwin biographers, some of whom have resorted to psychological gimmicks, has been a lack of information on his early life. Williamson compensates by examining the life of his father, Alfred, a successful Worcestershire ironmaster. Stanley not only inherited the business but acquired his father’s moral (religious) sensitivities and proclivity for public service. Families, such as the Baldwins, “who enjoyed wealth, rank, power, or special gifts held them in stewardship from God, and had particular obligations to serve their fellow men” (p. 107). This dedication to service, combined with a tolerance for socialism instilled by his mother, helps explain Baldwin’s success in dealing with working-class issues and the challenge of the Labour Party in the interwar period. Williamson effectively shows that Baldwin was neither a gentrified industrialist nor a backwoods Conservative. His sympathies were broad, and his efforts to promote citizenship and self-improvement were impressive. Like his father, he envisioned an organic unity between Conservatism, capitalism, and Christianity.
that embraced the working classes. Baldwin sought national self-renewal through speeches on moral uplift and magnanimous acts of charity, especially during the dark days of World War I. By 1920, he had given away £200,000, mostly toward redeeming the war debt. This was hardly the behavior of a hard-faced plutocrat or war profiteer.

Unlike many of his ilk, Baldwin was not aloof or insensitive to working-class needs. Though he was the prime minister who confronted the unions in the 1926 General Strike, he believed government should mediate between the classes and promote healing. It was only by such means that the growing gulf in society could be arrested and the labor movement rescued from the clutches of Bolshevism. Above all, constitutionalism and parliamentary democracy must prevail. It could hardly be taken for granted in a world beset by communist and fascist extremists. His watchwords were “‘ordered freedom’, order without despotism, freedom without anarchy” (p. 211). He believed class warfare could be avoided through adoption of the spirit of service and brotherhood that he himself embodied. But an important first step in this national reawakening was to change the image of Baldwin’s party from one of reaction and exclusivity to one where equality of opportunity prevailed. Conservatives could thereby seize the moral high ground.

National unity was a deeply cherished ideal for Baldwin, and he sought to instill a sense of British identity, often depicted as ruralism, in his speeches. So successful was he in communicating such wholesome qualities as “stability, continuity, tranquillity, harmony, perspective, imagination, and honesty” (p. 248), even to the Celtic fringe and empire, that he was often caricatured as John Bull. These sentiments culminate in Williamson’s enunciation of Baldwin’s public doctrine that was profoundly Protestant and exhibited a divine purpose to history. Destiny had made the British people socially cohesive and raised them to national greatness. Now Baldwin believed it was their duty to lead the world to political freedom.

Armed with these spiritual reassurances, Baldwin entered the treacherous world of international politics in the 1930s. Contrary to previous views, Williamson insists that Baldwin saw the need for rearmament as early as 1933, especially in the air. Nor was he gulled by the dictators into appeasement or leaving Britain morally unprepared. Nothing Winston Churchill might have done in a material way in the 1930s would have been more effective than the social cohesiveness Baldwin instilled in the nation. Baldwin helped create “a moral basis for rearmament in the mid 1930s” that contributed greatly to “the national spirit of defiance after Munich” (p. 361). He was thus a giant of his era!

There is much merit in this prodigious effort to set the record straight, but it would be more convincing without such slavish attachment to the Peterhouse model. Williamson’s laserlike focus on Baldwin’s altruism eventually, through overreliance on speeches, lapses into platitudes that assume a life of their own. Little attempt is made to incorporate material from his detractors or expose him to the vicissitudes of the historical process. While much attention is lavished on his parental connections, scant coverage is provided of Baldwin’s relations with his offspring where he might appear as less virtuous. “Spoilt, unstable, homosexual, naive” is Robert Skidelsky’s assessment of Baldwin’s son Oliver (Oswald Mosley [New York, 1975], p. 222). As a socialist and Mosleyite, the younger Baldwin rejected his father’s values. Baldwin is thus allowed to have his own way by having his life isolated, disengaged from criticism, and crystallized into public doctrine. This account is superbly researched, insightful, and elegantly written, but one can only hope that it will eventually be integrated into a more realistic biographical framework.

John D. Fair

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The Medical World of Early Modern France. By Laurence Brockliss and Colin Jones.

Eschewing the internalist’s agenda of documenting progressivism in medical science, this study identifies with the tradition of historical criticism that seeks the significance of the medical profession, medical practice and knowledge, within the political and cultural context of early modern France. Lamenting the absence of a strong French tradition in this domain and the marginal and incidental treatment of medical history in the *Annales* and in French historical writing in general, the authors offer a new synthesis. Bringing together materials usually relegated to separate disciplines or domains of study, this example of “the new medical history” covers the varieties of medical practice and knowledge in the early modern period and “attempts more rigorously than its predecessors to contextualize the medical world socially, demographically, economically, intellectually, and culturally” (p. 6).

To do so, the authors devise criteria of differentiation to structure their study. After an introduction on method and purpose, a Braudelian mode divides the period into its two biological and demographic phases, before and after the plague as an endemic feature of the European experience. This choice separates the subject into coherent parts. The first investigates the cultural and medical contexts of the middle and late seventeenth century dominated by political absolutism and the fatalism of “baroque piety.” The second part corresponds to the opening of the Enlightenment, its culture of scientific optimism, and the subsequent fragmentation of the medical profession under the pressures that were driving French society to reform or revolution.

The first half of the presentation opens with a demographic statement; it then sets forth the discursive techniques for circumscribing death and disease, for confronting a disease ecology homogenized by the ravages of the plague bacillus. Medical doctrine is dominated by “the Gospel according to Galen” (p. 107), a useful phrase that suggests the synthesis of the Christian and classical traditions that guaranteed the physicians’ place among the guardians of the social order. While the challenges from Paracelsian doctrine failed to convert the medical establishment, the text demonstrates how debate on theory did not prevent an experimental pragmatism among practitioners. Two explanations are offered. First, the professional medical hierarchy functioned according to the traditional order where the textual literacy of the humanist physician commanded the manual skill of the artisan surgeon. The mind dominated the body. Reassured in their corporate privileges that guaranteed their legal monopoly over licensed practice, physicians could explore doctrinal issues in confidence that their conclusions would not challenge their revenues or social station. Second, the medical world was far more open and adventurous than previously thought. To discuss this extensive world of medical practice, the text offers an additional refinement to the literature, “the medical penumbra” (p. 230). This category offers an escape from the rigid divisions between professionals and amateurs that tends to misrepresent the realities of medical practices and beliefs in the early modern period. This tool serves a useful purpose as it facilitates discussion of “charlatanism” and the “medical marketplace” located beyond the zone of the “medical core” where the surgeons and physicians, the licensed professionals of the medical corporations, focus analysis.

The second part opens with an investigation of the Marseilles plague epidemic of 1720 and traces the demographic recovery that followed the plague’s retreat. Examining medical doctrine and the corporate community between 1680 and 1720, the presentation offers the reader a medical world in transition. Subsequently, a dynamic of change
characterizes the medical world. With the midcentury awakening, Enlightenment culture and corporate discord undermined traditional compromises and habits. Dedicated professionals and an informed opinion came to perceive the social function of the medical corps in more public and utilitarian terms. The beneficent state required more of the profession; it supported administrative efforts to elaborate a medical topography and an efficacious assault on threats to public health. The increased power of state officials, the optimism reigning at the tribunal of enlightened opinion, fragmentation within the medical corps—all these contributed to the erosion of a traditional medical culture that had previously won public acceptance of the uncertainties of its conjectural art. Close to the magistrates in their role of guardians of the moral order, the physicians, like them, had drawn largely from the text of Augustinian Christianity. Pascal provided the philosophical grounding and the Jansenist movement the social credibility and institutional templates in the Parlement of Paris and the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Paris. Together, they had propagated the notion that a fatally flawed human nature, the necessary consequence of Adam’s original sin, could never assimilate the illusory remedies of the modern. In this closed world, malignity and disease, crime and punishment, were the order of the day. But that changed.

New men, institutions, methods, and values displaced the old. Describing this contest, the text gathers together the individuals and institutions working to reshape a world. The medical marketplace and the hospital, the academies and royal societies, the professionals and the quacks are examined against the effervescence marking France at the end of the Old Regime. In the final chapter, clinical medicine, practiced empiricism, biological and physiological experimentation—the ingredients of modern medicine—find their place. This worthwhile book ends with an insightful analysis of Antoine Gros’s painting Les pestiférés de Jaffa, a vignette that points to the relationship of the medical profession to political power in the nineteenth century. Standing with Napoleon, the incarnation of the newly founded nation-state, the “scientific, humanitarian physician is thus represented at the heart of the relationship between power and disease” (p. 834). Plague has returned, but now as a metaphor for those implicit threats to the new national order. In that impeding struggle, the physician would become a formidable ally of the nation-state, elaborating for the new order the discursive techniques of public health to contain the behavioral disorders emerging in industrial and urban arenas. In the schools, others would defend a secular and humanist legacy and so form the spirit of young citizens. The modern period, founded on the ethics of nation and work, did not escape revolution and struggle, a sign that the domestication of the animal laborans would not be an easy task. A monumental contribution to French historiography, the text will become the definitive reference for future investigations of the medical world of the early modern period.

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Readers of Larissa Taylor’s first book, Soldiers of Christ: Preaching in Late Medieval and Reformation France (Oxford, 1992), will not be surprised that she should disagree with the thesis of Denis Crouzet’s monumental work, Les guerriers de dieu. Violence
au temps des troubles de religion, vers 1525–vers 1610 (Seyssel, 1990). In Soldiers of Christ, Taylor argued that preachers of the second half of the fifteenth century had largely abandoned the messages of doom and apocalyptic warnings of their predecessors to focus instead on a positive exposition of the Catholic faith. In her new book, Taylor uses the life and works of one sixteenth-century preacher to contest Crouzet’s picture of an escalating atmosphere of religious anxiety and apocalypticism in France before the religious wars. François Le Picart is that man. Unfamiliar to nonspecialists, he was nevertheless the most important Catholic preacher and symbol of orthodoxy in Paris from the 1530s until his death in 1556. For Crouzet, he was a “preacher of panic,” who warned of “the violence of God and the end of days” (1:206, 208). For Taylor, Le Picart was a product of the numerous intellectual traditions influencing sixteenth-century Catholicism, a man who could simultaneously be in the forefront of the fight against heresy and preach a message of consolation to his flock. What he was not, in Taylor’s view, was a prophet of doom and an advocate of violence. Such anxieties only began to emerge in Paris after the preacher’s death. Although Taylor’s book is flawed in presentation, the importance of the issues it raises makes it a truly significant work.

François Le Picart, under Taylor’s treatment, emerges as concerned above all to preserve the Catholic faith. While he played an important role in censoring Reformed texts and prosecuting heretics, Catholic response to Reformed belief was not merely defensive and violent. True, Le Picart used all available arguments vigorously to defend orthodox belief from Protestant onslaught, yet his sermons emphasized the positive tenets of the Catholic faith and rarely played on his audiences’ apocalyptic anxieties. For Taylor, Le Picart was primarily a preacher of consolation and the possibilities for the human will. In confirming the Catholic interpretation of the sacraments and the importance of good works, he sought to convince doubters that God’s love for human-kind outweighed his just anger, that no sin was so mortal that it could not be forgiven with proper penitence, and that the human will could and must play its part to achieve salvation through repentance and good works. When Le Picart reminded his listeners of the end of days, explains Taylor, he was usually conforming to the traditional subject matter of the Advent sermon or reinforcing his call to penitence.

The style of Le Picart’s sermons reinforced his message. Although a product of the University of Paris, this doctor knew Greek and organized his sermons in a simple style that depended heavily on scriptural explication. A mentor and possibly a model to the early Jesuits, he shared their emphasis on the individual’s intimate relationship with God, simple preaching, the importance of confession, and the benefits of frequent communion. Not only do these concerns to guide the faithful to a firm but sympathetic understanding of the Catholic faith belie the view of Le Picart as a preacher of apocalyptic fear but they also serve to remind us that the strands of Catholic thinking present in early sixteenth-century Paris were not as incompatible as often represented. As a “humanistic non-humanist” (p. 149), fellow traveler of the Jesuits, and respected Parisian doctor, Le Picart represented all of these tendencies and successfully reconciled them in a single person.

Although Taylor’s arguments about Le Picart are convincing, the book suffers from several structural weaknesses. As the author remarks in her preface (p. xiv), the work is not a biography, although the organization of chapters, following the intellectual stages of Le Picart’s life, indicates otherwise. We therefore never truly develop a sense for Le Picart as an individual. Neither does this book successfully present an integrated picture of the religious and cultural milieus of Paris in the first half of the sixteenth century. Although we must suspect that Taylor is trying to do for the earlier period what Barbara Diefendorf accomplished so well for the decades leading up to the St.
Bartholomew’s Day Massacre in her *Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris* (Oxford, 1991), the integration of the greater context with Le Picart’s life and opinions is frequently awkward. In essence, Taylor’s work offers an interpretation of a limited body of sources: Le Picart’s posthumously published sermons. Despite indications that their style and content changed over time, these tend to be treated as a single key to Le Picart’s thought rather than as an evolving corpus. The emphasis on these texts, though, explains Taylor’s unusual decision to include two appendices, totaling eighty-five pages, of Le Picart’s writings in their original sixteenth-century French. These texts certainly confirm Taylor’s presentation of their author’s concerns, but it is regrettable that they are accessible only to specialists.

Concerning the central argument of the book, readers will argue that the evidence from one historical figure, no matter how influential, will do no more than offer a limited corrective to Crouzet’s massive assemblage of research. The author herself recognizes this problem and asserts that her aim is not to dispute the entirety of Crouzet’s thesis but to argue that the growing anxieties that he maps out for the early sixteenth century only began to assert themselves by 1557, a year after Le Picart’s death. Her concern for precise periodization has important implications. For Crouzet, the violence of the religious wars is to be explained by a mounting feeling of fear and apocalyptic fervor; for Taylor, these sensations only began to develop in specific circumstances, notably, after the establishment of a Reformed church in Paris. Her approach to religious motivation is thus situational and arises more out of the logic of conflicting beliefs than pervasive mentalities. She thus implicitly draws on interpretations of religious violence that root it firmly in this world, in the crux of religious belief and social organization (Natalie Davis) or of specific historical events (Barbara Diefendorf). From Taylor, therefore, we learn that Parisians were hearing a message of mercy, not violence and fear, from their foremost Catholic preacher over the three decades that he dominated the pulpit. Yet when we combine her emphasis on sermons with work designed to explain the genesis of such violence, we are confronted with a powerful counterpoint to the view of a pervasive Catholic apocalypticism.

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It would, it seems, be difficult to claim that there was anything modern about Joseph de Maistre, the reactionary Catholic who spent his life criticizing democracy and “modern” culture in the period of the French Revolution. Still, Owen Bradley tries to do this in his provocative interpretation of Maistre’s social and political thought. Two lines of argument run concurrently. First, Bradley wants to rediscover the complexity of Maistre’s intellectual position, to show how the prevailing views of this “counterrevolutionary” are, quite simply, misguided or radically incomplete. Second, and more important, Bradley wants to reclaim Maistre as an essentially modern figure, someone with important insights into our own world. This is a difficult argument to make. In the end, despite some often brilliant readings of Maistre’s neglected but fascinating texts, along with intriguing and suggestive comparisons of Maistre with various twen-
tieth-century authors, this book fails to establish a convincing historical context for the central claim that Maistre is best understood as a modern figure.

In the first chapter, Bradley explores "traditionalism" and argues effectively that the rise of a conservative philosophical position in late eighteenth-century Europe was in essence a defensive reaction. This means, Bradley rightly suggests, that the importance of conservative thought lies not so much in its doctrine as in its specific historical role as the first criticism of an emerging modernity. Conservative thinkers of this era opened up crucial questions about social and political order, even as they tried to answer them with a defense of traditional values. Bradley is not very interested in the nuances of this period, however. Maistre, Bradley says, more than any other conservative, dwelled on these ineradicable "aporias" of human culture. Bradley is, I think, too quick to dismiss interesting and complex figures (such as Pierre-Simon Ballanche, Louis de Bonald, and Félicité de Lamennais) in his effort to demonstrate Maistre's supposedly unique position. And Bradley ignores writers of the period who shared Maistre's perspective and might help elucidate it, writers such as Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin (someone Maistre actually read), whose 1795 book on the French Revolution parallels in many ways the "novel" providential interpretation of Maistre's better-known Considerations on France, published a year later.

Still, the emphasis on the critical role of traditionalism does lead into a promising reevaluation of Maistre's work. Through a series of sensitive readings of both major and minor texts, and with Maistre's intellectual itinerary always kept in view, Bradley argues, quite convincingly, that Maistre is best seen as a theorist of social and political reality, someone who did not so much advocate "irrationalism" or "symbolic" approaches to power as provide, for the first time, a kind of anthropology of European culture that revealed the violent and mysterious (that is, "sacred") foundations of any civilized order. Maistre is often accused of defending violence and arbitrary power, but here we learn that he was acutely aware of the intrinsic instabilities inherent in any order; he saw, in other words, that the "economy" of human existence relied on the relationship between order and disorder, sociability and violence. Many of Maistre's diverse concerns are linked by this central theme of sacrifice, which he understood to be the ground of so many human practices, whether legal, political, religious, or social.

Bradley is at his best analyzing these ideas, and the extended reading of Maistre's complex essay on Enlightenment and sacrifice (in chaps. 2 and 3) is, in particular, extremely good. With careful attention to Maistre's eclectic sources and references, Bradley shows us how the figure of the public executioner was "sacred" for Maistre, and how the criminal was the sacrificial victim of society's own problematic "imaginary." While Bradley does emphasize the sociological and philosophical dimensions of this essay, Maistre's complex and by no means orthodox relationship with Catholicism and Christian thought is also well explicated, highlighting in another way Maistre's underlying critical perspective. Subsequent chapters follow these themes in Maistre's work. Bradley engages Maistre's elaboration of the symbiotic relationship between law and violence, for example, as well as his thoughts on the foundational violence of sovereign authority, then goes on to discuss Maistre's intriguingly ambiguous explanations of science and providence. Finally, Bradley shows how Maistre's response to the French Revolution was not merely "reactionary" but more a function of his critical and anthropological perspectives on violence and political order. Overall, this emphasis on Maistre as a kind of cultural critic does open up genuine insights, though the intensity of his political and theological perspective is definitely missing from this portrait.

Bradley does not really try, in these analyses, to situate the Maistrean philosophy he reconstructs; in fact, he seeks to extricate Maistre from his own immediate setting, to
highlight his “modern” character. The unfortunate result is that Maistre’s “modernity” is demonstrated not with any historical analysis (Bradley’s references to the Enlightenment and French Revolution, for example, show little engagement with the period) but rather by a comparison of Maistre to various prominent “modern” intellectuals. This is not done very elegantly. Bradley interrupts his own sophisticated readings of Maistre’s texts with jarring juxtapositions and distracting allusions. For example, after discussing Maistre’s fascinating views on sacrifice we get a cursory overview of René Girard; in the midst of a complex discussion of law and violence in Maistre’s texts, we find a short and simplistic exposition of Michel Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish*; in the section on Maistre’s analysis of religion, we are led without any mediation (historical or otherwise) to Durkheim’s functional approach to religion. The procedure is to prove Maistre’s contemporary value by associating his ideas with important thinkers. Admittedly, many of these ideas are tantalizing and potentially interesting, but too often we learn absolutely nothing from the comparison. Does it help us to read that Maistre and Georges Bataille’s College de Sociologie were “partners in extremity”? Or that Maistre “anticipates” Jacques Derrida? Both Maistre and his “modern” heirs exist in a kind of historical limbo. Bradley’s discussion of Carl Schmitt is, I think, instructive. Rather than ask the interesting historical question of why Schmitt (or figures like Bataille or Georges Sorel—not mentioned here, incidentally) was interested in Maistre and sacrificial violence at this time, Bradley takes us through a superficial reading of a handful of Schmitt texts, simply to show how Maistre cannot be accused of “decisionism,” which we gather is not “modern” (even though Schmitt’s work is in vogue today).

A tremendous weakness here is Bradley’s failure to define the central term of his book. What does it mean to be “modern”? (Only occasionally is “postmodern” ever referred to, again with no clear definition.) A few hints are given obliquely: it seems “modern” does not include religion (p. vi), it implies ambiguity, equivocality, undecidability (p. xviii), and accepts unresolvable tensions (p. 237). Maistre may very well be “modern” in this loose sense of the word. Still, despite its interesting presentation of Maistre’s texts, this book fails to say much about their specific role in the intellectual history of modernity.

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**Leisure Settings: Bourgeois Culture, Medicine, and the Spa in Modern France.**

By **Douglas Peter Mackaman**.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. Pp. xi + 219. $46.00 (cloth); $18.00 (paper).

Douglas Peter Mackaman’s *Leisure Settings* demonstrates the challenge of understanding the French bourgeoisie in our post-Marxist world. His subject is the thermal spa, or internal *ville d’eaux*, in nineteenth-century France and the role it played in shaping modern life. For Mackaman, the spa is important as the place where the industrious bourgeoisie, and, later, the middle classes, could figuratively and literally learn to play. Mackaman’s definition of class is shaped as a function of economic activity so narrowly, however, that a surprisingly traditional grid overlays his fascinating history.

Mackaman’s story begins in early modern France, with the establishment of the aristocratic spa where “erotic and public” bathing was the norm. Plombières, Vichy,
and Aix-les-Bains—like Bath (until 1770)—were characterized by public fountains, communal baths, little medical supervision, and noblesse oblige. The deserving poor took their place alongside the ailing rich in taking a cure. The aristocratic nature of the spa was maintained in the early years of the Revolution. Through 1791, spas close to France’s eastern border like Aix-les-Bains saw a decline in spending but not in visitors. During the Republic, however, the nature of the spa was radically changed. Controlled by the state, purged of aristocratic visitors and monarchist allusions, spas were liberated for “old and wounded soldiers,” the “defenders of the Republic” (p. 26). They fell into a decay that imperial interest could not repair.

The rich began to return to the spas during the Restoration and July Monarchy, but these rich were bourgeois and equipped with a set of demands different from those of the Old Regime aristocracy. The communal bath offended expectations of privacy, modesty, and propriety. The moist dripping stone walls of the interior indicated bad air, stench—the miasma that triggered disease. So, too, did the presence of the poor.

Entrepreneurial doctors and savvy municipal leaders profited by redesigning spas to meet these needs. The new spa architecture was characterized by private baths, gendered spaces, an aggressive cleanliness, and the separation of the poor from the paying. Unsuccessful spas demonstrated the force of consumer demand: “To lack sufficient hygiene, as hapless spa developers throughout France learned in the 1830s and 1840s, meant the loss of bourgeois bathers” (p. 81).

Mackaman draws for us a very specific picture of the bourgeoisie as driven by the need to work. In this we see the arguments developed by his secondary sources, but we see too little of the spa goers themselves. Mackaman usefully but too frequently references Adeline Daumard and Bonnie Smith. He very oddly quotes Elinor Barber’s 1955 book on the eighteenth-century bourgeoisie in a claim that “again and again, contemporaries stressed that ‘everyone [involved in commerce] worked from 6 A.M. till 8 P.M. and went right to bed after dinner’” (p. 38). Lurking within the rentiers and professionals who patronized spas in the 1820s and 1830s is an a priori commercial drive.

At the center of Mackaman’s argument is the bourgeoisie’s need for “social and cultural justification” for extended leisure, that is, for vacations, a need which was met by medicalization: “medicine let the bourgeoisie have its rest, all the while making that rest impermeable to waste, indecency, excess, sloth, and other social attributes the still forming bourgeoisie took to be antithetical to the dual guises of productivity and respectability” (p. 6). From the 1830s on, doctors exercised a welcome, more intensive control over the spa regimes, dictating a time for waking, a time for sleeping, a time for water drinking, followed by a regimen of warm or cold or mud or vapor baths, rectal, vaginal, or shower massages, all executed by “technicians” and welcomed by bourgeois who needed to know how to “do” a vacation with the clear conscience that theirs was an “orderly expenditure of leisure” (p. 120).

Bourgeois interest in spas waned and their medicalized aspects weakened in the early Third Republic. Mackaman argues that “the more ‘set’ that bourgeois identity became the less need spa vacationers seemed to have for the strict dictates of mineral water curing” (p. 6). The spa was liberated for the middle classes: “These new tourists and curists would seek holiday versions of the pleasures and public life that they enjoyed in Paris and elsewhere” (p. 6). But how specifically bourgeois a phenomenon was the interest in hydrotherapy?

The strengths of Mackaman’s book lie in the spaces that it opens up for our understanding of identity formation in the nineteenth century. Spa towns take us beyond the set pieces of French cultural history such as the bourgeois interior, boulevards, dance
halls, and artists’ studios to a place and a concept which, until Leisure Settings, was almost wholly neglected. Alain Corbin’s book on the discovery of the seaside—The Lure of the Sea: The Discovery of the Seaside in the Western World, 1750–1840 (trans. Jocelyn Phelps [Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1994])—ends with the 1840s. Ruth Harris discusses recreational pilgrimages, but her book, Lourdes: Body and Spirit in the Secular Age (New York, 1999), has only recently become available.

The weakness of this book is its inability to see where its evidence seems to go, beyond class to a broad history of sensibilities. As Mackaman himself points out, aristocrats were plotting the rebuilding of spas along “bourgeois” lines before the Revolution. The fear of miasmas was not simply a matter of class; or, perhaps, class has a broader meaning than Mackaman’s argument can embrace. This myopia is evident—in his discussion of the decline in popularity of the medicalized spa, which is explained entirely without reference to the germ theory of disease. Perhaps the germ theory of disease had nothing to do in the 1880s and 1890s with discouraging enthusiasm for hydrotherapy—the understanding that “through absorption of water . . . a healing measure of secretions and excretions could be achieved” (p. 98)—but I would like to know why.

Hydrotherapy and the germ theory of disease were “bourgeois” but not clearly in the Marxist sense as stemming from control of the means of production. It is easier now, as it was then, for contemporaries to say what bourgeois was not than what it was. At times the term seems to have been used as a marker, a term without positive value in and of itself but that helped orient the self in history—“bourgeois” was not the Old Regime aristocracy; “bourgeois” was not the uncivilized working classes. “Bourgeois” meant “modern” in the way “aristocrat” meant “enemy” in 1794. It signified a cultural stance and a fate different from social origin, its material underpinnings so disparate as to escape Marxist meaning.

A contemporary quoted by Mackaman explained: “every[body] knows what is the bourgeoisie,” but we are less sure (p. 37). Leisure Settings—witty and interesting as it is—requires us to ponder anew why, after Marxism, we remain unable to define adequately what that is.

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As Alain Corbin points out in the foreword to this translation of his 1994 Les cloches de la terre, the image of rural church belfries has long been both familiar and powerful in France: the bell tower is a central figure in nineteenth-century French paintings of rural landscapes, for example, and François Mitterrand’s famous 1981 “la force tranquille” campaign poster, showing him against a background of village and church with belfry, has been credited with helping his election. In this study, however, Corbin is less concerned with the sight of belfries in the countryside than with the sound of bells. His interest in sensory history, begun with his 1982 exploration of odor (Le miasme et la jonquille [Paris: Aubier-Montaigne]), is here continued with an investigation of one
element in the “auditory landscape” of nineteenth-century rural France. Consideration of auditory perceptions, he argues, is crucial to understanding the history of representations of space and of the social imagination (p. xii).

Corbin compellingly shows that bells played a powerful role in nineteenth-century rural France as an aural manifestation of the temporal, spatial, and social distinctions structuring everyday life. Bells were tolled to mark the predictable rhythms of everyday, liturgical, ceremonial, and life-cycle time: ringing the beginning and end of each workday, the call to mass, calendrical ceremonies and festivals, births, weddings, deaths, and funerals. They also signaled extraordinary events of danger or joy, tolling to warn of attack or impending thunderstorm, or to celebrate the visit of an important personage. Bells helped define the territorial boundaries of meaningful communities, not only by drawing those within earshot into a shared auditory landscape but because many of their pealed messages were fully decipherable only to those familiar with localized codes. Finally, the size, quality, and patronage of bells as well as distinctive peals for individual life events all marked social distinctions drawn between and within communities.

Undoubtedly the strongest evidence of the importance of bells to French country dwellers—as well as the richest source of data about them—lies in the astonishing number of disputes about bells and bell ringing that erupted all over the hexagon throughout the nineteenth century, and the passions these engendered: apparently people cared deeply about their bells, how and when they were rung, and who controlled their ringing. Indeed, the bulk of material considered here concerns such disputes, as they variously pitted national authorities and local populace, one village against another, competing factions within communities, clerical and secular authorities, and especially priest and mayor. From this welter of (often petty) detail, Corbin skillfully extracts a coherent picture of the evolving shape of bell conflicts, thereby illuminating patterns of change regarding identity, social order, authority, and the organization of space and time in rural France over the course of the nineteenth century.

He musters convincing evidence to argue that efforts in the aftermath of the Revolution to prevent, desacralize, or impose uniform national regulations on bell ringing were largely unsuccessful in diminishing the emotional power of bells or homogenizing their use. Rather, he argues, the language of bells retained rich meanings through the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century, becoming progressively impoverished only in its final decades. In general, he shows the shifting—and eventual diminishing—meaning of bells to follow the slow, uneven, and conflict-ridden movement in the organization of rural life from sacred to secular principles. For example, the parish gradually gave way to the municipality as a key source of territorial identity, long feeding disputes between priest and mayor over access to the bells and control over when they should be rung. The measurement of time by prayer, marked by the ringing of morning and evening angelus, was eventually displaced by clocked measurement, marked by ringing the hours. By the final third of the nineteenth century, the use of bells had been largely secularized; peals rung for the newly invented national holiday on July 14, 1880, notes Corbin, indicate both the integration of local communities into a secular, national space and the loss of clerical control over the sound of bells that had once defined local space and sacred time. The many disputes over July 14 peals until the eve of World War I, he claims, only illustrate the collapse in the meaning of bells: temporarily secularized, they finally returned to clerical control after the separation of church and state, having lost most of their former emotional and communicative powers.

In Corbin’s hands, bells provide a more powerful tool for illuminating important patterns of change than one might imagine. It is not so clear, however, that he succeeds
in demonstrating that consideration of auditory perceptions is necessarily essential to understanding the history of representations of space and of the social imagination. Although his approach is novel and engaging, the general contours of his history are not altogether unfamiliar. Indeed, one might argue that his analysis is more about disputes over bells than about the sound of bells. Certainly, the frequency of such disputes does indicate that people cared deeply enough about bell ringing to provide immediate grounds for heated conflict, but the ultimate stakes most often seem to be less about bell ringing per se than about issues of authority and power (clerical/secular; national/local, etc.). Both the passion in these disputes and their ultimate interest to us appear to derive from the political issues (large and small) at stake. In the end, Corbin’s focus on bells is well chosen, less for what it tells us about sensory history and more because it captures in a novel and compelling way the troubled history of redistributions of power among religious and secular authorities, as it was played out in local settings across the nineteenth century.

In insisting throughout his study on the difficulty for contemporary readers of imagining the importance of ringing bells to French country dwellers in the nineteenth century, Corbin somewhat undermines his project of establishing the interest of auditory history. He compellingly traces the changing meanings of bell sounds over the century and their declining importance as a site of dispute by century’s end; his argument about their decline in significance to country dwellers is somewhat less convincing and strikes me as overstated, though not entirely implausible. However, he seems at times to imply that sound in general has become less important as a way of marking the temporal, spatial, and social distinctions that structure contemporary life. I would argue that contemporary urban dwellers, no less than country dwellers of a bygone era, depend upon highly coded auditory messages—though not necessarily from bells—to locate themselves in time as well as physical and social space and are equally capable of intense passions or disorientation in the face of sounds or silence deemed unaccustomed, inappropriate, or excessive. If we are usually inclined to neglect this dimension of our sensory experience, it is not because our auditory sensibilities have withered but rather because for us, as for those in other times and places, it is normally a taken-for-granted part of everyday life, usually functioning largely out of consciousness. The history of auditory perception and of the meanings attributed to sound, then, certainly seems worth pursuing as a crucial and ongoing dimension of human experience, highly variable across time and place, and revealing of meaningful distinctions structuring social life. How to recover the history of something as evanescent as sound or as internalized as its meanings, though, is a thorny problem indeed, provocatively posed if not altogether resolved here.

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Fraternity among the French Peasantry maps out the precise spatial location of associational activity among the peasants of this department between 1815 and 1914 and illustrates its richness, variety, and historical longevity. The book begins with a com-
prehensive depiction of the department’s physical, human, and political geography, tracing the slow but steady growth in population, advances in material and cultural progress, and the extension of secularization and republicanization by the turn of the century. Having set out these multiple contexts, Baker then provides the empirical core of his research, with separate chapters on the Loir-et-Cher’s livestock insurance societies, mutual aid associations, fire-fighting corps, antiphylloxera syndicates, and agricultural associations.

The core thesis of the book is an attack on the myth of peasant “individualism.” The case of the Loir-et-Cher, it is claimed, suggests on the contrary that throughout the nineteenth century French peasants joined professional and self-help organizations through which they developed a stronger sense of community and a greater understanding of the worlds which lay beyond the narrow confines of their pays. These processes were uneven and marked by peaks as well as troughs. But between the mid-1840s and the mid-1860s, then in the 1880s, and then again in the early twentieth century, successive groups of peasants flocked into these various agricultural associations, thereby demonstrating in Baker’s eyes the continuing relevance of the ideal of “fraternity” in the social life of the rural world. The book also posits a parallel explanation for these forms of solidaristic behavior: economic rationality. Peasants joined agricultural associations not merely as an expression of sociability but also as a means of defending themselves against natural and economic disasters. This collective action against risk, according to the author, further demonstrates the limits of traditional “static” accounts of French peasant life in the nineteenth century.

This is an impressive volume, both from the perspective of political geography and economic and social history. Given the paucity of written sources—the eternal problem for historians of an oral culture and community—there is relatively little focus on individual narratives, the author relying instead on a more quantitative approach and an impressive array of maps and graphs to plot the development of peasant associational life in nineteenth-century Loir-et-Cher. The book is based on extensive research in the departmental archives, with some chapters (notably those on fire fighting and agricultural associations) even drawing on material not yet classified—a triumph of scholarly endeavor and perseverance. The method used by Baker is distinctive in offering a synthetic analysis of an entire category of associations over time, thus enabling valuable comparisons among different types of peasant organizations. The book is also notable for its bold challenges to orthodoxy, both in the historical and geographical literatures. In the latter context Baker rejects the conventional view—articulated in Georges Dupeux’s classic study (Aspects de l’histoire sociale et politique du Loir-et-Cher, 1848–1914 [Paris, 1962])—that peasant sociability only really took off in the Loir-et-Cher in the early twentieth century. More broadly, his conclusions strongly challenge Eugen Weber’s thesis about the Third Republic’s politicization of the peasantry “from above” (Peasants into Frenchmen [London, 1977]). Democratic values were not imposed by the Jacobin republic but emerged through the egalitarian and self-governing practices developed by peasants in their associations. Indeed Baker contends that in the Loire valley the state was neither the exclusive nor even the primary motor of “modernization.” Peasants spontaneously developed their own forms of sociability, as reflected in the emergence of a wide network of rural intermediate associations by 1914.

Baker’s research is immaculate, and the empirical findings are lucidly presented. How modern France emerged out of the nineteenth century is a question that is currently being revisited by historians and historians of ideas, and this book makes a welcome contribution to this reappraisal from an economic and social perspective by stressing
that peasants were not passive recipients of state policy but sovereign and creative agents who in significant senses forged their own destinies. The book’s anti-Jacobin emphasis on the transformation of social and political practices “from below” is thus extremely positive and will resonate with all those seeking to move away from the historiographical orthodoxies concerning the transformation of nineteenth-century France. Nonetheless, Baker’s overall conclusions are sometimes debatable. There are many ambiguities surrounding the concept of “fraternity,” which provides the theoretical framework for the entire book. The term is sometimes used to denote a spontaneous, egalitarian, and protorepublican type of association, and is thus presented as the antimony of “paternalism” (a characteristic of elite-led and hierarchial associations sponsored typically by the aristocracy or the church). But this is something of a false opposition. Many of the organizations defined as “fraternal” were led by provincial republican notables, whose social and moral views were nothing if not hierarchical (and indeed patriarchal, as Baker concedes). More fundamentally, commitment to solidarity is taken too readily for granted, as, for example, when Baker deduces the existence of “fraternal” sentiments from the statutory principles of specific organizations. Sometimes Baker swings too far in the opposite direction, as when he implies that organizations whose purposes were ostensibly economic were nonetheless operating according to some “latent” principle of “fraternity.” The fundamental problem, which is encountered throughout the book but never resolved conceptually, is how logically to distinguish “fraternity” from self-interest, and particularly economic self-interest. Such a distinction is necessary for the concept of “fraternity” to be analytically useful—unless we understand all economic organizations to be expressions of social solidarity simply by virtue of their existence. This would be an intellectually coherent position but would deny the concept any serious heuristic value.

The book also underestimates the importance of politics. Baker argues that state influence on the promotion of agricultural associations has been exaggerated, and to the extent that this is a rejoinder to Weber’s thesis the point is well taken. But in making this claim Baker gets somewhat carried away, undervaluing the evidence that his own research uncovers about the crucial role (both direct and indirect) of the French state in promoting provincial agricultural sociability. The periods that he identifies as peaks in terms of associational growth in the Loir-et-Cher largely overlap with periods of strong purposive government in Paris—the 1850s and 1860s, the 1880s, and the early 1900s. Baker himself recognizes that the Ministry of Agriculture had a critical impact on livestock insurance associations; that the mutuelles grew with the explicit encouragement of the Second Empire (whose overall importance, however, tends to be rather glossed over in the book); and that the prerepublican Syndicat des Agriculteurs du Loir-et-Cher developed after 1884 through the extensive sponsorship of the local agents of the Third Republic. In fact the author (rightly) underlines throughout the book the importance of local institutions, especially municipalities, in nineteenth-century French public life. But there is no systematic attempt to assess the impact of these institutions (both spatially and temporally) on the different forms of peasant sociability he observes. In any event, local representative institutions—the municipality and Conseil Général—were effectively part of the state for most of the nineteenth century, and Baker cannot therefore, on the one hand, stress the importance of these institutions in stimulating peasant sociability and, on the other hand, attempt to play down the significance of the “state” in the same process.

At a time when so much history has lost all moorings to space, studies of this kind provide a refreshing reminder of the inexorable relevance of territoriality. But too strong a separation between local and national contexts can reify the former and undervalue
the importance of the latter. In this sense Baker’s apparent endorsement of the view that broad syntheses should be abandoned in favor of detailed archival research should be gently but firmly resisted—not only because such a proposition is logically contestable (who then would produce the generalizations upon which all local studies have to rely?) but also because it would appear to suggest that there is not much left to say in aggregate terms about French intellectual, political, economic, and social history in the nineteenth century. And in its scholarly and stimulating responses to the various “myths” about the French peasantry, this fine piece of research indeed demonstrates precisely the opposite.

SUDHIR HAZAREESINGH

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*Paris fin de siècle: Culture et politique*. By Christophe Charle. L’Univers Historique.

For some time Christophe Charle has been one of the most productive and stimulating historians writing on modern France. What has characterized his work—largely focused on elites and intellectuals at the turn of the century—has been a sensitivity to the interplay of culture and society, and the relationships of power that join the history of one to that of the other. His latest book, *Paris fin de siècle: Culture et politique*, is, on the surface, a series of discussions on cultural and intellectual life in Paris in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, chronologically centered on the Dreyfus affair. But, at base, it is one more demonstration of how to write intellectual history as social history.

Despite the looseness of the presentation, Charle returns to several themes again and again. One of these is career strategies, which he ties to a broader exploration of social connections and the agencies of power. In a fascinating chapter on the social geography of Parisian intellectual life, Charle charts the strategic choices underlying the residential patterns of the capital’s cultural classes. Whereas lawyers, magistrates, teachers, and, somewhat less so, doctors preferred the fifth, sixth, and seventh arrondissements, playwrights and writers inclined to live in the more affluent districts, especially the ninth arrondissement adjoining the theater and press districts. There they could hobnob with the consumers of culture, haunt the salons, cafés, and pressrooms where talents were recognized, and where a double process of selection (for those prepared to produce for established tastes) and dispensation (of positions on newspapers and revues, of access to theater productions) occurred. Central to this networking process was the growing role of cultural mediators or power brokers, what Charle initially refers to as “*les hommes doubles.*” The emergence of self-proclaimed “intellectuals” and an “avant-garde” at the end of the century was, he argues, in good part a reaction to the barriers and submissions these brokers imposed; although in a perhaps more suggestive passage Charle proposes that in modern society all individuals are forced to split between their private and public roles and that cultural producers, feeling this most acutely, find a resolution through the strategy of redefining themselves as intellectuals.

Strategies, cultural power battles, the social determinants of choices wind their way throughout this text. Hippolyte Taine’s rise to magisterial status, his bridging of schol-
arly and literary domains, is the product of a carefully pursued set of intellectual and career strategies. The promotion of Russian translations by intellectuals on the Right and the counterpromotion of Scandinavian works by intellectuals on the Left are not only the cultural politics of aesthetic preference but strategic choices to advance one school and its ideological dispositions at the expense of another. In a still more incisive chapter toward the end, repeating his earlier foray into social geography, Charle analyzes the career and familial influences on the political and scholarly choices of fin-de-siècle Normaliens who gravitated toward socialism. Once again Charle grounds the emergence of “intellectuals” and the cultural and political decision making that informed the trajectories of some but not others in the social history of lives, experiences, and options. It is a history of patterns, but never crunchingly so.

A second theme that intersects with the first is the contrast Charle draws between heirs and parvenus, and the paths open to each. He uses this schematization to comprehend anti-Dreyfusards (notably Paul Bourget) and Dreyfusards (notably Émile Zola), Normalien scholars and Normalien socialists. More provocatively, his first chapter contrasts Paris the heir with Berlin the parvenu. The latter challenges the former, but it is the heir that is indisputably the draw of provincials and foreigners, the center of ferment, the generator and eater of cultural careers. As heir Paris can afford all, squander all, risk and re-create all. Charle wants to argue that Paris thus could operate as a crucible unlike any other on the Continent for the coming together of culture and politics at the turn of the century. The theme is suggestive, and the comparison with Berlin is well drawn; but the idea itself carries only as far as an aperitif.

More of a main course is Charle’s third theme, the ineluctable tension between scholarship or art, on the one hand, and politics, on the other. Those who enter politics in the era of Dreyfus never fully succeed in squaring this circle. Taine (a forerunner of this story) falls victim to changes in the institutional infrastructure of intellectual life and is forced to surrender magistery for politics. Charles Seignobos chooses politics and fails at ever attaining magistery. Both Zola and Bourget are compromised when they place their art at the service of their politics. With the socialist Normaliens the story becomes more complex, as political engagement coincides with scholarly preferences for modern history of a leftist orientation and Durkheimian sociology. Such risky ruptures with traditional options are buoyed by the advancement of social sciences as legitimate disciplines and by the heady Dreyfusard years; but after the turn of the century familiar patterns reemerge, as some reintegrate into the world of pure scholarship, others abandon scholarship altogether for politics, while a third group attempts to bridge the two worlds but survives on the margins of academia. Underlying all choices recurs a certain social logic that Charle deploys persuasively throughout the text.

In this fine book there are unfortunately too many loose ends. We are alerted at the beginning to the prospect that, subject to two great upheavals in half a century—the first at the hands of power (Haussmann), the second at the hands of revolutionaries (the Commune)—Paris is a city where nothing is fixed and hence all is permitted. This is a remarkable idea for approaching the interchange between culture and politics at the turn of the century, but where it leads is left to the reader. “Hommes doubles” as cultural brokers get a few more pages but not many more. To the contrary a discussion of Taine, Seignobos, and Léon Blum is allotted a long middle section, but just how they fit in is not always clear.

Still this is a book that rarely disappoints, and when it does it is only from failure
of development, scarcely failure of conception. Even the least satisfactory middle section should be read for its portraits of Taine and Seignobos, especially the reconstruction of the latter’s extraordinary understanding of how to do history. Charle too has that understanding, and when he writes of power, strategies, trajectories, and choices, and the lightbulbs light up, we can only be insistent that he give us more.

Michael Miller

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This collection of essays on the Popular Front and French colonies will be of considerable interest to historians of interwar France and of modern colonialism. The last major study to consider the watershed period of 1936 to 1938 outre-mer was William B. Cohen’s important 1972 article, “The Colonial Policy of the Popular Front” (French Historical Studies 7, no. 3 [1972]: 368–93). Cohen had determined that, despite laudable intentions at reform, Léon Blum’s left-wing Popular Front government’s actual forays into the colonial realm were timid at best. This new, detailed tome elucidates how a seemingly promising experiment in “colonial humanism” and “liberal colonialism” played itself out in a colonial context. In so doing, this volume considers the “exporting” of Popular Front reforms to a variety of colonial settings, from Indochina to Cameroon and Tunisia.

As with many edited conference proceedings, the essays in this book vary widely in focus and methodological approach. Gary Wilder’s piece, “Historicising Popular Front Colonial Policy in French West Africa,” constitutes a polemic for viewing the emergence of liberal colonialism as fundamentally related to a “transformation in the form of state power” (p. 37). A similarly ambitious—though much less focused—contribution by Don LaCross attempts to compare the surveillance and policing of lepers in New Caledonia in the 1930s with recent French nuclear testing in the South Pacific. In contrast to these essays informed by the work of Michel Foucault, articles by Gilles de Gante’s, Panivong Norindr, Michel Brot, Jean Koufan, and France Tostain concentrate on the impact of the Popular Front on specific colonies, namely, Indochina, Guinea, Cameroon, Tunisia, and Algeria, respectively. The result is a multifarious approach, which breaks the volume into two parts—the first theoretical, the second empirical.

In the second category, three contributions in particular stand out for both their research and broader implications. Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch’s chapter on the Popular Front in West Africa represents a strenuous refutation of two theses—that of the Popular Front’s colonial failure and of its complicity in the colonial project. To condemn Blum’s government for having operated within the colonial framework is fundamentally anachronistic, she contends, for even the most progressive voices in France at the time could not envision outright decolonization. Coquery-Vidrovitch stresses above all the wide-scale unionization of French West Africa, enabled by Popular Front legislation.

Ghislaine Lydon’s rich chapter delves into a specific report commissioned by Blum’s government. Lydon traces the implementation in 1936 of new legislation on the status of women in French West Africa, focusing in particular on a mission of inquiry on the
condition of women, led by Denise Moran Savineau—a rare woman in the French colonial administration at the time.

In his study of the Popular Front and Indochina, Panivong Norindr deftly exposes the flagrant contradictions of “liberal colonialism” in the fundamentally uneven playing field that was French colonial Indochina. In particular, Norindr shows how Blum’s colonial minister Marius Moutet was transformed, once in power, from colonial opposition reformer into a pragmatist, clearly compromising his socialist ideals in the process.

In the end, however, this volume raises nearly as many questions as it addresses. A very basic yardstick of colonial reform in this period involved the number of indigenous naturalizations. In an era when even Communist parties advocated naturalization and equal rights, rather than national liberation, naturalization statistics served as important markers of colonial “liberalism.” And yet curiously such figures are never discussed at any length in this book, outside of Tostain’s chapter on the Popular Front in Algeria.

Notwithstanding their agreement that the Popular Front constituted a watershed, the authors remain clearly at odds over the actual impact and significance of Popular Front reforms. On the one hand, Norindr concludes that the Popular Front failed to effect any major “concrete achievement” (p. 243), and LaCross posits that the Popular Front actually exacerbated colonial injustices by “reinvent[ing] colonial authority” (p. 59). On the other hand, Coquery-Vidrovitch defends the Popular Front’s record, viewing it as the “first step” on the path to decolonization (p. 155). Norindr takes issue directly with Coquery-Vidrovitch, arguing that a critical assessment of the contradictions of “liberal colonialism” is entirely warranted (p. 242). At first sight, these differences of interpretation might be ascribed to local particularities. However, Indochina, the colony studied by Norindr, accounted for 1,532 of the 2,028 total political prisoners amnestied in all French colonies under the Popular Front, as Patrice Morlat pointed out in his La répression coloniale au Vietnam, 1908–1940 (Paris, 1990). Indochina was, in other words, one of the colonies where the impact of the Popular Front was most pronounced.

The origins of this historiographical debate must then stem instead from a difference of appreciation: to Norindr, the phrase “colonisation altruiste,” coined by Blum’s Minister of the Colonies Marius Moutet, represents a flagrant contradiction in terms. To Coquery-Vidrovitch, it constitutes a short-lived middle ground—an ultimately unsuccessful effort at reforming the colonial system from within. At the end of this ideologically charged debate, however, Lydon’s question remains largely unanswered: Did the Popular Front’s “fleeting ideals leave a long-term mark in any colonial context?” (p. 170).

Though a collective volume can admittedly rarely aspire to comprehensiveness, some geographical and chronological omissions also emerge from this book. It is striking that none of the so-called anciennes colonies of Réunion, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guiana, or the quatre communes of Sénégal were examined. These colonies, which had featured universal male suffrage since 1848, would have presented fruitful sites in which to assess Popular Front reforms in other colonial contexts—ones already presenting a thriving political culture.

Chronologically, one is struck by the curious jump between chapters 5 and 6—a leap that takes the reader from 1938 to 1944. Though Martin Shipway’s study of the impact of the Popular Front on the 1944 Brazzaville conference is both useful and interesting, the book’s effacing of six crucial years obfuscates the reductionist turn taken by Vichy in 1940. This point is alluded to no fewer than six times in the book’s introduction—never to be raised again. What the authors describe as a “subsequent attempt to turn the colonial clock back under Vichy” (p. 25) actually marked a critical
reaction against the perceived spirit of the Popular Front (note that the myth of the Popular Front might indeed be its most enduring colonial legacy)—a reaction that should be situated within a decade of almost schizophrenic French colonial outlooks. These had ranged from oppression to “liberalism,” association to assimilation, and from disinterest to the sort of fascination that the colonies evoked during the 1931 colonial exhibit. In this sense, the Popular Front’s brand of colonialism—if such a brand can even be discerned—must be situated within a broader context, if only because the colonial proconsuls serving between 1936 and 1938 neither arrived nor disappeared overnight.

In the final analysis, the contrasting methodologies and conclusions within this book render it a rich and interesting collection, one that broaches a crucial period in French colonial history. The text successfully dissects a unique colonial moment, when a reformist yet clearly not anticolonial government came to power. The hope stirred by Blum’s election alone—arguably more than any single concrete reform—served to alter and even shake parts of the colonial edifice.

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Women in Culture and Society. Edited by Catharine R. Stimpson.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. Pp. xxi + 285. $45.00 (cloth); $20.00 (paper).

At the 1990 Paris conference on Vichy, Miranda Pollard took on the might of the French academic establishment with her paper on women. The waves of disapproval were almost visible. It is not that the audience disagreed with her views; they were simply loathe to concede that women were deserving of study. Things have, of course, changed in the intervening decade, and it is to be hoped that the French historians will be as positive about this work as British or American ones.

The Reign of Virtue places the gender issue so centrally in the analysis of Vichy that it is difficult to imagine now how the subject managed without it. Pollard argues that the regime mobilized gender for political purposes, redefining sexual roles for the program of moral regeneration that was the National Revolution. “Marianne, the politically charged, feminine symbol of the Republic, could be replaced by the French Mother” (p. 49). The Fête des Mères would take over from July 14. The defeat of France in June 1940 had been among other things an act of emasculation: 1.5 million soldiers were now prisoners of war in Germany, and Marshal Pétain stepped in as a father (or grandfather) figure to protect the French womenfolk. Vichy’s policies for women, however, were deeply antifeminist, by which Pollard means they were based on an assumption of the radical inferiority of women because of their nature. So in schools an emphasis was placed on enseignement ménager to train wives and mothers, not bluestockings, while physical education was designed to make boys strong but women graceful. Having mobilized women for war, the regime now sent married women in public services such as education back to the home under a law of October 10, 1940. Legislation against contraception, divorce, and abortion at best regulated women’s sexuality and at worst desexualized them.

These antifeminist policies, Pollard demonstrates, were not all or systematically enforced. The Vichy state did not have the organizational force and coherence to imple-
ment its cherished ideals, and women’s issues’ lobbies did not always push in the same
direction. Because of the absence of so many men, women were frequently catapulted
into position as heads of households and even heads of farms and businesses. Labor
shortages meant that they had to do traditional male jobs such as secrétaires de mairie.
The insatiable German desire for foreign labor hit women too by 1944, in spite of the
strong opposition of the churches. The absence of husbands led to wives’ sleeping with
other Frenchmen and even with the enemy, to increased prostitution and family break-
down. Hunger and hardship, finally, made abortion more, rather than less, likely.

Pollard argues that Vichy was an extraordinary moment in French history, but she
does not fall into the trap of seeing it conjured from nowhere. Natalism and familialism
had built up a head of steam between the wars and the Code de la Famille, which was
designed to encourage and support large families, dated from 1939. The basic law
against abortion dated from 1920, while in 1922 the Senate, dominated by the Radical
party, threw out a bill on female suffrage. Enseignement ménager went back to the
1890s at least, while the origin of French antifeminism is lost in the mists of time. She
is also clear that the Liberation in 1944, while it may have given women the vote, did
not change the traditional support of the state for the family.

Three small points of criticism might be made. First, Pollard argues that the family
was “not open to multiple interpretations; its legitimate and patriarchal form alone
would undergird the state” (p. 34). This is seen as unduly oppressive, which it was,
but what needs also to be asked is how far the family could in practice be remodeled.
Arguably, with so many men away this was the era of the matriarchal family in which
many women were empowered as main breadwinners and heads of household as well
as childbearers and educators. When the men returned they had a choice, either to
rebuild the family cocoon that had been threatened or to get rid of their partners and
start again. The law stood, but women were not powerless to change their lives.

A second point is that Pollard’s book is fundamentally discourse history. Women,
she says, were “as much an immensely powerful symbolic character as an actual con-
stituency of sexed citizens” (p. 5). The fact that Vichy did not have the money or clout
to deliver its policies on women is not seen to be a problem; “family politics is not
just about discrete policies or budgets, it is the official discursive shifts and realign-
ments around ‘Family’ that count” (p. 119). In the unraveling of these discourses Pol-
lard is incomparable, but one yearns for a few more real women in her story. The only
chapter in which she really does this is in her analysis of the abortion cases that went
before the Tribunal d’Etat and resulted in the guillotining of Marie-Louise Giraud,
immortalized in Claude Chabrol’s Une Affaire de Femmes. Here she uses the archives
admirably to tell the stories of a sample of women and the predicaments they faced,
as well as the ways they were vilified by the state.

My last point is that the thrust of Pollard’s account is that women were squeezed
into roles they did not want, oppressed by ideals they could not match, victimized by
laws that punished all aberrations. There is a danger that this analysis in itself makes
women passive. Vichy made women into saints and witches, but they could also choose,
like Mme Hubert of Allonnes in Anjou, who apologized for not attending the ceremony
to collect her medal for carrying on the family business in the absence of her husband,
a POW, precisely because he was absent and she was minding the shop. Bad women
there were as well as good, my favorite being Mme Longuepée, who held the little
town of Chinon in thrall with her extravagant denunciations of men in high places. Of
course this “badness” was also constructed, but it was constructed as much at the
Liberation when men returned to put women back in their places, and Pollard has little
to say about the issue of head shaving of women accused of sleeping with Germans,
now tackled in the literature. Maybe it is unfashionable to call for more flesh and blood, or maybe the time has come for another change.

ROBERT GILDEA

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Reading Tony Judt’s book brings us back to a quietly retreating world, a world of intolerance, which, even if still close, suddenly seems part of an almost buried past. It is as if the Charles Peguys and Emile Zolas, the Maurice Barrès and Charles Maurras, the Henri Barbusses and Paul Nizans have all ceased to speak. Is this to say that Judt’s book arrived too late, that it conjures up with difficulty a world of ideological confrontations that have become almost foreign to us? On the contrary—The Burden of Responsibility continues to concern us because it successfully brings to life conflicts that could emerge anew if by chance the prophets succeed in making themselves heard again. Judt believes that French intellectuals’ engagement in the name of great causes often leads them to take irresponsible positions that are too little attuned to the complexities of the real world. His study deals with three exceptions to this rule: three intellectuals who, in his view, knew how to escape the prevailing irresponsibility by remaining “outsiders,” who shared certain moral qualities that, combined with an undeniable physical courage, pushed them to rebel against the erring ways of their own camp, three “loners” who rejected prefabricated ideas, ideological recipes, and conformity based on ignorance and paid dearly for their attachment to “responsible” behavior. For Judt, these three—León Blum, Albert Camus, and Raymond Aron—join the sparse cohort of “men in dark times” dear to Hannah Arendt.

In a few rapid pages, Judt evokes the multiple dimensions of the extraordinary person who was León Blum—the man of letters who knew how to make himself heard in crowds, the socialist admirer of Jaurès who reclaimed his Jewishness, the republican who faced an immeasurable antisemitic hatred when he became, for many, the “Asiatic,” the “homosexual,” the “Palestinian.” And yet, Judt concedes, this “wanderer between the different French identities that he shared at various moments” (p. 84), this “outsider,” nonetheless failed as much in his handling of the political economy of the Popular Front as in the way he faced up to the Spanish Civil War. Judt deems that the political culture of Blum’s party (that is to say, its inveterate Marxism and its use of rhetoric that recalled and regarded as the ultimate disgrace the distant participation of Alexandre Millerand in the political management of a “bourgeois” government) made Blum a prisoner of an ideological logic limiting his freedom of action. Did the dominant culture ultimately permeate the behavior of those who were the greatest “outsiders,” the most “solitary” and least blinded by ideology, even those who were capable of demonstrating, in extreme circumstances such as those of Vichy, an exemplary courage and determination that separated them in this moment of truth from many of their former political allies?

Another historical period is brought to the fore when Judt considers Camus. We see Camus and Sartre, Camus and Algeria, Camus and the insurgents of Eastern Europe,
a “man like Václav Havel” (p. 122). To Hannah Arendt, who met him in 1952, “he is, undoubtedly, the best man now in France. He is head and shoulders above the other intellectuals” (quoted in Jeffrey C. Isaac, Arendt, Camus, and Modern Rebellion [New Haven, Conn., 1992]). Camus is the “inorganic intellectual” (pp. 129–30), rejecting the partisan brigade and the justification of means by ends, even those of revolution; he is an “apolitical man,” lacking any partisan affiliation, a “rootless cosmopolitan” launched into a republican universe through a republican meritocracy to which he would remain loyal. One of the rare intellectuals who did not belong to the elite of the Normaliens who dominated the Paris intellectual scene, Camus would dedicate his Nobel Prize to his elementary school teacher, Louis Germain. According to Judt, Camus and Blum appear as “mirrors of France” (pp. 82, 133) in the sense that both demonstrated an independent spirit even while they acceded to the dominant rhetoric of their own camp, which exculpated Lenin’s Russian Revolution, even while they persisted in placing their only hope in a mythical working class and disdained a social democracy that they scorned as reformist despite actually feeling close to it.

There remains Raymond Aron, the “peripheral insider,” the “little comrade” of Sartre who was the first to see Tocqueville as one of the key authors of a modern society confronted by the advantages and dangers of individualism. Aron appears in Judt’s book as the ironic destroyer of all mindlessly accepted ideas, the polemista who let the air out of French windbags, the scholar obsessed all his life with the richness of Marxism, who still had the courage to ridicule all the Holy Families, including that of Althusser. Aron the member of the Resistance, Aron uncertain about the significance of his Jewish identity, Aron the philosopher-sociologist who “reasoned with Sartre” but in the end considered his own work as less important than that of his little comrade who was nevertheless so often mistaken.

One cannot count, in this work, the infinite variations on the themes of isolation, marginality, exteriority, peripheral belonging, solitude, the absence of roots, cosmopolitanism. These three thinkers, philosophers, men of action obsessed by the truth are, page after page, presented as strangers to a French society still and continually obsessed by a rhetoric of the absolute. They are opposed in every way to the posture of a necessarily irresponsible French intellectual. These heroes upon whom “the burden of responsibility” rests, these “patriots” who, even as they are likened to “un-French” thinkers, nevertheless brilliantly incarnate the French spirit and reflect best the contradictions internal to French society (pp. 83–85, 89, 101–3, 133–35, 180–81)—these “un-French” are at the same time intensely French. For the better but also for the worse? Judt never ceases to praise the independent spirit of these men who knew how to avoid constant accusation, how to speak the truth, and how to proclaim the meaning of history. But regretfully, grudgingly he confesses that these Jansenists could themselves go astray, misunderstand the sense of things, acquiesce in their turn to the political culture of the hexagon. This is true of Blum especially, this “great Frenchman” who so often surrendered to the prejudices of his camp; less true of Camus, this “best man in France”; and still less true of Aron, this “greatest intellectual dissenter of his age” who nonetheless retains a “distinctive French tone,” which Judt sees as unfortunately removed from analytical philosophy and the English liberal tradition obsessed by ethics and rights. Decidedly, even these intrepid “un-French” remain, in Judt’s eyes, too French.

Pierre Birnbaum

University of Paris I
Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999. Pp. xiv + 261. $49.95 (cloth); $17.95 (paper).

The political philosopher Claude Lefort criticizes political science for reifying a distinct realm of politics whose facts are abstracted from the integrated totality of social life that itself is political. Edward DeClair’s institutional analysis of the French National Front (FN) exemplifies the limits of such a narrow disciplinary optic. Deploying election data and public opinion surveys, questionnaires and interviews with Front leaders, DeClair uses quantitative methods to demonstrate “how this previously impotent and marginal political party . . . evolved to become the only thriving political force in French politics today” (p. 10).

DeClair explains that the Front has been the only organization in this century to unify modern France’s various far right currents—monarchism, Catholicism, antisemitism, xenophobia, nationalism—into a durable national force. With direct links to Vichy and the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète, the National Front was created in 1972 by members of the far right still enraged about Charles de Gaulle’s “betrayal” of French Algeria and reacting against the Marxist student revolt of 1968. This organizational descendant of antirepublican traditions decided to become a formal party and pursue electoral politics led by the experienced Jean-Marie Le Pen. DeClair acknowledges the importance of this decision but does not adequately explore its genesis or implications. Instead he focuses on the development of the Front into a legitimate and “solidly anchored mass-based political party” through a series of elections in the seventies, eighties, and nineties (pp. 212–13). Its national breakthrough occurred in 1984 when it elected ten candidates to the European Parliament. By the midnineties the movement was regularly winning 15 percent of the vote in national legislative and presidential elections. It also elected mayors to the cities of Marignane, Toulon, Orange, and Vitrolles.

This is an organizational analysis of the National Front’s structure, ideology, leadership, and constituency. DeClair argues that the FN cannot be reduced to the person of Le Pen, cannot be limited to the issue of immigration, and cannot be dismissed as an aberrant protest vote. He demonstrates that the Front is a political machine with a program addressing unemployment, government intervention, insecurity, abortion, European integration, and national identity as well as immigration and must be taken seriously. Yet, by treating the Front as just one political party among others—a case study in the “life-cycle” of parties (p. 48)—DeClair himself fails to take it seriously enough. His quantitative approach depoliticizes the Front; it does not recognize the FN as a qualitatively significant national phenomenon. He reduces it to a formal organization—a vote-maximizing machine—whose ideology is secondary. He explains that the Front began as an assemblage of political marginals, then promoted economic neoliberalism and recruited the middle-class Right, and more recently courted the French working classes through a protectionist nationalism opposed to immigration and European integration. DeClair does not consider the converse possibility that the National Front is a xenophobic social movement whose strategy is to participate in electoral politics in order to gain legitimacy and public power.

This book slides from describing the way the Front has achieved legitimacy to actually legitimizing the movement, perhaps unintentionally. DeClair sees the Front as a nonviolent participant in the democratic process and explains, “I have consciously eschewed the phrase extreme right when describing the party, instead cautiously em-
ploying the less inflammatory label far right” (p. 203). (He includes monarchism, antisemitism, nationalism, and xenophobia as elements of this far right tradition.) He also calls those scholars politically biased who identify the Front as neofascist (p. 202). Rather than explore the fundamentally racist character of this movement, he reduces Le Pen’s antisemitism (i.e., a reference to Nazi gas chambers as a detail of history and a pun linking a Jewish minister’s name to a crematorium) to a matter of “rhetorical excesses” and a “distasteful episode” (p. 90). DeClair believes the FN is “a model of party organization and discipline” (p. 158) and treats its refusal to allow France to become multiracial or multicultural as an example of organizational resolve: “Unlike the mainstream parties, the National Front has taken a stance on this issue and refuses to equivocate” (p. 205).

DeClair suggests that a “growing Islamic presence within [France’s] borders” due to “decades of liberal immigration policies” naturally creates a “national identity crisis” and will “force France to redefine itself and its commitment to secularism” (p. 205). Implying that there is a transparent relationship between depressed social conditions and hatred toward foreigners, DeClair writes, “Lashing out at immigrant populations is clearly misguided but easily understood given the double-digit unemployment” (p. 207). He construes the problem of immigration as a demographic crisis rather than a political creation and displaces anti-immigrant sentiment onto an already xenophobic public: “Many French citizens feel threatened by the Islamic immigration from North Africa, and the Front has expertly manipulated their misgivings to its political advantage” (p. 124). He does not explore how National Front politics themselves contribute to popular racism. Instead, he reminds us that the established parties themselves passed restrictive immigration legislation in the nineties. He correctly points out that the Front has influenced mainstream French political debate and that the center Right appropriates FN positions in order to steal its votes. But the fact that anti-immigration is socially general neither makes the National Front less extreme nor should it legitimize xenophobia as one among many campaign issues.

DeClair concludes, “The future does indeed belong to the National Front” (p. 224). If so, it is not because this better-organized party out-campaigned the others. Rather, an extremist social movement with populist support has insinuated itself into the parliamentary system. The point would not be simply to denounce or dismiss the Front as fascist but to ask what structural and conjunctural forces have made such a movement publicly acceptable and what its implications may be for the republican order. Such an analysis would have to view the National Front as more than a typical political party and engage recent scholarship on the new cultural racism, the racialization of immigration, and the way fascism does assume electoral forms.

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Die Revolte des Patriziats: Der toskanische Adelsliberalismus im Risorgimento.


The recent, fine work on the long-neglected topic of Italian nobilities in the nineteenth century, especially that of Anthony L. Cardoza on the Piedmontese nobility and of Marco Meriggi on the nobility in Lombardy-Venetia, has now been complemented by Thomas Kroll’s superb study of the hereditary elite of Tuscany during the Risorgi-
mento. Kroll makes an important contribution in two respects. First, he provides an outstanding political, socioeconomic, and cultural treatment of the Tuscan nobility from the beginning of the nineteenth century through unification in 1860–61. Second, his focus on the nobility supplies us at the same time with a regional perspective on the Risorgimento that calls into question much of the traditional, teleological historiography depicting a linear road—from revolts in Piedmont and Naples in the 1820s to Mazzini’s activities after 1830 to the revolution of 1848—to Italian unification. As Kroll convincingly argues, “the Risorgimento in Tuscany was not a bourgeois-national movement, but a revolt of the nobility against the centralized bureaucracy of the state” (p. 392). More fundamentally, his work helps redefine our understanding of the “bourgeois century,” calling into question many of our assumptions about “modernity” and its boundaries. At a time when the nobility had allegedly already yielded its place to the bourgeoisie, the patriciate emerges from these pages as the central player in Tuscany, many decades after 1800, in the political process that led ultimately, albeit indirectly, to Italian unification. In this process, members of the Tuscan middle classes assumed a distinctly subordinate role. Arno Mayer’s provocative thesis about the “persistence of the old regime,” which has otherwise been much revised in recent years by historians, here receives important empirical support. Kroll’s redirection of our attention from the middle and working classes to the nobility is a necessary corrective, as it suggests the profound extent to which older hereditary elites shaped the modern world.

A key aspect of Kroll’s argument is his rejection of the notion of the embourgeoisement of the nobility, a thesis that has won wide currency especially among historians in the German-speaking world, where research into the nobility of the modern era has remained an unloved stepchild of the flourishing historiography of the middle classes. Kroll attacks the thesis on a number of fronts. Most significantly, he disproves the theory posited by Marxist scholars that the liberalism (moderatismo) espoused by Tuscan patricians resulted from their adoption of a dynamic agrarian capitalism and an alliance with bourgeois entrepreneurs. In fact, Tuscany remained an overwhelmingly agrarian society, where most noble landowners suffered neither an economic eclipse after 1815 nor adopted the agrarian capitalist reforms espoused by a progressive few among their number, such as Marchese Cosimo Ridolfi and Baron Bettino Ricasoli, whose efforts have drawn inordinate attention. Most patricians clung to the traditional Tuscan form of agriculture (mezzadria), a stance attributed by Kroll to the persistence of older noble and anticapitalist ways of thinking about economic affairs. In the patrician espousal of free trade, Kroll similarly fails to find any positive correlation between “modern” political and economic thinking. Free trade had been introduced in Tuscany in the eighteenth century, and its preservation after 1815 presented the patriciate with the opportunity “to prevent the effective modernization of agriculture using the vocabulary of modern political economy” (p. 90). Kroll rejects the idea that such readiness on the part of the nobility to innovate in defense of its interests, whether in the selective adoption of new ideas or a limited social opening to the middle classes, amounted to embourgeoisement. His study convincingly posits the ability of the old Tuscan patriciate to maintain its sociocultural distinctiveness throughout the epoch of the Risorgimento.

Kroll’s primary thesis is that the Risorgimento in Tuscany constituted a revolt of the nobility against the bureaucratic state and that this revolt aimed for the constitutional reestablishment of the rule of the nobility and not the creation of a national state. His sophisticated approach in support of this argument incorporates three elements: the socioeconomic history of the nobility, the political history of the Risorgimento, and
the all but unexplored administrative history of Italy before unification. The presenta-
tion is both analytical and narrative in form. To reinforce his conclusions, Kroll also
undertook a prosopographical investigation of 180 noble delegates to the Tuscan par-
liaments of 1848–49 and 1859, as well as to the parliament in Turin following the
Tuscan plebiscite of March 1860. He gathered systematic data on the political and
administrative careers of liberal nobles, their marriage patterns and kinship, and mem-
bbership in voluntary associations. This work further enabled him, importantly, to char-
acterize the relationship of the patriciate to other sections of the Tuscan population,
especially the bourgeoisie.

Kroll shifts the focus from the traditional milestones of the history of the Risorgi-
mento, instead orienting his presentation on the caesuras of Tuscan administrative
history from the Napoleonic era to unification. In the first of his four chapters, he traces
the gradual alienation of the patriciate from the bureaucratic-absolutist state established
by the Habsburg grand dukes after 1815. The nobility’s hopes for a restoration of the
pre-Napoleonic constitutional order remained thereby unfulfilled. In the middle of the
1820s, the expansionist personnel and administrative policies of Leopold II began dis-
lodging the patricians from their previous, dominant place in the central bureaucracy
and, even worse from their perspective, in local government. The small Tuscan officer
kors, which enjoyed little social prestige, and a minimal diplomatic service offered
no alternatives for noble ambition, while the grand duke’s adoption of a generous,
meritocratic policy of ennoblement, which was closely connected to the expansion of
the bureaucracy, presented a threat to the hereditary elite and its position at the grand
ducal court. By the 1850s, most patricians had turned their backs on the ruler’s house-
hold and retinue. Before shifting his attention directly to the rise of noble liberalism,
Kroll devotes a short second chapter to a discussion of the agricultural economic basis
of the nobility that in turn guaranteed its social predominance in primarily agrarian
Tuscany. A third chapter treats the recourse of Florentine magnates such as Marchese
Gino Capponi and Marchese Cosimo Ridolfi, beginning in the 1830s, to political lib-
eralism as a consequence of the tension between the nobility and the bureaucratic state.
Here Kroll explores the social mechanisms, such as its unique network of kinship
connections and its salons, that facilitated patrician control of the liberal movement
when it actually emerged in the mid-1840s with a concrete reform program aimed at
the centralized bureaucracy of the state. Noble domination of the academies (especially
the Accademia dei Georgofili) and voluntary associations, which furnished important
opportunities for political discussions and which in other states (Germany) were a
domain of the middle classes, further augmented the patrician advantage. Kroll con-
cludes this chapter with a well-documented discussion of the bourgeois moderati
as the political clientele of the liberal patriciate. He concludes that "despite the presence
of numerous members of the bourgeoisie, the moderatismo of the Risorgimento most
resembled a 'party of the nobility' of the ancien régime" (p. 175).

Fully half of the text is devoted to the fourth and last chapter, "The Attack on the
Bureaucratic Monarchy," which covers the period from 1847, when the moderati first
actively entered the political arena, to unification. This subtly argued section constitutes
a major revision of the traditional historiography of the Risorgimento. Kroll shows that
the latter, which nationalist historians have mythologized as the history of the creation
of the national state, was in substantial measure a conflict of an antinational nobility
and the modern bureaucratic state in Tuscany. A key aspect of this struggle was the
question of local control, which the patricians regarded as the sine qua non of their
sociopolitical dominance. Here, the Tuscan nobility resembled its counterparts else-
where on the Continent in the nineteenth century, even though such control in Tuscany
lacked the feudal basis it had, for example, in Bohemia. Throughout the upheavals of 1848–49 and the years of reaction in the 1850s, the patricians never lost sight of their goal of creating a constitutional order resting on the political domination of the landowners at the provincial and local levels. Unification, according to Kroll, was merely “the unforeseen consequence” (p. 201) of this process.

WILLIAM D. GODSEY, JR.

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The Society of Jesus was prominent in the Portuguese empire—in Africa, Asia, and Brazil—and Portuguese Jesuits were prominent from Nagasaki to Maranhão. But the historiography is heavily weighted toward India, China, and Japan, to the neglect of Africa and Brazil. Furthermore, whereas Italian Jesuits, notably in Asia, and Spanish Jesuits in Spanish America and the Philippines have been the objects of international scholarly attention, the great Jesuit missionaries of Brazil—Manuel da Nóbrega, José de Anchieta, and António Vieira—are scarcely known other than in studies predominantly by Portuguese and Brazilian scholars, their writings are not translated into English, and none has been accorded a full-length critical biography in English.

Vieira was a towering figure in the Luso-Brazilian world of the second half of the seventeenth century: indefatigable missionary; inspiring preacher; sometime resident in Brazil, Portugal, Amsterdam, and Rome; superior of Jesuit missions in Maranhão; censured by the Portuguese inquisition only to be granted papal immunity; confessor to the queen of Sweden; royal emissary and diplomat; and adviser and confidant—on matters political, economic, and spiritual—of Portuguese monarchs. The last thirty years have witnessed a surge in scholarly interest in Vieira. Thomas Cohen has consulted all primary and secondary printed sources to provide a meticulously researched, rigorously argued, balanced, illuminating, and, in many regards, revisionist study. He has selected three periods in Vieira’s life for close analysis: the mission to the Amazon (1653–61); his years in the custody of the inquisition (1663–67); and his residence in Brazil from 1681 until his death in 1697. Six chapters examine the nature of the Jesuit mission in Brazil as framed by Manuel da Nóbrega and parallelisms between Nóbrega’s and Vieira’s social thought; they trace the evolution of Vieira’s missionary strategy, theology, and social thought, his defense before the inquisition, and his millenarian vision for Portugal and its empire. Cohen departs from his predecessors in several regards: by focusing on the apostolic dimension, he emphasizes that Vieira was first and foremost a priest for whom the pastoral dimension was the driving force in his life; he views Vieira’s experience in Maranhão as pivotal to his intellectual and apostolic formation; and he situates the colony, not the metropolis, at the center of his study to offset a markedly European perspective in the historiography.

Vieira did not shy from controversy and was no stranger to personal attacks. Cohen admirably traces the inner tension between the man of letters and the man of action; between the theologian and the pastor; between the visionary and the pragmatist; between the local priest and the national figure; between the man of God and the strategist attuned to factionalism at court and to economic and political contexts and priorities; between the missionary in his canoe in the Amazon and the missionary in the service
of a pastoral enterprise in which he saw Portugal as the leader in the conversion of
Jews in Europe and of non-Christians in America. Vieira was sensitive to the potential
for conflict arising from divergences between metropolitan goals and colonial aspira-
tions and between Portuguese imperial expansion and missionary imperatives. What
emerges is a very human Vieira: impatient, dynamic, obdurate, intolerant of naysayers
and the faint-hearted, compassionate toward the voiceless and dispossessed, and driven
by his faith, his missionary vocation, his strength of intellect, his convictions, and his
millenarian visions. His writings variously reflect optimism, frustration, anger, and
dissillusion. Some tenets of his thought remain constant: a critical stance toward secular
and religious authority and imperial and ecclesiastical institutions; impatience with
church leaders in Portugal; unwavering confidence in Portuguese crown support for the
missions and the singular apostolic role of Portuguese monarchs; and conviction in the
appropriateness of Jesuit leadership in the mission field and of the Society acting in
collaboration with the crown. Vieira was critical of different groups in Portugal and
Brazil: of representatives of the crown in Brazil; of Portuguese ministers of state and
the nobility whom he suggested should exchange their love of the chase for apostolic
service in the missionary enterprise; of colonists in Brazil; and of men of the cloth
whom he chided for placing self-interest ahead of vigorous engagement in apostolic
service. Vieira was vocal and public in excoriating abusive behavior toward Indians in
Brazil. His mastery of pulpit oratory was calculated to gain a wide audience for his
opinions.

Based on his experiences in the Amazon, in which the expulsion of the Jesuits from
Maranhão was a defining moment, Vieira modified his pastoral strategy toward the
Indians and Portuguese settlers. Initially, Vieira had seen his ministry as being both to
Portuguese and Indians, was set to pursue an inclusionary pastoral strategy of coop-
eration between settlers and Jesuits, and hoped to create a society of apostles. Expe-
rience dashed such aspirations. Vieira instead espoused a policy of segregation of In-
dians and settlers, advocated no further collaboration with settlers or institutionalized
religion in favor of an exclusively Jesuit apostleship, and with a ministry whose sole
focus was on Indians. Even when armed with legislation (1655) protecting Indians and
supporting the authority of the Jesuits—a personal success for Vieira—on his return
to Brazil he adopted a conciliatory stance toward the colonists. He was to renounce his
initial premise that a modus operandi could be worked out so that the missionary church
could coexist with the institution of slavery. Here he prevaricated: instead of criticizing
the institution, Vieira condemned human greed and the practice of slavery. Early as-
sertion of the primacy of language skills in the work of conversion was tempered in
later sermons acknowledging the value of apostolic uses of silence and sacrifice.

Cohen is at his best when engaging in exegesis to reveal rhetorical and interpretive
strategies pursued by Vieira and the prophetic views he developed in prison on the
Fifth Empire. One rhetorical strategy was his inversion of European perceptions—for
example, that Italian was more “barbarous” than “barbarous” Indian languages, because
it distracted from missionary priorities and was associated with Rome; that Jesuits
should preach in Indian languages—the “fire of tongues”—and not in Portuguese to
convert non-Christian peoples of America; that Portuguese should not expect non-
Christians to serve the Portuguese, rather it was they who should serve non-Christians;
that Maranhão was central to missions in the New World and that these, and not the
church in Portugal, would provide the stimulus for a unified Luso-Brazilian church;
that Indian history and religion could illuminate the Bible, and not vice versa; that
missionary activity in the New World and on the peripheries of empire was paramount
if the Portuguese were to fulfill their divinely inspired mission of being the successors
to the Israelites. Vieira’s experience in Amsterdam led him to assert the pivotal role of Jews in the missionary enterprise. Cohen demonstrates the influence of the Book of Daniel in the formulation of Vieira’s vision of the Fifth Empire and examines his messianic hopes and interpretations, use of biblical and Portuguese domestic prophecies, and how he relates prophecy to Portuguese history. Cohen examines the basis for Vieira’s conviction that Portugal would be the temporal locus for the Fifth Empire, which Christ had entrusted to the Portuguese and which would be ruled by a Portuguese monarch. Vieira gave equal importance to America and Europe in the history of the postprimitive church, with a privileged role for Brazil, and especially Maranhão in the prophecies of Isaiah. Cohen does full justice to Vieira’s bold agenda.

Vieira’s literary opus includes state papers, letters, sermons, defense briefs before the inquisition, prophetic treatises, and millenarian interpretations of Portuguese history. Individual scholars have drawn selectively on one or two groups of his writings, but Cohen has achieved mastery of the literary corpus. This permits him to contextualize Vieira’s ideas, identify interconnective relationships, and advance interpretations not apparent from a narrower reading. He is the first to make full use of the seven Lenten sermons (1655) to illuminate the complexity and development of Vieira’s pastoral concerns, and gives greater importance to the Exhortations than did his predecessors. This broad reading imbues his monograph with considerable authority in its reassessments and revisions of prior scholarship.

In lucid style and with precision of language, Cohen unravels rhetorical devices, chases down recondite references, and illuminates complex conceits. The translations into English are invaluable and, insofar as this reviewer could determine, accurate. Footnotes contain a wealth of information to be mined for factual, interpretive, and bibliographical data: that they are indexed is welcome. The author is to be congratulated on a superb and stimulating study of Vieira’s religious and social thought that places Vieira in the context of his age. This monograph is required reading for scholars of the history of ideas, prophecy, millenarianism, and missionology, as well as of the Portuguese Assistancy, and of Portugal at home and abroad.

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Having written several substantial articles on the seventeenth-century Habsburg nobility and related topics, Thomas Winkelbauer has now folded a great deal of that learning into a Habilitationsschrift. With its narrowly focused topic, mechanical organization, and superabundant detail, it has all of the lifeless hallmarks of this normally bulked-up genre. At the same time, the exhaustiveness of the scholarship and the thoughtful commentary that accompanies it raise questions of interest to the generality of scholars of early modern Europe. One should be prepared to read several of the more discursive footnotes, along with the text: this is a laborious undertaking but a rewarding one.

Winkelbauer carefully explains that he has chosen not to do a biography of his subject, whose family origins were in the northeast corner of Lower Austria, but to present him as a case study in the internal history of a noble type in the seventeenth-
century Habsburg empire. While he admits that he is not the first person to have said this of Gundaker von Liechtenstein, he certainly is the first to address the subject at such length and from so many perspectives. Winkelbauer concludes by declaring that he has carried out the mission he set for himself, but that to clinch his point he will have to do future studies, presumably of Liechtenstein’s generational cohorts. Whether other Austrian noble houses are as well documented as the Liechtensteins is an open question. One wishes him well in such a worthy enterprise, but with the uneasy suspicion that his family must prepare itself for the more of the absentee fatherhood he regrets in his dedication.

The success of his argument hangs largely on his demonstration of Gundaker’s “typicalness” for his class, the Austrian “noble elite,” who played such a preeminent role in the political life of the Habsburg monarchy from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Liechtenstein, who began his service with Emperor Matthias, was in and out of the imperial privy council from the 1620s through the 1640s and served as Emperor Ferdinand II’s treasury president from 1620 to 1622 and major domo (Obersthofmeister) from 1624 to 1625. He was certainly one among many of the noble strivers who enriched themselves mightily from the Habsburg spoils of the early Thirty Years’ War. Like others of his class, he played significant roles both in his provincial seats, especially in Lower Austria and Moravia, and the court. But not every member of the Austrian Herrenstand had an older brother—in this case, Karl von Liechtenstein—who, as a significant creditor to the Habsburg court, could make that arena more accessible for his younger sibling.

Gundaker von Liechtenstein was unusual in other important ways as well. At a time when even the native Catholic Bohemian nobility was abandoning Czech for the German spoken at court, Gundaker knew enough of the former tongue to conduct business on his estates when he had to. And how many men of his class had his remarkably versatile intelligence, which he exercised in cogent and creative memorandums on economic, military, administrative, and tax reform? Winkelbauer suggests that this young Liechtenstein was following the program suggested by the seventeenth-century Piedmontese administrative theorist Giovanni Botero. Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that most noblemen of his class could do even this, particularly since, as the author himself observes, some of these policies were clearly to the disadvantage of that group as a whole.

Winkelbauer’s categories of typicality can be very helpful—he describes Gundaker von Liechtenstein as a member of the Gesamtoesterreichische nobility, that is, someone with major holdings in all of the Habsburg domains of the seventeenth century. Not all of his classifications, however, are so successful. Among Winkelbauer’s most ambitious chapters is one that analyzes the varieties of conversion experiences from Protestantism to Catholicism among the Habsburg empire’s high aristocracy. Some men took this step only to hold important office in the Counter-Reformation court of Ferdinand II. Winkelbauer has quite correctly seen that far more thought and feeling often went into this process, some of it so personal that no outsider can grasp its totality. The clusters into which he puts these changes of confession, however, differ so greatly from one another that no meaningful generalization can be drawn from them. Nor are his categories always persuasive intellectually. One can understand what he means by “conversions as a more or less sudden turn around” (Konversionen als mehr oder weniger ploetzliche Umkehr), but the construct is too vague to be hermeneutically useful. But, as is so often the case in this book, the author’s analysis of the considerations and circumstances that accompanied conversions is both stimulating and instructive.

Perhaps the most questionable side to Winkelbauer’s thinking is his effort to situate
his study within the debate over seventeenth-century absolutism. He clearly supports those who argue that the term has only limited applicability to monarchical rule in early modern Europe: Gundaker von Liechtenstein and the cohort of influential aristocracy where he is placed allegedly function as one of the major checks on royal and imperial pretension. While it is certainly true that contemporary Habsburg rulers depended upon their noble elite both for financial support and for political and administrative service, they seem to have done as much to shape Liechtenstein's career and thinking as the other way around. The Habsburgs paid attention to him at their pleasure; most of Gundaker's suggestions for administrative reform fell on deaf ears among the emperors he served. Those of his ideas that were realized—most notably, changes in military organization—only furthered the centralization of power that was not in the long-term interests of his class. Indeed, most of this Liechtenstein's thinking seemed geared toward strengthening the sovereign state; one would have been hard put a century earlier to find any noble in the Habsburg holdings arguing for such policies. And, indeed, while Gundaker was a familiar at court, his treatment at the hands of Ferdinand II and Ferdinand III was startlingly cavalier. Liechtenstein died in 1658, his petition for a special benefice from the yet-to-be-crowned Leopold I unanswered.

For all of these defects, however, this is a work of powerful and illuminating scholarship. Any historian interested in the history of Europe's noble grandees of the seventeenth century and the social framework of the institutions in which they were active will find much that is useful in this book.

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This book was published on the 350th anniversary of the Peace of Westphalia, forty years after Fritz Dickmann's unsurpassed monograph on the same subject, and the same year that Dickmann's work was released in its seventh edition (Der Westfälische Frieden [Münster, 1998]). Heinz Duchhardt's collection of six English, one French, and thirty-two German articles was selected from a conference of proven international scholars held in 1996. Since Dickmann, research has evidently made progress. Duchhardt's collection, moreover, shows that the approach to the subject has changed: whereas postwar historians focused on the worth of the peace, current scholars emphasize its role in the development of the international community. Interest in the peace has extended from politics, diplomacy, military history, and law to all aspects of human life.

The book's concept is underlined by its division into five sections. The first part contains four articles on the question of whether the Peace of Westphalia was an epochal event at all. In particular, Heinz Schilling, Heinhard Steiger, and Winfried Schulze point out that 1648 was not a sudden beginning of Europe but rather an important step toward secular diplomacy, tolerance, and international law—a step, however, that had a previous history, and that also owed its importance to subsequent development. In the book's second and largest section, fifteen authors discuss the peace's European dimension. "Europe" is to be understood literally: we find studies on
the Ottoman Empire by István Hiller, on Russia and the Ukraine by Lyudmila Ivonina, and on England by Ronald G. Asch. The question seems to be no longer what the European powers’ role was in the Peace of Westphalia but rather the opposite—what the Peace of Westphalia meant for Europe. The broad look at Europe takes into consideration those powers that influenced the Congress of Westphalia but are usually not at the center of interest: for example, the very instructive article on the form and content of Spanish policy by María Victoria López-Cordón Cortezo, the article on Catalonia by Fernando Sánchez-Marcos, and that on Portugal by Pedro Cardim show that research on Iberia’s role is just beginning.

The strong emphasis on Europe, however, neglects the fact that the Thirty Years’ War was also the “German War.” The Holy Roman Empire is the subject only of the third section, which contains eight articles, half as many as the European part. Crucial aspects are missing: religious problems, the relation of the imperial estates to the Emperor, and the empire’s structure are present in many articles but are not analyzed. Military affairs have their own section (the fourth), which, however, contains only two articles. These, by Bernhard Sicken and Bernhard R. Kroener, are admittedly excellent on the question of military structure; the last is even equipped with tables and a map. Immediate and mediate estates of the empire or other influential groups are presented only as particular case studies; the only exception is the knights of the empire, discussed by Rudolf Endres. The other articles deal with three of the electors; Hesse-Kassel; Pomerania’s mediate estates; the Hanse; and Erfurt. Each is important in itself, but together they give no idea of the complexity of the empire that the foreign powers had to face. In general, this third section presents the empire as a sum of individual units, despite the fact that at the congress there were councils of immediate estates where common interests were discussed. Duchhardt admits in the preface to have declined a systematic view in favor of articles that offer new aspects and methods. This concept is ambitious enough to excuse lacunae, but it need not necessarily exclude systematic considerations. The book contains several overlapping subjects, including two articles on imperial and two on French policy. Leopold Auer’s description of the imperial aims in general and Konrad Repgen’s intriguing study of the details of the imperial-French negotiations in 1646 are perfectly complementary. However, the first-rate studies by Paul Sonnino and Lucien Bély deal with precisely the same question of France’s foreign policy against the background of the beginnings of the Fronde.

The really novel approaches to the Peace of Westphalia, on its cultural environment and reception, will be found mainly in the ten articles of the book’s fifth and final section. Among the new subjects investigated are the celebration and representation of the peace, which, however, is a bit overrepresented with four contributions. The message of this section is that the peace has a history not only of its genesis but of its reception as well. How the peace was celebrated gives an idea of what it meant for those who were affected. Its reception during subsequent centuries makes it clear that we do not simply study an event that took place more than 350 years ago, but that our view is influenced by a history of interpretation. Every generation, in its historical setting, has its own understanding of the peace, including Nazi attempts to abuse the subject for ideology, as Duchhardt himself points out in an article on the changing remembrance of the treaties of 1648.

The book’s use is facilitated by a solid index (which, however, includes the striking error of naming Napoleon as “king” of France, p. 877). Unfortunately, the index indicates only persons—no places, not to mention terms or facts. Territories and states can be found only if mentioned in relation to their rulers. A more extended index might have corresponded better with the book’s own concept.
The thirty-nine articles are not, of course, of the same quality. Some are founded on archival sources or other unused material and, thus, offer brand-new research; Konrad Repgen and Bernd Roeck (who deals with the celebration of the peace in different German territories) have even included copies of primary sources. Other articles, however, offer in a few pages a short overview of some facts and literature—often literature written by the same author. Thus a reader’s judgment will depend on the subject in which he is interested. In general, it is a most valuable contribution to our understanding of the “Westphalian Age” and its effects and will remain a standard for a long time.

Anuschka Tischer

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Constructing Modern Identities: Jewish University Students in Germany, 1815–1914. By Keith H. Pickus.

Keith Pickus’s study of German Jewish university students departs from earlier historical accounts that focused on antisemitism in the universities during the Kaiserreich and Jewish responses to it. Without denying the significance of these issues, he criticizes the tendency of historians to depict Jewish identity as contingent on antisemitism. As many memoirs and autobiographies reveal, it was possible to be a Jew in the socially exclusive environment of the German universities “without letting antisemitism become the focal point of one’s identity” (p. 139). His study emphasizes the roles of the university setting, social coterie, and pursuit of Bildung in the process of Jewish identity formation. This is an ambitious project. It covers the entire nineteenth century and includes Jews who participated in the corporate subculture of the universities as well as “free students” who were not affiliated with a society. The strength of this work lies in the chapters on the period after 1880, for which the source materials are more abundant and very rich.

Pickus contends that the founding of Jewish student associations from 1886 on represented “a significant paradigmatic shift in the process of Jewish identity formation” (p. 168). He takes issue with the historical interpretation of scholars who have viewed the emergence of the Jewish fraternities primarily as a response to antisemitism and exclusion from the long-established Burschenschaften and Corps. The formation of Jewish student societies, as he demonstrates convincingly, is also related to the evolving nature of German Jewish identity in the nineteenth century. During the long quest for emancipation most Jewish students balanced the requirements of German acculturation and loyalty to their Jewish heritage by relegating Jewishness to the private sphere. When Jews began to be excluded from university organizations, some students felt compelled to reassess their self-definition and the disjunction between their public and private identities. The young generation who joined the Jewish student associations “rejected the terms of Emancipation passed down to them by their parents and adopted public positions that accentuated their Jewishness” (p. 86).

Antisemitic harangues against the Judaization of German culture and the public debate on the “Jewish Question” in the early 1880s struck a resonant chord among German university students. The agitation of the Verein Deutscher Studenten, founded in the winter of 1880–81, thrust the “Jewish Question” into the foreground of student politics and created an aggressive climate in the universities. The Burschenschaften and Corps, which had been open to all honorable German students regardless of reli-
gious belief, now decided that Jewish students could not be equal members of academic society. Pickus’s useful but compressed analysis here could have brought out more clearly, as Norbert Kampe shows in Studenten und “Judenfrage” im Deutschen Kaiserreich: Die Entstehung einer akademischen Trägerschicht des Antisemitismus (Göttingen, 1988), that this antisemitic campaign took place when a crisis in the academic labor market, which produced a high level of unemployment for university graduates lasting up to 1900, was accompanied by the enrollment of an increasing number of students of lower-middle-class background.

Soon after the founding of Viadrina at the University of Breslau in 1886, similar Jewish fraternities were organized at other universities, and together they formed the interuniversity Kartell Convent deutscher Studenten jüdischer Glaubens (Association of German Students of the Jewish Faith). The Kartell Convent provided Jewish students with the opportunity to participate in the traditional corporate subculture of the German universities and promoted “a public identity in which being Jewish was placed on equal footing with being German” (p. 100). Jewish fraternities imitated the German corporations in their rituals, formal drinking and singing sessions, and promotion of an image of masculinity based on fencing and a “feudal” code of honor. They rejected the pattern of identity formation that relegated Jewishness to private life and chose to display their Jewishness proudly. Wearing their fraternity colors, Jewish students participated in official university functions and public commemorations. Pickus states that there was “little Jewish ‘substance’ to the identities” crafted by the members of Viadrina and that “traditional modes of identity formation such as religious worship and study of Torah and Talmud were not part of their cultural wardrobe” (p. 99). Although social coterie undoubtedly played a big role in the formation of Jewish identity within the Kartell Convent, the effect of the membership’s commitment to the defense of Jewish equality and dignity vis-à-vis antisemitism in this process should not be ignored.

Jewish nationalist associations were organized in the German universities in the 1890s and after the turn of the century. Students belonging to the Vereinigung Jüdischer Studenten and to Hasmonaea and other Zionist fraternities differed from the chapters of the Kartell Convent in their cultivation of Jewish nationalist consciousness and rejection of an integrationist agenda. However, the public identity fashioned by these students was a synthetic act; the Zionist fraternities also adopted the rituals and social customs of the German student corporations. A striking aspect of German Jewish student life was the rivalry and verbal strife between the Jewish associations pursuing different ideological goals. Pickus provides an insightful interpretation of this “war of words” when he points out that it served as the means by which each group could define its version of Jewish identity opposite the “other” more distinctly and boldly.

Pickus provides a perceptive analysis of the changes in Jewish identity formation during the Kaiserreich and illuminates how Jewish students constructed a synthetic identity that expressed their Jewishness publicly and had enough characteristics of the German student subculture to enable them to function in the university environment. Since German Jewish students could have joined any one of several identity-defining societies and subgroups, the question of choice may be posed. What determined the decision of Jewish students to belong to the chapters of the Kartell Convent or the Jewish nationalist and Zionist associations? Did the memberships of these organizations differ in their social backgrounds, career aspirations, and political ideology? How do these associations compare in respect to the size of their membership and to the estimated number of unaffiliated Jewish students who “sublimated their Jewishness in favor of other concerns and interests” (p. 139)? Pickus’s book is a valuable contribution to a growing body of historical research that is enhancing our understanding of the
many ways that German Jews sustained a Jewish identity after religious law and worship ceased to influence their personal life.

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MARJORIE LAMBERTI


From a perspective of some fifty years, younger scholars of German intellectual and political history have rediscovered a number of marginalized figures and suppressed arguments from the first half of the twentieth century. The fact that these scholars are occasionally astonished at the persistent virulence of some of those ideas is a simple consequence of the compulsory suppression of dangerous intellectual traditions in Germany during the period after 1945. Unquestionably, the work of Carl Schmitt fits this description. Virtually an entire epoch of antidemocratic thought reached its culmination in his writings. And his “rediscovery” several years ago aroused fears of a Schmitt renaissance.

Apparently such fears were baseless. At present there are no signs of any significant revival of antidemocratic perspectives in German political thought. Studies of Carl Schmitt, however, continue to appear in significant number. Most recently, such studies have emphasized Schmitt’s relationship to Catholicism, a connection that had long been neglected. Those who think that the significance of theology for Carl Schmitt is at present greatly exaggerated will not find their views changed by Manfred Dahlheimer’s book. There can be no doubt, however, that the author has presented an informative panorama of Catholic perspectives and programs during the first half of the twentieth century.

Dahlheimer begins with an outline of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Catholic political and legal philosophy (chap. 2). The central part of the work, extending over some 350 pages, examines Schmitt’s ideas and positions in the context of German Catholicism (chap. 3). The next chapter describes Schmitt’s personal and professional development in relation to the Catholic Church (chap. 4). Dahlheimer detects a growing distance between the two, beginning in the early 1930s. Nevertheless, his Catholicism became his undoing when, in 1936, Schmitt’s National Socialist opponents cited his contacts with the church as grounds for curtailing his influence. “The ultimate result,” remarks Dahlheimer with regard to Schmitt’s complex path in the Third Reich, “was that there was no one camp in which Carl Schmitt found a home” (p. 479). In a final chapter (chap. 5), the author examines Schmitt’s relationships and intellectual connections with prominent professors, students, and journalists, men such as Erik Peterson, Hans Barion, Waldemar Gurian, Franz Blei, and Hugo Ball. These portraits reveal once again the broad spectrum of ideas that characterized German Catholicism during the first half of the twentieth century.

In many respects Dahlheimer’s study complements Barbara Nichtweiss’s biography of the theologian Erik Peterson (Erik Peterson: Neue Sicht auf Leben und Werk [Freiburg, Basel, and Vienna, 1992]) and, above all, Andreas Koenen’s major study of the “Case of Carl Schmitt” (Der Fall Carl Schmitt: Sein Aufstieg zum “Kronjuristen des Dritten Reiches” [Darmstadt, 1995]). But while Koenen may have placed too much
emphasis on the study of archival documents, Dahlheimer announces that “in order to save time” (p. 21) he was unable to examine Carl Schmitt’s papers. For a dissertation that took more than ten years to complete, such a remark is hardly convincing. He certainly could have referred in more detail to Koenen’s study. Instead he limits his remarks on Koenen’s book to a few rather ungenerous references.

There can be no doubt that Koenen erred in the extent to which he placed Carl Schmitt at the center of Catholic debates. Dahlheimer, in contrast, never explains why he has resorted to such an unrepresentative “outsider” in his portrayal of the German Catholicism of the early twentieth century. On more than one occasion the author finds himself compelled to admit that “it must be noted in summary that the evidence that Schmitt adhered to Catholic political teaching is not unambiguous. . . . As a political theorist he went his own way” (p. 286). Schmitt’s idiosyncratic paths are clear, for example, in his attitude toward natural law, in his views of the Weimar constitution, and in his estimates of the various authorities, which seemed, to him at least, capable of transcending the political squabbling in Weimar.

As a result, the only positions Dahlheimer can identify as indisputably shared by both Schmitt and the papacy were, first, a common front against liberalism and individualism and, second, the preference for an authoritarian state. From the perspective of Catholicism, Schmitt remains a riddle for Dahlheimer. In his conclusion (chap. 6) the author wonders why Schmitt, a talented thinker applauded on all sides, never pursued the possibilities open to him in Catholic political organizations, why, “when all the doors for a successful engagement in the social groupings of German Catholicism of the early twentieth century” (p. 570) were open for him to enter, he chose not to do so.

Might the reason not simply be that Catholicism was not Schmitt’s principal concern? The differences between his views and those of orthodox Catholicism arose from the fact that Schmitt had a rather instrumental relationship to Catholicism. Like many other thinkers of his time (who, admittedly, were more at home in the Protestant milieu), Schmitt had discerned the theological roots of modern politics in a secularized world. But he did not wish to retreat from this foundation. He wanted to build upon it, and to elaborate further a concept of the political that could make successful use of this heritage. As a result, he was generally unwilling to take part in theological arguments, with the sole exception of political theology. To him, there appeared too great a danger that such arguments would embroil him in reactionary “romantic” debates. That in turn would have threatened the absolute and unconditioned status Schmitt did want to reclaim for the political realm.

There can be no doubt that Dahlheimer’s book is an informed and, for the reader, informative one. It is very readable, though it lacks an overall thesis, a guiding thread to give the reader the feeling of participating in a discovery. The book’s approach is phenomenological. Its scope is encyclopedic. In essence, then, Dahlheimer’s study is a descriptive portrayal of the development of Schmitt’s thought. Along the way, parallels with Catholic doctrines are indicated, and contemporary criticisms of Schmitt from the Catholic camp are noted. The approach is systematic, though this also serves to make the reading somewhat tiresome. There are few surprises. A great deal of the material has already appeared elsewhere.

One pleasant surprise is the somewhat less-than-reverent approach Dahlheimer adopts toward Schmitt. Such reverence has only served to make a number of recent exegeses of Schmitt’s work rather tough to digest. Dahlheimer deals primarily with original publications, contemporaneous with Schmitt’s own work. He resorts far less to the enormous secondary literature, from the very reasonable insight, perhaps, that a researcher might never extricate himself from it. Also passed over in silence, for the
most part, are the political issues of the Weimar Republic, problems that Schmitt occasionally sought to untangle. In Dahlheimer’s presentation, Schmitt emerges primarily as a significant figure in intellectual and theological history, and not as an individual who sought to—and, in modest measure, actually did—influence the events of his time.

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DIRK VAN LAAK


The political development of Imperial Germany has in recent years undergone an important reorientation. The very titles *Practicing Democracy* or *Democracy in an Undemocratic State* of recent books on the topic suggest a liberal democracy under construction rather than a steadfast, autocratic regime with a few inconsequential constitutional and democratic adornments. Hermann Butzer’s *Diäten und Freifahrt im Deutschen Reichstag* contributes to this broad historical debate by providing a microscopic study of Article 32 of the Imperial Constitution. This seemingly minor article explicitly forbade deputies from receiving any public reimbursements for the travel and living expenses resulting from their duties in the Reichstag. But just like current legal and technical arcana surrounding campaign finance reform, Article 32 proves to be important and hence provides a useful window into Germany’s political development.

The book retraces the Reichstag’s numerous attempts to have Article 32 overturned, down to every change in the travel reimbursement formula. The history of these attempts is quickly retold. In 1873, the Reichstag scored a first partial success by winning free railroad travel throughout Germany during parliamentary sessions. In 1881, this privilege was geographically limited to the travel between Berlin and a deputy’s home. Finally, in 1906, Article 32 was overturned. The new law reimbursed deputies twenty Reichsmarks for each day they attended Reichstag sessions and removed any geographic restrictions on railroad travel. The book then follows up on a few minor changes in the closing years of the empire and the Weimar Republic. It also contains a brief chapter on the more significant break after 1945, when the Bonn Republic began to pay deputies a regular salary and benefits (rather than mere reimbursements). Normatively, Article 32 was grounded in the classical liberal conception that only educated and economically independent gentlemen could be disinterested adjudicators of the national interest and thus serve in parliament. Politically, Article 32 served Bismarck’s intent to contain the democratic consequences of universal manhood suffrage. He speculated that the financial burden of public officeholding would limit political representation to only the wealthiest Germans.

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The book’s narrowly constitutional topic and length (over 500 pages) mark it as a prime suspect for old-fashioned political history. The book, however, places such suspicions quickly to rest by skillfully relating the constitutional and legislative technicalities to the larger political struggles with which they were interwoven. In doing so, it provides important insights into the construction process of liberal democracy in late nineteenth-century Germany and offers an opportunity to reevaluate the typecasting of Imperial Germany as having had a political order that was autocratic and unchanging.

Butzer presents the following incriminating evidence about Germany’s democratization. The unelected Bundesrat was the worst offender of democratic norms. It continuously vetoed bills passed with near unanimity by the Reichstag to abolish Article 32. These vetoes were possible under Article 78, which required a two-thirds Bundesrat majority for constitutional changes (p. 127). The political struggles over Article 32 also underscored the disunity among parties. Parties readily passed bills overturning Article 32 but they were too fragmented to logroll this demand in exchange for their passage of budgetary items desired by the government (pp. 322–23). Butzer partly links this disunity to another democratic deficiency of the constitution. The chancellor could easily deter parties from ganging up on him by punishing deputies by holding early elections. This powerful lever of the executive was not offset by the Reichstag’s right to call a vote of no-confidence (p. 320). Finally, all political actors were at the whims of the emperor and his camarilla. After 1900, the emperor, for example, opposed Chancellor von Bülow’s tepid attempts to improve relations with the Reichstag by having Article 32 abolished.

These deficiencies are well known but, and here Butzer makes his major contribution, they certainly do not constitute the entire story. In Butzer’s account, the Reichstag hardly seems the passive and apolitical legislature that traditional historiography depicts. The original inclusion of Article 32, for example, reveals a vibrant legislature in which the article’s constitutionality was thoroughly debated, legislative protocol was strictly adhered to, and public opinion was extensively mobilized. The Reichstag also introduced innumerable bills to have Article 32 overturned and thus clearly demonstrated its agenda-setting prerogatives. Finally, the Reichstag emerges as a skillful practitioner of filibustering, to which Article 32 inadvertently contributed by encouraging absenteeism. Absenteeism frequently reached levels where the quorums required under Article 28 were paper-thin. Parties skillfully exploited these marginal quorums by staying away from parliamentary sections and thereby in effect blocking all parliamentary proceedings (pp. 153, 257).

As Butzer further shows, the implications of Article 32 extend well beyond the legislative arena, as it had important and unexpected consequences for the development of parties. In traditional historical accounts, the centralization and bureaucratization of parties have been linked to Germany’s arrested democratization. Butzer does not challenge this characterization of parties, but he proposes a novel set of causes by very astutely relating Article 32 to the organizational development of parties. Article 32, for example, led parties and interest groups to compensate deputies for the costs associated with holding public office. It thereby tilted the balance of power decisively in favor of the former and made parties more autocratic. This autocratic effect was reinforced by the absenteeism to which Article 32 contributed. This absenteeism enhanced the political leverage of the small number of deputies regularly attending the Reichstag either because they resided in Berlin or because they were independently wealthy. Their internal influence in their parties thus grew as they were the best informed and most professionalized (pp. 153–58). Moreover, compensation of deputies created fund-raising and logistical exigencies that contributed to the organizational growth and centralization of parties (pp. 154–59).
These findings are significant because they shift the understanding of German parties from sociological and cultural factors to institutional ones. In Butzer’s account, party leaders are powerful because institutional incentives favor them and not because politicians have been socialized by deferential or aliberal values. And parties are centralized because institutional factors create specific organizational exigencies and not because of some preexisting, negatively integrated social milieus. In short, explaining the administrative and governance features of parties in institutional rather than sociocultural terms matters because it makes for less exceptional and deterministic explanations. A constitutional article is far less country specific or durable than sociocultural factors like a feudalized bourgeoisie or workers’ belief in the historical inevitability of revolution.

Overall, what makes the legislative politicking surrounding Article 32 worth a 500-page analysis is its revelation of political actors diligently exploiting the democratic potential provided by the existing constitution and thus practicing, if not already mastering, many elements of liberal democracy.

Marcus Kreuzer

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As an emblem of a topsy-turvy world, Munich between the years 1914 and 1924 has few rivals. Widely viewed by contemporaries as a determinedly petit bourgeois city, Munich had, even before the Berlin Revolution, witnessed the overthrow of its Wittelsbach dynasty. The home of a self-styled, if short-lived, Bavarian soviet, the city also played host to the counterrevolution. Among its prodigies was Adolf Hitler, who—dismissed by a 1928 guide to Munich as “an historical excrement”—turned his Beer Hall Putsch into the beginning rather than the end of the National Socialist movement (p. 399). Torn between the traditional and the modern, Munich offers, in Martin Geyer’s words, a “synecdoche” of German history. In Munich, as in Berlin, the conflicts attendant on Germany’s swift and violent transition to modernity played out floridly on the city stage.

Geyer’s subject is the atavistic political culture created by war, revolution, and inflation. Like other scholars of the period, he traces a deepening antagonism between producers and consumers, demonstrating the clefs created across class lines. As support for Social Democrats plummeted in Munich, the rhetorics of the political extremes drew together. Communists, like the radical Right, expressed profound hostility toward a state unable to protect the populace from the purported economic dominance of a few. Frustrated by the inadequacy of state assistance, Germans turned to self-help measures intended to shield them from a world gone mad. The inflation divided rather

2 For an elaboration of these different explanations of political parties, see Marcus Kreuzer, Institutions and Innovation: Voters, Parties, and Interest Groups in the Consolidation of Democracy. France and Germany, 1870–1939 (Ann Arbor, Mich., in press).
than unified; it led to disillusionment and hopelessness, not to revolution. Alienated from the Republic, many Germans took refuge in utopian imaginings.

Geyer focuses particularly on Germans’ subjective experiences during the years 1914–24. Although scholars in the past two decades have underscored the significance of the inflation, they have tended to regard with skepticism the pronouncements of contemporaries, whose recollections often obscure the larger context and self-servingly minimize their own gains. And yet, as Geyer demonstrates, to understand the consequences of the inflationary decade, scholars must determine not only who “won” and “lost” but also who felt that they had.

From the artists’ quarter of Schwabing (where sex, one of the few things left unrationed by the state, was available in abundance) to the laboratories of counterrevolutionaries who diagnosed the “psychosis” of the revolutionary crowd, Geyer considers how Germans made their way in a world where none of the old rules seemed to apply. In a sparkling chapter on speculation, he considers what it meant when money, once an ostensibly neutral regulator of social relations, could no longer be trusted. As rentiers sold their cherished possessions, those who had money hastened to convert it into tangible assets. In this mania of consumption, 1923 proved a boom year for the German Automobile Club.

This is a superb book, rich both in argument and evidence. Geyer is equally at home in the analysis of representations as in calculations of real income, prices, housing density, and voting trends. In assessing the significance of contemporary debates about rights and justice, luxury and consumption, he hews a careful path through perception and economic realities. Despite draconian legislation and a fierce rhetoric about profiteers, he notes that everyone who could sought to gain an advantage: “The real ‘culprits’ could not be clearly determined, the ‘righteous’ could hardly be distinguished from the ‘dishonest.’ Talk about ‘profiteers’ turned into a stereotype that could be directed against everyone” (p. 247). With inflation, Geyer argues, came a new consciousness of money. Even that most ardent opponent of finance capital, the Völkische Beobachter, began in 1923 to publish stock market reports.

The reader who comes to this book in search of the history of Munich may be disappointed. Although Geyer draws on the city for specific episodes and statistics, Verkehrte Welt lacks a sense of place. Outside of Schwabing, Geyer does not explore the city’s neighborhoods. While he quotes extensively from prominent citizens like Mann (embarrassed, during the Revolution, to be seen on the street in a fur coat), few other of Munich’s residents come alive. This is not just a lament for local color, though it is that. More important, in his evocation of disorder, Geyer gives short shrift to the forces of order. Other than the failed consumers’ organizations, there is little here on the organs of civil society—both new and traditional—that provided the mainstay of social life. Most notably, the Catholic Church receives mention only on a handful of occasions. While Geyer notes that 1919 marked a high point of cinema attendance in Munich, we learn very little about what people found in those darkened theaters. Without a more detailed analysis of the moorings of people’s lives, it is difficult to appreciate the full significance of a world turned upside down.

Verkehrte Welt is a very important book. In his focus on the culture of economics, Geyer illuminates what the inflation meant to Germans who lived through those turbulent times. Though anchored in twentieth-century German history, Geyer’s observations about the function of money, the relation between laws and justice, and the divisions between producers and consumers will prove of interest to scholars of modern
Europe more broadly. This book should be translated so that a wide audience can profit from its method and conclusions.

DEBORAH COHEN

American University


Rainer Behring’s study of German social democratic foreign policy analyses and proposals in the twelve years of Nazi rule will remain a standard reference work for many years to come. His convincing portrayal of the various strands of social democratic thought on foreign policy is based on an exhaustive scouring of archives, and there will remain little doubt in the minds of any attentive reader that Behring’s portrayal and conclusions are firmly supported by the available evidence.

For Behring, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and its periphery constituted the sole serious and desirable alternative to the conservative anti-Nazi opposition symbolized by July 20, 1944. Moreover, its consistent elevation of democracy and freedom to the central place in its foreign (and domestic) policy proposals stood in a direct line of continuity with its pre-1933 and post-1945 ideas. Already in Weimar Germany the SPD in effect constituted the sole unwavering block of support for a democratic foreign policy most frequently identified in the literature with the personality of the liberal Gustav Stresemann but in actuality conceived and realized by Weimar social democracy. Likewise, for Behring, the basic outlines of the Federal Republic’s foreign policy were already anticipated in the exile circles of isolated social democrats dispersed throughout Great Britain, the United States, Scandinavia, Switzerland, and elsewhere.

Given the extraordinary importance of social democratic policy proposals elaborated or extended in the course of the Thousand Year Reich, the particular tragedy of German social democracy lies in the fact that its influence on policy strategists and government representatives of Western Allied nations remained insignificant throughout its years of exile. The publications of the exiled SPD found few interested readers willing to purchase these journalistic products. Allied politicians and diplomats rarely paid attention to SPD proposals, and this held true for socialists and nonsocialists alike. The British Broadcasting System, for instance, consistently denied SPD politicians the right to speak on the airwaves in their own names, regardless of Labour Party representation on the BBC’s board of directors or within the British government tout court. Even fellow members of the Socialist International by and large avoided contact with exiled SPD representatives, an ostracism applied more stringently as the war progressed. To be honest, SPD spokespersons never developed a coherent plan to exert influence on Allied policy, but Behring leaves little doubt that a more concerted lobbying tactic, had it materialized, would have met a wall of silence anyway.

Behring’s exhaustive (and exhausting) detailed rendering of various individual concepts elaborated by leading members of the SPD, however, is not beyond reproach—not for its factual accuracy but for its interpretive framework. His praises of the social
democratic alternative, which he at one point portrays as “the democratic alternative of German foreign policy in the age of the world wars” (p. 634) leaves curiously unaddressed the socioeconomic content of the desired goal of a parliamentary democracy. For Behring, the SPD’s “democratic foreign policy . . . included the firm rejection of traditional German power politics and its replacement by a rational and cooperative politics of peaceful understanding, compromise, the honoring of treaties and economic cooperation with the aim of creating an international order based on law. All states should be treated as equals, and the politics of force and threats were to be excluded. In order to keep international peace, the respective states were to renounce a portion of their traditional sovereign rights” (p. 618). The reader searches in vain for elements of a socioeconomic dimension to this “democratic foreign policy.” Behring thus justifiably speaks of a “Westernization” (Verwestlichung [p. 363]) of social democratic policy proposals and, when speaking of the SPD’s conception for a new Europe, he claims that its “political and social dimension . . . found an appropriate expression in the concepts freedom and democracy” (pp. 381–82).

Only occasionally does he refer to continuing desires for more fundamental social change as, for instance, in his discussion of the critical response to Curt Geyer’s 1941 “Skizze über den kommenden Frieden,” where, in latent contradiction to other portions of his text, Behring clearly states that “freedom and democracy” as the ultimate goal only captured a portion of the strategic aims of more far-reaching visions of democratic socialism still adhered to by most SPD supporters and leaders: “For the majority of social democrats democracy and socialism formed an indivisible unity; both elements combined should determine at the very least the future Germany and, if possible, the coming Europe” (p. 410).

Behring’s tendency occasionally to refer in thinly veiled pejorative terms to some mainstream social democrats’ continued adherence to socialist goals—or, in the author’s word choice, “outmoded anticapitalist prejudices” (p. 359)—is most annoyingly present in the bulk of his discussion of the left socialist tendencies on the margins of social democracy, elements that ultimately rejoined the social democratic fold and that are therefore included in the discussions of this tome. Behring, by the way, correctly insists on the proclivity of these left socialist groups toward the reliance on elitist policy paradigms, but this astute critique would be more convincing had Behring developed an equally necessary analysis of the vague and undefined notion of “democracy” in mainstream social democratic circles.

In the first years of Nazi rule, German social democrats staked their hopes on opposition from within the German state. As these desires lost credibility with the fading of resistance in the wake of Nazi terror and full employment policies, SPD leaders began to focus their attention on the need to aid the crushing of the Nazi machine from without and on the corresponding need to define the range of options for a new, postwar Germany bound to rise from the battlefields of World War II. Therefore, social democratic foreign policy perceptions became increasingly important for their self-understanding as the war progressed. Behring also suggests that, as much as their foreign policy proposals became guidelines for several generations of post–World War II West German politicians, many of their exile assessments of Nazi foreign policy in effect anticipated post–World War II historiographical trends. “All serious attempts by historians to explain and analyze national socialist foreign policy are already present in contemporaneous publications of the social democratic exile—in their details as well as their grand design” (p. 110). It is to the credit of Rainer Behring to have documented
these and other contributions of a tiny number of German social democrats, who developed their ideas under the worst imaginable living and working conditions and who remained marginalized in their time.

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This is not a volume to be picked up lightly. With over twelve hundred pages of densely printed text divided into seven major thematic sections, containing sixty-five separate articles plus a substantial introduction and epilogue, Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realität deserves undisputed heavyweight status. The outgrowth of a 1997 international conference on the Wehrmacht, this work builds on the significant achievements of the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (where the editors both hold senior positions), including the projected ten-volume series Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 1979–), of which six volumes are now available. (The first four volumes have appeared in English translation as Germany and the Second World War [New York, 1990–].) It is framed not only by a rich historiography treating the German military in the Nazi era but also by the heated public controversy spawned by the 1995–99 Wehrmacht exhibition, Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 1941–1944, sponsored by the Hamburg Institute for Social Research. This timely book engages ongoing debates, assesses past work, and presents the results of new research. Welcome though it is, the challenge to any reviewer is daunting. To do justice to the range and diversity of the collection, let alone to the many excellent individual selections, is impossible. My task in this review, then, will be to highlight major unifying themes, to explore a few particularly intriguing selections, and to offer a brief critical evaluation.

As is common to most historical investigation, this examination of the German military confronts the theme of continuity and change. In becoming one of the “two pillars” of the Nazi state (the other being the National Socialist party) and enmeshed in its war of conquest and destruction, did the Wehrmacht fundamentally break with prior incarnations and traditions of the Prusso-German military? According to Gerhard Weinberg and Karl-Heinz Janßen, among others, German military leaders—shaped by the experiences of World War I, defeat, revolution, and the Versailles Treaty—reinforced antidemocratic attitudes, undermined the Weimar Republic, and endorsed the creation of a military force to “guarantee German hegemony in continental Europe but also facilitate a much desired war of revenge” in the “Great Plan” of 1925 (p. 77). Collaboration with Hitler based on shared goals and self-interest (rearmament) was a logical next step. If there were points of tension between the Nazi state and Wehrmacht leaders, at each critical juncture the military surrendered more of its independence and compromised on fundamental values, becoming a willing and essential tool of the Nazi state (see selections by Weinberg, Janßen, H.-E. Volkmann). This process distanced the Wehrmacht from the German military past. For Weinberg the tides of German victory in the West in 1940 swept away any remaining scruples and ties to the past, leading to the military’s ready acceptance of the Vernichtungskrieg (war of destruction) against the Soviets, where “mass-murder became a self-evident part of war leadership”
These arguments are not new but are given additional weight through nuanced analysis grounded in continuing research. This theme also features prominently in the transitions following the collapse of the Third Reich in 1945. Given unconditional surrender, the dismantling of the Wehrmacht, the discrediting of Wehrmacht leadership in the postwar trials, and the people’s repression of the war experience in order to cope with the hard demands of that time, the case for discontinuity appears overwhelming. “Stunde Null” (“Zero Hour”) conceptualized the radical nature of the break, yet the picture, as we know, is more complex. The cold war competition between former allies over Germany spurred not only the formation of two German states with their respective military forces but also the rehabilitation of former members of the Wehrmacht. Memoirs by Wehrmacht officers reinforced by the work of Western military historians, such as B. H. Liddell Hart, revived the image of the Wehrmacht as a superb fighting force, irrevocably compromised by the strategic blunders of Hitler, who refused to accept the sound advice of his military leaders (H. Strachan, pp. 99–101; M. van Creveld, pp. 175–76; W. Murray, p. 328). Central to this process was the myth of the “clean,” unpolitical Wehrmacht; that is, a Wehrmacht that dutifully executed its military responsibilities unsullied by the criminal actions of the SS. This facilitated the integration of former Wehrmacht officers into the new Bundeswehr of the Federal Republic and the Volksarmee of the German Democratic Republic. To be sure, as Ulrich de Maizière, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, and Jürgen Danyel for the former and Gerhart Hass and Rüdiger Wenzke for the latter make clear, the Wehrmacht was not the model for these new military formations, yet no force is without its roots in the past. Further, the Bundeswehr became increasingly eager to embrace the legacy of the military resistance in the Third Reich, introducing yet another aspect of continuity (see P. Steinbach, pp. 1150–70).

Intertwined with the continuity/discontinuity theme is that of the Wehrmacht’s complicity in the criminal acts of the National Socialist state. This theme is pervasive, figuring substantively in over half the selections. The mass of evidence presented here should finally extinguish the persistent myth of the “clean,” unpolitical Wehrmacht. Senior Wehrmacht officers and the Wehrmacht as an institution were fundamentally compromised by their roles in implementation of the Nazi’s racial program and brutal war in Eastern Europe. The treatment of Soviet POWs and especially the “combing out” of the Soviet commissars for “special treatment,” the conduct of antipartisan actions, cooperation with killing units such as the Einsatzgruppen and various auxiliary formations of the SS-police system, and participation in a variety of other actions critical to the implementation of the Holocaust also compromising those of lower ranks and enlisted men to some degree. If the Wehrmacht stands condemned, a number of the authors, especially Rolf-Dieter Müller in his introduction (pp. 20–23) and Eberhard Jäckel (pp. 739–42), challenge what they see as a new myth propagated most notably in the Wehrmacht exhibition and in Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 1941–44, edited by Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann (Hamburg, 1995), the companion volume to the exhibition. The new myth asserts that the Wehrmacht leadership on its own initiative deliberately pursued murderous policies to break down the moral reservations of the German soldier as prelude to a war of complete annihilation. Müller and others such as Timm Richter, who in his selection on the partisan war in Soviet territory concludes that “the Wehrmacht became a willing engine for an unrestrained, yes murderous security policy” (p. 857), argue that the Wehrmacht was not a monolithic force in the east. Many of its members were not involved in criminal actions, while others protested against them, and still others engaged in opposition or resistance. The path taken by any particular unit or individual was a function of complex factors that remain imperfectly understood (pp. 848, 834–36).
A major volume on the Wehrmacht would not be complete without consideration of the military competence of this fighting force and larger strategic issues. Reinforcing past judgments, Martin van Creveld highlights the Wehrmacht’s operational strength and its tactical brilliance based on extraordinarily compact, well-integrated, and flexible smaller units led by lower-level officers showing a combination of discipline and initiative (pp. 333–38). Strategically, however, the Wehrmacht’s deficiencies were manifold. While this point is made in numerous chapters, three selections highlight the strategic wasteland: “Die Blitzkriege 1939–1941: Operativer Triumph—strategische Tragödie,” by Karl-Heinz Frieser, who clarifies the negative strategic implications of Germany’s greatest victories; “Defensive ohne Strategie: Die Wehrmacht und das Jahr 1943,” by Bernd Wegner, who argues that the military leadership’s failure to end a clearly unwinnable war in 1943 was a dereliction of duty; and “Strategie der Selbstvernichtung: Die Wehrmachtführung in ‘Endkampf’ um das ‘Dritte Reich,’” by Heinrich Schwendemann, who blames “leading military figures [for] placing their loyalty to the Führer above their responsibility and duty to care for their soldiers” (p. 236). These authors are quick to point out that strategic failures cannot just be blamed on Hitler.

Rewarding contributions from the fields of social, women’s, cultural, and legal history as well as the history of the everyday and of mentalities comprise approximately one-fourth of the selections. In the past military historians have been indifferent, if not hostile, to these approaches, but the ability of the latter to enrich our understanding of the Wehrmacht is evident. It is a strength of this volume that such materials are included.

Before concluding, allow me to mention just two selections that struck me as particularly provocative and engaging. The first, Michael Salewski’s “Die Abwehr der Invasion als Schlüssel zum ‘Endsieg,’” falls into the category of traditional military history. Salewski rejects the frequently asserted position that the end of German chances for victory came at the Battle of Moscow (1941) or the Battle of Stalingrad (1943). Rather he defends the proposition that until the Allies successfully landed in Normandy, Germany could have prevailed. By making Normandy, and not Moscow or Stalingrad, the decisive conflict in the war, Salewski restores greater significance to the western theater after several decades in which the eastern front has been granted primacy. His position also has implications for the degree of culpability of Wehrmacht leaders who continued to support a war supposedly lost much earlier. His argument, heavily dependent on how key German and Allied generals perceived the significance of the coming invasion as well as on counterfactual analysis, intrigues but is not fully persuasive. The second, by Thomas Kühne, “Gruppenkohäsion und Kameradschaftsmythos in der Wehrmacht,” draws on the approaches of the new cultural history. Kühne addresses the issue of what kept German soldiers fighting effectively against Soviet forces in increasingly brutal and desperate circumstances. While Kühne does not fully reject Omar Bartov’s thesis that racial ideology and draconian discipline provided the necessary motivation as primary group cohesion disintegrated, he asserts the continuing role of comradeship. Based on his reading of letters from the field and diaries, Kühne argues that the mythic concepts of heroism, manliness, and comradeship created an “antistructure against the reality of war” (pp. 357–58). As an antistructure, comradeship affirmed equality in the face of military hierarchy, support and protection in the face of material deprivation and bodily risk, and the bonds of brotherhood in the face of isolation. It was a “symbolic countermodel not only against civil society, but also . . . against the social praxis and the ideological context of the war itself” (p. 542) and thus made the war bearable. Kühne pushes his analysis one step further, suggesting that the
myth of comradeship, when joined with Nazi ideology, could become the basis for criminal actions.

I suspect that few will read *Die Wehrmacht* from cover to cover but will rather treat it as a reference book to be consulted on a particular topic when the need arises. Those who do will usually find the examined selection resting on extensive research in primary and secondary sources, addressing significant questions, and advancing compelling arguments. For the intrepid reader of extensive segments, one of the additional rewards will be discovering the degree to which many of the individual articles interconnect. Despite the range and diversity of the articles, in sum they create a richly textured mosaic. This picture of the Wehrmacht is not, of course, set in stone. There are too many issues requiring more investigation and too many questions generating continued debate; however, this is now the definitive work on the Wehrmacht and deserves to be made available to a wider audience through translation into English.

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**Brot, Butter, Kanonen: Die Ernährungswirtschaft in Deutschland unter der Diktatur Hitlers.** By Gustavo Corni and Horst Gies.


There has always been a widely held assumption in histories of the Third Reich that agriculture held a special place in the affections of Hitler and the National Socialist movement. If fascism is viewed as reactionary and antimodernist, it is largely because of its reputation as a friend to the peasant and its promise to create an antiurban, anticapitalist utopia. “Blood and Soil” ideology, with its racially defined belief that true breeding stock can only be found in the village, is often seen as the primary strand of National Socialist culture. All of these assumptions are held up to critical examination in this outstanding survey. Thanks to what must surely become the definitive book on the subject, it is now possible to view agriculture under Hitler in a new light.

In the first place, Gustavo Corni and Horst Gies insist on placing the subject in its proper historical framework. The tension between a modern, urbanizing, industrializing society and the interests of the large rural population went back to the arguments over tariff reform in the 1870s and the antimodernist backlash of the 1890s. A string of antibourgeois writers condemned the decline of the peasant and simple rural values from then until the 1930s. The National Socialist Party (NSDAP) gained most from this tension because it spoke a language of economic justice, anticapitalism, and anti-Marxism that peasant leaders could identify with wholeheartedly. An assortment of ruralist intellectuals gravitated to the party for that reason; chief among them was Walther Darré, soon to become a key figure in the rise to power. Darré’s ability to spread the gospel of a new deal for agriculture in 1931 and 1932 brought millions of farm votes for Hitler. Without the peasant vote Hitler would have looked much less attractive to the conservative landowners who hoisted him to power in January 1933.

The second historical context emphasized here is a comparative one. The drift after 1933 to market regulation, debt reduction, price support, and so on was mirrored in other economies where primary producers were deep in crisis. The Italian example is perhaps the closest, since fascism there also contained its ruralist planners and antiurbanites. However, before the German experiment is appropriated as a forerunner of the Common Agricultural Policy developed in the 1960s to regulate Europe’s farm pro-
duction, Corni and Gies are at pains to show that, in two important respects, Nazi agricultural policy diverged from the international efforts to protect farmers. In the first third of the book they explore how the utopists around Darre set out not only to protect the economic interests of rural producers but also to create a new social deal based around a central “estate” (the Reichsnährstand) and policies to encourage reagrarianization and the survival of peasant values and culture. In the second two-thirds they demonstrate that this effort to turn “blood and soil” ideas into reality were frustrated and then destroyed by the imperative of remilitarization and war.

War, they argue, dominated the agricultural issue from 1936 onward. There is no hint here of butter before guns. Darre was sidelined politically by his deputy Herbert Backe, who joined Hermann Göring’s Four-Year Plan organization as a technocrat committed to the regime’s short-term goal of creating a secure food base for waging war. The priority was maximum production of easily grown foods (potatoes, rye, sugar beets) at the expense of consumer demand for more variety and the peasant sector’s hope for greater social autonomy. The authors see Göring and the expansionists in the movement as the driving force here, though the army also had a key role to play. Because of its obsessive fear of a second stab in the back, the army encouraged the planning of wartime rationing in 1936–37 (when ration cards were already printed and distributed) and the development of a tight form of “economic management” from 1938 onward.

Corni and Gies show here that the military priority was in the end much more successful than Darre’s ruralist ambitions. Food was never plentiful, but it was evenly distributed, prices were closely controlled, and propaganda was carefully directed to avoid the class-based conflicts over access to food characteristic of World War I. Food supplies slowed down during the war, despite access to foreign supplies (whose exploitation was, on this account, poorly managed), but only in the last months and in the first two years of occupation did Germans suffer as they had done in the notorious “Turnip Winter” of 1917. Farmers found themselves subject again to the compulsory economy (Zwangswirtschaft) that they had so resented in the earlier conflict as an expression of urban consumer interests and state intervention.

The book might have made more of the revived “utopianism” of the Himmler apparatus in the east. Darre’s star may have been in decline, but there were many geographers, development economists, and rural idealists who saw in the east the possibility of creating the agrarian idyll difficult to impose in the Reich itself. It is perhaps significant that Götz Aly’s work in this area (The Final Solution [London, 1999]) does not appear in the bibliography. In the conclusion the authors also point to food supply as a critical factor in maintaining loyalty to the regime right up to the end in 1945. This is a more problematic assertion. Even if the food supply had been much lower, it is difficult to imagine the harsh state terrorism imposed in 1944 and 1945 being set aside by crowds of hungry consumers. Moreover the figures for consumer spending used to prove the survival of consumer priorities, derived from the postwar bombing survey, have been shown to be quite erroneous. The diet in Germany was stodgy and dull for most of the war (Germans already consumed much less per capita in 1939 than the British or Americans), and for many city dwellers food became increasingly scarce once the bombing started. Nevertheless, as this remarkable account makes clear, the regime did keep food supplies going despite its reputation for polycratic confusion and managerial incompetence.

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Historians of women in twentieth-century Germany have tended to focus particularly on reproduction and motherhood. With more than 90 percent of births occurring within wedlock in the interwar years, for example, this has meant that married women are at the center of the subject. Taking a different perspective, Elizabeth D. Heineman considers the significance of marital status itself and, in particular, “women standing alone” (passim): the never-married, the separated, the divorced, and the widowed, a minority group that was larger and more visible in the years following the slaughter of men in the two world wars than at other times. In the 1930s, the nature and functions of this group were altered, argues Heineman, by Nazi policies. On the one hand, these defined and controlled who was permitted to marry, consigning many women labeled as eugenically “unvalued” to involuntary single status but not necessarily to childlessness; indeed, many of the women treated as “asocial” were unwed mothers. Yet, on the other hand, Nazi policies assigned to eugenically “valued” young single women enhanced status because of their new role in “public service” (see esp. pp. 39–43, 63–74), both before and during the Second World War. This included work away from home both in Nazi institutions like the Labor Service and as auxiliaries with the armed forces. The experience and confidence that this gave them paid dividends during the later stages of the war and in the immediate postwar years, when many women faced daily rigors and dangers as the heads of their households.

Heineman is particularly astute in dealing with the immediate postwar period, when there were, at first, seven million more women than men in Germany. She shows how women’s forced independence caused problems when men returned from the war or, later, from captivity to find that the bases of their prewar authority had been eroded. Many marriages—particularly those contracted in wartime—did not survive the strain, and in the western occupation zone, at least, foreign occupying soldiers seemed more attractive, not only because of the material goods that they could provide but also because they seemed psychologically stronger than German men whose lives and minds had been shattered by their experiences. The occupation authorities’ demeaning treatment of women who had social or sexual contact with their soldiers demonstrated both that the double standard in sexual morality persisted and that it was not only in the Third Reich that women’s “value” was based on their sexual conduct. But there, the “double standard” had meant not merely censure but actual danger, with women (unlike men) classed as “asocial” overwhelmingly because of perceived or actual nonmarital sexual activity.

During the 1939–45 war, the importance of marital status eroded; for example, “war brides” were denied the allowance paid to the wife of a serving soldier. In effect, many married women lived the life of a single woman during and immediately after the war. On the other hand, a pregnant “valued” single woman might be permitted to contract a “postmortem marriage,” while a widow who engaged in sex with a foreign worker might be served with a “postmortem divorce” for dishonorable conduct and lose her widow’s pension.

After 1945, major differences emerged between the two Germanies. In effect, in the west “women standing alone” were seen as a problem—although Heineman shows that their numbers were not as great as popular mythology insisted—and married
women as the norm. But in the east, the problem was to encourage married women into the workforce, whereas single working women were perceived as being easier to integrate within the new system because they were more politically accessible—like single women in the Third Reich, no doubt. Did this mean that women in the GDR were more emancipated in the 1950s, toward the end of the period on which Heineman focuses? Her answer is that they were, in theory, but that in practice “marital status divided women more convincingly than did residence on one side of the border or the other” (p. 211). In the 1950s, however, while war widows in the west could avoid paid work, in the east the denial of pensions to most of them forced them into employment. It would be only in later decades that single status seemed less of a disadvantage, not least in the GDR because of “the extraordinary expansion of social benefits such as childcare and maternity leave in the 1970s” (p. 241), which brought reality closer to official rhetoric.

The value of this book lies in its innovative approach to the idea of marital status, in its consideration of a fairly long period spanning the turning point of 1945, and in its detailed case study of Darmstadt, which yields graphic personal testimonies. It is well researched and intelligent in its judgments. It considers the “woman question” from a new perspective. Heineman’s particular virtue being that she never loses sight of the whole picture, even when she is discussing in dense detail intricate debates on family law in the Federal Republic, the pensions question in the Soviet Zone/GDR, or postwar housing policy. There is some attempt to integrate the experience of women in the Soviet zone/GDR into the discussion of the postwar years, but the magnetic pull is constantly toward the west until chapter 7, “Narrowing the Difference . . . in East Germany.” Throughout, the discussion is overwhelmingly (often implicitly) about urban women, with very little consideration of rural women. There is some misuse of words: “approbation” when “opprobrium” is clearly meant, for example. But this is a readable book with a direct and emphatic style. It builds in a constructive and illuminating way on existing knowledge, brings significant new material to light, establishes and sustains a coherent and novel argument, and considers the importance—and at times the unimportance—of marital status over a crucial and lengthy period. Anyone interested in twentieth-century Germany, in gender history, in social policy, broadly defined, and in the relationship between war and social change should read it.

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In the years after World War II, virtually everyone who lived in what became the Federal Republic of Germany accepted the fact that Hitler, the Nazis, and thus all Germans were responsible for the war. The consequences of defeat—the loss of lives, both military and civilian, vast physical destruction, occupation by allied troops, dismemberment of the state, the loss of formerly German territory, the loss of full sovereignty—these were the result of German actions and thus perhaps deserved. Nevertheless, there also was a strong sense of victimhood that went beyond any sympathy for the direct victims of Nazi terror, such as Jews. Millions of West Germans, at least a quarter of the population, considered themselves innocent victims. Many had lost
homes and businesses in the bombing and fighting on German soil. Millions had lost everything when they fled or were expelled from formerly German lands in the east. Others saw their life’s savings wiped out by inflation, just as had happened after World War I. Still others, workers lacking capital assets, were impoverished because their places of employment had been destroyed.

The subject of this fine book by Michael Hughes is the prolonged debate about whether and how these categories of victims, the so-called war-damaged, should be compensated for their losses. Everyone agreed that the demand for compensation was different from the state’s obligation to help war widows, disabled veterans, and the families of prisoners of war still held in the Soviet Union. It was also different from more traditional demands on the German social safety net, such as unemployment insurance and old-age pensions. These latter claims were considered welfare, and the war-damaged rejected being lumped together with welfare cases. Instead, the war-damaged argued that help ought to come out of the assets of those who got through the war without having suffered such losses. If all Germans shared responsibility for the war, then it was only just that all Germans also shoulder their fair share of the burdens of the war, what the Germans called a Lastenausgleich, or equalization of burdens. An Equalization of Burdens Law was not passed until 1952, with significant amendments in 1954 and 1957.

Hughes explains how this law came into being, and in so doing he has a lot to say about not only social and economic conditions in postwar Germany but also the development of a genuine democracy. In an earlier work (Paying for the Great Inflation [Chapel Hill, N.C., 1988]), Hughes dealt with the consequences of the great inflation of the Weimar Republic, when a radical currency reform forced holders of paper assets to sacrifice their savings and investments on behalf of economic stability for the whole society. That one-sided solution radicalized large segments of the middle class and undercut the fragile democracy of Weimar, and this was very much on everyone’s mind after 1945. (Undoubtedly for the same reason, there is a vast scholarly literature about the Weimar inflation, while the success of the Federal Republic in dealing with enormous economic loss has received far less attention.) The catastrophe of Nazism and the presence of the Allies in fact served to discredit any real right-wing radicalism, but the threat of leftist radicalism was very much present in the form of the Soviet-dominated East Germany, and the Social Democrats had traditionally challenged the property rights of the middle and upper classes. There were so many war-damaged that, had they become alienated from the Federal Republic, their opposition could have endangered it. Hughes argues persuasively that the process by which the various interested groups hammered out the compromises embodied in the Equalization of Burdens Law constituted an essential building block in the West German democracy. In particular, both the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats were willing to work out a compromise solution when politics based on compromise rather than ideology was essential to the success of democracy.

A vast number of sources generated by individuals, formal organizations of the war-damaged, government officials, and political parties has enabled Hughes to examine in detail the debate over this issue. The war-damaged made several fundamental arguments. They claimed that lost property, whether real or in the form of savings, reflected a proper social and moral order that ought to be restored if Germany was not to sink into communism. As property owners, they would be able to be self-supporting and, indeed, create jobs to stimulate economic recovery. Fate had cost them their property, but their losses were suffered as part of the German racial community, and hence that community had an obligation to the war-damaged. These arguments, as Hughes notes,
were not based on narrow legalistic claims and were broad enough to include expellees from lands not part of West Germany. Remarkably, everyone, including the owners of assets who might have now to sacrifice for the war-damaged, accepted these arguments. The experience of the Third Reich and its aftermath clearly had helped lessen the rigidity of traditional social and class barriers.

What solutions were possible? The draconic 1948 currency reform, pressed on Germany by the Americans to stop inflation, wiped out most individual savings and was hardly a fair sharing of that burden; savers wanted a return of at least some of their savings. Expelled farmers demanded new farms. Businessmen wanted capital to start new firms. Expellees and the bomb-damaged wanted essential household goods replaced. The war-damaged rejected any solution that would raise funds through normal taxation, since they themselves would have to contribute to those taxes. Instead, they demanded large capital levies on the undamaged and immediate distribution of the funds. But this was only part of the problem. The wealthiest wanted distributions that were proportionate to their losses, an “individual” solution, which would have hurt small savers and workers who lost their livelihood rather than property. These groups favored distributions based on current need, a “social” solution.

In keeping with its philosophy of a social-market economy, the Adenauer government, with the support of the Social Democrats, favored a productive, social solution. Large, immediate capital levies would undermine economic recovery. Existing businesses, farms, and housing could not just be divided between the current owners and the war-damaged without creating a vast oversight mechanism, threatening current investment patterns, and disrupting the current tax structure. The 1952 law then called for a modest levy on capital to be paid out over thirty years, with modest payments to the war-damaged for their losses. As amended, the law conceded that payments for lost household goods should be in some relation to the size of the losses, but no one saw their former wealth restored. This was a compromise, and, as Hughes notes, the war-damaged were “much more pragmatic” (p. 134) than those who had lost their assets in the 1920s.

Well over 100 billion DM were eventually distributed, but to so many claimants that individual payments were far too small to make up for the losses suffered. Moreover, by the time the war-damaged began to receive payments, their situation was quite different from that in the 1945–48 period. The division of Germany appeared permanent. The housing shortage had been nearly eliminated. Expellees had found new jobs and were increasingly integrated into the new society. In short, time and the economic miracle had taken the sting out of the suffering of the war-damaged. As much as the actual payments, the process of arriving at a means of sharing some of the burdens of defeat had important psychological and political consequences. The claims of the war-damaged, including the moral and social value of private property, were acknowledged as legitimate, and this helped legitimize the new Federal Republic and its social-market philosophy. Hughes rightly observes that the contribution of this process to “a stable liberal democracy reads as a tale of triumph” (p. 197).

The sharing of the burdens of defeat was an essential building block of West German democracy, so anyone seeking to understand postwar Germany will profit from reading this book. There is some repetitiveness, and the treatment of the actual administration of the Equalization of Burdens Law gets shortchanged. Still, the thoroughness of this book invites a similar study by Hughes or some other scholar of the complicated debates about the assistance given inhabitants of the former German Democratic Republic as well as ethnic Germans in other East European countries since 1990.

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For anyone familiar with the ideological polarization and polemical tone that characterized research on German and Polish nationalist conflict during much of the cold war era, Sabine Grabowski’s new monograph, Deutscher und polnischer Nationalismus: Der deutsche Ostmarken-Verein und die polnische Straż, 1894–1914, offers encouraging signs of change. During the first postwar decades, the bulk of the historiography produced by West German centers for Ostforschung (research on the east) displayed a troubling degree of continuity with earlier nationalist scholarship. Most of its efforts were devoted to the celebration of German heritage in the East or to decrying the “falsifications” of Polish/Communist scholars. Given its very limited use of archival sources in Poland or East Germany, this generation of work was also often conspicuously thin in its scholarly content. Grabowski’s book, while published by one of the centers of traditional Ostforschung (the Herder-Institut in Marburg), represents a very different sensibility. In her comparative study of the German Ostmarken-Verein (Eastern Marches Society) and the Polish Straż (Guard), two rival nationalist organizations operating in Imperial Germany’s eastern borderlands, she engages fully and productively with Communist-era Polish and East German scholarship as well as recent American studies dealing with various aspects of German and Polish nationalist movements. And, like a growing (though still lamentably small) number of other German researchers, Grabowski has taken advantage of the rich archival sources available on both sides of the German-Polish border, including holdings in the archdiocesan archive in Poznan, as well as a wide array of published and periodical sources. The monograph she has produced, in addition to providing solid institutional histories of the Ostmarken-Verein and the Straż, offers a useful contribution to the long-overdue integration of Polish-, German-, and English-language work on German and Polish nationalist movements.

The overall profile of the Ostmarken-Verein presented in the book—for example, its analysis of the social backgrounds and political orientations of its members, or of the variable relations between its leaders and government officials—will not drastically revise the portrait painted six decades ago by Richard Wonser Tims’s monograph (Germanizing Prussian Poland [New York, 1941]) or by Adam Galos, Witold Jakobczyk, and Felix-Heinrich Gentzen in their more archivally based study from the 1960s (Die Hakatisten: Der Deutsche Ostmarkenverein 1894–1934 [East Berlin, 1966]). But the book’s discussion of the role that the Polish Marcinkowski Society (an educational aid association founded in 1841) played as a “model” for the leaders of the Ostmarken-Verein starts to raise some interesting comparative points. As Grabowski argues, German nationalists envied and sought to emulate the Marcinkowski Association’s remarkable success in financing the education of several generations of Polish activists, and yet the Ostmarken-Verein never came close to matching the Poles’ ability to organize an autonomous system of economic support and mutual aid for conationals. Rather, the group’s defense of “Germandom” was focused almost exclusively on lobbying state officials for economic assistance and coercive anti-Polish legislation; it was a nationalism of semiofficial supplication more than populist right-radical mobilization. Grabowski underlines the point by repeatedly downplaying the ability of the Ostmarken-Verein to compel any important change in government policy. Since none of Germany’s chancellors exhibited anything like a “pro-Polish” orientation—even the “New Course” government of Leo von Caprivi (1890–94) “in principle never left the path of Bismarck’s [anti-] Polish policy” (p. 66)—there could be no clear “shift” in policy in
the late 1890s for which the Ostmarken-Verein could take credit. Likewise, in the subsequent ebb and flow of relations between the Eastern Marches Society and various chancellors and provincial officials, Grabowski (largely following Tims) portrays the organization as essentially dependent on the good graces of the latter (pp. 128-29 and pp. 301–2). This seems, overall, a persuasive portrayal, particularly given the fact that the Ostmarken-Verein’s membership levels and activities surged during periods of official favor (particularly under the Bülow ministry) while stagnating during periods of relative “opposition” (p. 85).

Despite this reliance on top-down support, the Ostmarken-Verein’s success in creating a highly visible, fifty-thousand-strong network for promoting the German cause eventually sparked efforts at emulation by Polish activists. In 1904, spurred by the intensification of state restrictions on land parcelization, a cross-section of Polish leaders founded the Straza (Guard), envisioning it as an organization that could rally and coordinate the entire Polish population of the eastern provinces and match up against the Ostmarken-Verein more effectively than the existing loose network of Polish-Catholic associations. The goals, administrative structure, and territorial organization of the new group closely mirrored those of the Eastern Marches Society, and the strategies that each side employed in the final years before the First World War to build national solidarity—historic commemorations, economic boycotts, cultural and educational campaigns—also suggest what Grabowski calls a “mutual learning process” (p. 304) in the rival organizations’ evolution.

There was, however, “one decisive exception” to this parallelism between the Ostmarken-Verein and the Straza: their radically different relationships to state authority (p. 303). Whereas the Eastern Marches Society became more and more dependent on summoning official intervention to promote germanization, state harassment and repression pushed the Straza ever further away from its original goal of a high-profile mass organization and toward quiet, microlevel cultural work. Two measures in particular severely handicapped the Straza’s efforts to match the development of the Ostmarken-Verein. In April 1906, under strong pressure by government officials and by the neighboring bishop of Breslau, Georg Kopp, Archbishop of Poznan Florian Stabiewski issued a ban on clerical involvement in the Straza, which, Grabowski argues, deprived the movement of its “organizational backbone” (p. 265). Two years later, a new Association Law passed by the Reichstag sharply restricted the use of Polish in public meetings and promised even harsher restrictions after an initial grace period for the most heavily Polish parts of the empire. In the face of these severe constraints, the leaders of the Straza were compelled to abandon much of their program of mass mobilization and public demonstration and resort to almost an “underground” strategy of local neighborhood organization and word-of-mouth agitation.

At this point, the limits of the kind of top-heavy institutional history pursued by Grabowski become clear. Once the public activities—and the accompanying state surveillance—of the Straza taper off after 1909, her account does as well, leaving readers with the rather anticlimactic conclusion that the Straza, despite the rapid crippling of its institutional development, nonetheless proved “thoroughly successful” in creating an autonomous Polish-national infrastructure (p. 305). This seems to beg two questions. First, was it in fact so easy to overcome the draconian restrictions on public displays of “Polishness” and preserve a sense of national solidarity in the private sphere alone? The profound pessimism about the national cause that gripped many Polish activists in the immediate prewar years, which Grabowski only hints at, suggests that this was not so clear-cut. And if popular devotion to Polish history, culture, and language was, indeed, being successfully cultivated in everyday private (and particularly religious)
life, despite every officially imposed constraint, then how exactly did this work on the ground? It is to be hoped that future researchers in this field, delving into parish records, additional press sources, memoirs, and other materials, can build on the story of institutional rivalry and imitation told so thoroughly by Grabowski to further develop our understanding of whether and how organizations like the Ostmarken-Verein and Straż achieved their primary goal: creating committed Germans and Poles.

JAMES BJORK

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In this important and erudite study, Nancy Shields Kollmann investigates aspects of early modern Russian history through the study of litigation in cases of dishonor (beschest’e) and precedence (mestnichestvo). Kollmann begins by outlining concepts of honor in Kievan and early Muscovite society; she goes on to examine sexual dishonor and then legal procedure in honor litigation before considering precedence cases among the Muscovite elite. The next chapter broadens the discussion by situating honor in the context of the strategies of social and political integration adopted by the autocratic state. A further chapter considers the abolition of precedence in 1682 in relation to the emergence of absolutism, and an epilogue traces continuities and changes in Russian concepts of honor to the mid-nineteenth century.

In the chapters that consider different types of honor litigation, Kollmann has made extensive use of archival and published primary materials. Although mestnichestvo is a well-established field of scholarly investigation, Kollmann’s is the first attempt in any language to conduct a detailed examination of beschest’e, and the rich sources which she has uncovered enable her to provide a fascinating picture of conflict and conflict resolution at various levels of Muscovite society. Her discussion of the evidence is subtle and perceptive, consistently informed by her impressive familiarity with the secondary literature on honor and related concepts in other early modern European societies.

When she goes beyond her source databases of dishonor suits and precedence cases, however, and attempts an ambitious reconceptualization of the relationship of state and society in early modern Russia, Kollmann’s touch is slightly less sure. She argues convincingly that honor cases represented a form of cultural practice that enabled the state to promote social integration, but on the strength of this she goes on to make bold claims about the extent to which stability and cohesion in Muscovy were based on consensus rather than coercion. Her evidence for the importance of consensus-building strategies, however, applies primarily to the elite: in spite of her assertion that concepts of honor in Russia were socially inclusive, Kollmann’s beschest’e cases relate disproportionately to elite individuals; and precedence cases, by definition, of course, involved only elite clans. She provides little evidence that peasants and other nonprivileged groups were controlled by strategies other than coercive ones; indeed, it was these groups that contributed most to the chronic instability of seventeenth-century Russia. Kollmann’s somewhat idyllic neo-Slavophile depiction of the social cohesive-ness of the pre-Petrine period omits any serious consideration of the civil war of the Time of Troubles (1604–13), the urban riots of the mid-seventeenth century, or the
great cossack-peasant rebellion led by Sten’ka Razin in 1669–71. Soviet historians, with their emphasis on class struggle, may have overstated the case when they described the seventeenth century as the “rebellious age,” but Kollmann swings the pendulum too far in the opposite direction when she tells us that “the degree of violence in the state should not be exaggerated” (p. 182). Nor does she consider how far the cohesion that she shows to have existed between the state and the elites may have stemmed from their common interest in controlling the nonprivileged by coercive means (this, after all, is the conventional explanation for the legal enserfment of the peasantry in 1649).

Kollmann makes her case for the existence of social stability in early modern Russia more effectively for the micro- than for the macrolevel when she argues that honor was one of the many noncoercive strategies employed by the state in promoting social cohesion. Her chapter on sexual dishonor demonstrates convincingly the ways in which insult and other forms of public shaming could be used to enforce the patriarchal norms that underpinned the stability of the household and community as social units. And her discussion of the practice of litigation in honor cases shows how trials in many instances served to resolve underlying tensions and conflicts in the community, thereby providing an arena within which collective norms could be reasserted and stable social relations restored. Precedence, too, Kollmann argues convincingly, served primarily to reinforce the patrimonial political system and to affirm traditional status relationships.

At the macrolevel, Kollmann is most persuasive when she considers the relationship of the state to elite groups. She rightly stresses the problems of political control posed by the vast and rapidly expanding territory of the sixteenth-century Muscovite empire as well as the limits that geography and demography imposed on the power of the ruler. The role of the central state was a minimalist one, concentrated on the mobilization of key resources; routine administrative tasks were devolved to local elites, in relation to whom the state adopted various strategies of co-option that allowed them a considerable degree of autonomy in practice. And it is primarily by emphasizing the practice of autocracy, as much as its theory and its juridical basis, that Kollmann provides a stimulating revisionist account of the Muscovite polity. In questioning the extent of Russian despotism in the early modern period, however, she oddly overstates the contemporary relevance of her theme when she claims that her position leads to a degree of optimism about Russia’s present prospects for “modern liberal development”: “For those who see autocracy as less powerful in practice than in claim, Russia’s future potential is less gloomy, because its history provides evidence of agency and voluntarism” (p. 20). Leaving this strange piece of historical determinism aside, one must conclude that Kollmann’s book is an innovative and thoughtful piece of scholarship whose argumentation is presented with a considerable degree of conceptual and methodological sophistication. The author has been well served by her publisher: Cornell University Press has allowed her a generous scholarly apparatus, with lengthy footnote references and a very full bibliography that includes works of comparative and theoretical relevance as well as primary and secondary materials relating to Russia. This well-produced volume should prove highly influential among historians of early modern Russia; hopefully it will inspire new avenues of research, as well as reassessments of some of our older conventional wisdoms.

MAUREEN PERRIE

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The best-known moment in the history of Russian Freemasonry was the day it died. On April 23, 1792, the Russian publisher, pedagogue, and philosophe—and prominent Freemason—Nikolai Novikov was arrested. After interrogation, and the confiscation of his books, he was sentenced to fifteen years’ confinement. “Not long after Novikov disappeared behind the walls of the Schlüsselburg fortress, Russia’s few remaining lodges closed their doors, and what had once been a vibrant Masonic community vanished” (pp. 3–4). By the time Catherine II died in 1796, Russian “Freemasonry as an active, organized institution had ceased to exist” (p. 174). In the relatively liberal early period of his long reign, Catherine’s grandson, Alexander I, indicated official toleration of the movement in the new century, and some lodges resuscitated themselves. But once again, in 1822, when the movement was denounced as corrupt by one of its venerable elder leaders, Alexander instructed the lodges to close, and within days Russia’s Masons signed a pledge “that they would never again establish this or any other secret society. . . . The brothers closed their lodges for the last time; there were no reports of disobedience or resistance” (p. 182).

The ease with which Catherine and Alexander dispersed a perceived threat and the utter subservience of their loyal Masonic subjects have convinced generations of historians that the movement merited scant attention. An interesting foreign import, a plaything of the minuscule upper tiers of the urban nobility, a humane charitable and educational enterprise in the hands of Novikov (even if he was personally attracted to the most mystical branches of the movement)—Russian Masonry was worth a footnote but little more. Told to commit suicide, it did so instantly, without complaint. It had no afterlife, it fed into no French Revolution, even if one fully credits its vague ties to the circles that produced the circus of Decembrism. Its insignificance seemed proven, its marginality in Russian society self-evident.

Douglas Smith’s account of Russian Freemasonry is the fullest available. He has the advantage of building his Russian edifice on a more solid scholarly foundation of recent work on European Masonry than his few predecessors had. Furthermore, he apparently is the first scholar permitted “to make full use” (p. 188) of a massive manuscript collection, a Rossiiskoe masonstvo: Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’, compiled by A. I. Serkov in Moscow. Unfortunately Smith’s use of this treasure can be maddening. Central is Serkov’s figure of “3,093 Masons active in the eighteenth century” (p. 189), which is the basis for Smith’s discussion of membership in the movement. But nowhere does he inquire into the meaning of this figure: Does it mean that one’s name appeared somewhere on a Masonic roster? One-time attendance? Taking of more than one degree? Dues-paying membership for more than one year? What percentage of this group were foreign born? Foreign surnamed? The reader is given no evidence.

In many ways, this is an odd book. Novikov, the one Mason known to most historians, receives very little attention. The Masons were famous both for their philanthropy and for their educational endeavors, but neither receives any attention here (neither word appears in the index). Smith emphasizes almost exclusively the Masons’ commitment to individual moral improvement—“working the rough stone”—to the exclusion of other activities. Disappointing too is the absence of a clear enunciation of the elusive secrets that Masons learned as they took higher degrees. Smith dates the arrival
of Freemasonry in Russia to “the 1730s or early 1740s” (p. 18), and he nowhere addresses the old tradition that ascribes it to the Petrine era. One venerable scholarly tradition sees Russian Masonry as a German plot, serving the fiscal and diplomatic interests of the Prussian court; Smith instead vigorously defends the British roots of the movement but does not inquire whether the British too had a political agenda. More serious is his disinterest in religion in general and Orthodoxy in particular. Catherine viewed the movement as a sect, but Smith does not inquire into her concept of Orthodoxy’s role in the governance of her empire in the second half of her reign. When he discusses the clergy’s denunciation of Masons as “‘beastly, shameless, atheists, apostates, schismatics, Armenians’ and persons of ‘Epicurean and Masonic temper and mind’” (p. 138), he becomes a modern Masonic partisan, forgetting that old regime Russia had a state religion, a consecrated empress: ruler, clergy, and laity shared a common spiritual, physical, and political universe as well as a religious faith, including its inherited attitudes toward apostasy, heresy, and sectarianism.

At the heart of the book, however, is Smith’s insistence that the movement flourished—more than 140 lodges in over forty cities and towns, he asserts—because the lodges were “not isolated and unique institutions, but part of a complex network of new social spaces including assemblies, salons, clubs, theaters, and societies” (p. 178). Crucial to his exposition of the secret societies was their situation within two “public spheres,” one of “print, with its journals, newspapers, and books,” and the other “a host of new physical sites from salons, theaters, and lecture halls to clubs, literary circles, and learned societies [which] presented a zone of social intercourse beyond the traditional spheres of family and state.” “The popularity of such venues suggests the degree to which Russia participated, along with the rest of Europe, in what one historian has recently dubbed “the sociable century” (p. 61).

Not since East German and Soviet historians invented the fictitious “Russian Enlightenment” for the purposes of Marxist ideological symmetry have such extravagant claims been made for eighteenth-century Russian Europeanized polite society. The annals of books published in Russia are misleadingly presented, the discrepancy between books published and books sold is unexplored, and the reading public is grossly exaggerated. In Smith’s presentation, everyone was reading, but there is not the slightest suggestion that what they chiefly read was the Psalter and the religious manuscript miscellanies of the seventeenth century. Here not only were they reading, but they were maintaining “open” houses, literary salons, dancing merrily, hosting soirees, attending lectures, rushing off to the library, attending masquerades, poetry readings, and fireworks, and of course, frequenting the theater, in the capitals and in the provinces. This depiction of vibrant new social spaces is, unfortunately, untempered by any statistics to reveal the minuscule percentage of the Russian nobility and public able to afford such a lifestyle.

In a remarkable passage, Smith castigates the marquis de Custine’s La Russie en 1839 as a “deeply flawed book.” “Custine’s description is clearly at odds with the picture of Russia in the previous century, and particularly with the era of Catherine the Great” (p. 86). Indeed. Smith’s imagined link between widespread Freemasonry and a glittering eighteenth-century Russian society remains as speculative and undocumented as his assertion that Masonry was popular because its numerous ranks paralleled Peter the Great’s system of chin (p. 111).

MAX J. OKENFUSS

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Russian elite culture, what we often refer to as culture with a capital C, has received extensive attention. After all, it is the elite who produced War and Peace, The Brothers Karamazov, and the many great works of Russian written literature. It is the elite who are the subject of many, especially earlier, history books. In Russia, the folk, too, have been studied. Folklore scholarship is prestigious, and folklore, defined as the verbal, musical, social, and material culture produced by the peasantry, has been held to be the repository of the Russian spirit, the wellspring of truly Russian beliefs and artistic forms. But there are many people who are neither elite nor folk; they are the producers and consumers of small c culture, and about them we know precious little. Faith Wigzell’s book gives us a glimpse into one aspect of their lives: fortune-telling, dream interpretation, and the various printed aids used for these activities.

Because the culture of the masses has not been valued and records of it, including books, are poorly preserved, Wigzell begins with a discussion of her sources. She explains that fortune-telling guides were not taken seriously and not tracked carefully by libraries and book depositories. Publishers allowed themselves many liberties with these materials and republished the same book under different titles, or used the same title for books with a different content. Wigzell lists the problems she encountered and her efforts to deal with these.

The discussion of sources is followed by a description of the various types of books which are the subject of this study. Dream books were the most popular item; they existed from the eighteenth century to the time of the Revolution and appeared in a variety of formats and dimensions. They were dictionaries of sorts: one looked up the object, or animal, or event seen in a dream and found its meaning. Oracles, another type of guide to the future, were more complicated and required using dice and/or dots to calculate the answer to a question, while in books of numbers, the letters in a question had to be counted and manipulated according to the published instructions to yield a prognostication. Books on physiognomy and chiromancy helped their owners use physical appearance to determine the personality traits of others. There were astrological guides, books of calendary divination that predicted weather, lists of auspicious and inauspicious dates, and guides to reading coffee grounds or separating beans into piles and rows to foretell the future.

It is striking that part of the attraction of this material was its real or ostensible attribution to foreign sages. At least when it came to items in print, the public assigned greater value to non-Russian sources. Yet it was the many ancient folk methods of seeing the future that predisposed Russians to readily accept printed guides, and Wigzell devotes her next chapter to describing this tradition, noting that even urban dwellers probably practiced some combination of folk divination and prognostication guided by published materials. To give a sense of the milieu in which dream books and other printed guides were used, the author examines references to fortune-telling in literature, such as Pushkin’s mention of Tatiana’s interest in the dream book of Martyn Zadeka, and, because the urban lower classes wrote little about themselves, she presents elite reflections on dream books, which range from lively interest to fears that these would only encourage and perpetuate superstition, making efforts at education all the more difficult.
Wigzell presents a thorough catalog of publishers: who published which books, when, where, and in what context. It is interesting that some publishers specialized in fortune-telling materials while others used them to subsidize literary works that were more ambitious but less appealing to the general public. In the chapter on gender, the author looks at breakfast-time discussions of dreams and other indigenous forms of divination and speculates on their evolution, especially as people moved to cities and women learned to read. She contrasts men’s using cards for gambling to women’s using them for prediction and examines fortune-telling as entertainment, especially in high society. The discussion of professional fortune-tellers that follows also traces rural-urban links and focuses on issues of gender. Not only was divination a profession practiced primarily by women but the clientele, whether lower or upper class, was also predominately female. In the printed sphere, however, most of the sages whose names were used to add credibility to dream and other fortune-telling books were male. Their connection to the wisdom attributed to them was often tenuous—the Martyn Zadeka to whom Pushkin’s Tatiana was devoted first appeared in print as the venerable old Swiss hermit Martin Zadeck who delivered political prophecy on his deathbed. His name was altered and gradually attached to a variety of books on divination until he became the most widely known “author” of dream books.

A subtext to Wigzell’s book is the growing disapproval of dream books and of interest in divination. This disapproval reached its peak with the Soviet era because, as the author points out, official doctrine saw only one possible future and could not tolerate any activity which implied otherwise. With the collapse of the Soviet system, restrictions on everything, fortune-telling included, disappeared and the uncertainty that Russia now faces has encouraged the revival of interest in divination.

Wigzell is venturing into new territory by attempting to describe a little studied and poorly documented level of culture and, like many such forays, hers has its problems. The history of the publishing of fortune-telling books is thorough and detailed, but the phenomenon of divination itself fails to come to life. This is, of course, the area for which information is the most scarce. However, one wishes Wigzell had drawn on related but better-documented practices, such as folk predictions, or collected her own data on contemporary fortune-telling revivals to give the reader a better feel for Russian divination. A more thorough description of dream and other fortune-telling books would have been helpful. The author does mention entries under the letter A to give a sense of variation from edition to edition, but this again is publishing history, not a description of fortune-telling. Still, there is a great deal of interesting information in this book and we can hope that Wigzell will expand her explorations in this level of culture.

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Edited by Jonathan Harris.


The movement of Russian peasants into urban locales and industrial employment has attracted the attention of more than one historian. Unlike their counterparts in most other countries, labor migrants (otkhodniki) before 1917 remained bound to their native
villages by a combination of administrative regulations and economic and cultural ties. Where previous studies have followed workers into the cities, Jeffrey Burds focuses on the rural society that nurtured them and continued to claim their allegiance. This was “a peripatetic world in which traditional relationships and traditional ways of doing things were profoundly transformed” under the influence of a developing commodity economy (p. 1). Profoundly but incompletely, and therein hangs a tale.

Skeptical of “Leninist hoopla about class conflict,” Burds sketches a society that evolved and adapted itself to a changing environment, absorbing massive changes but fending off others. The pillars of rural life were the family household and the village commune, both expressions of patriarchal authority. Under serfdom, these were mechanisms for enforcing the demands of landlords and the state but also for maintaining (varying degrees of) autonomy, solidarity, and conformity within peasant society. The challenge of the postemancipation era was to maintain this authority over a younger generation that was spending more and more time away from the natal village: Would a patriarch’s sons and daughters learn bad habits in the city? marry against their father’s will? demand division of the family’s plot of land? stop sending money back to the village? Would entire families depart, saddling their erstwhile neighbors with extra debt and tax obligations?

Against such possibilities, Russian law and practice offered several defenses. The strongest was the internal passport that, until 1906, every migrant had to present for registration in order to live and work in town. If an individual stepped out of line, this document could be revoked by village authorities, forcing the individual to return whence he had come.

Another way of reinforcing migrants’ bonds to the native locality was to hire workers as a crew (artel’) that traveled and labored (and often ate and roomed) together in distant localities. Such units were organized by more experienced workers or subcontractors (variously described by Burds as brokers, hingemen, opportunists, patrons, and benefactors), who made loans to village families in return for workers signing on for a fixed term. In addition to being in effect indentured, the members of an artel’ were collectively responsible for fulfilling their contract, so that if one member quit the others would do extra work in his place. Above and beyond the formal obligations that group labor entailed, fellow villagers (zemliaki) provided a network of mutual support and supervision that discouraged anyone from stepping out of line.

Were workers glad to depart the village? sorry to return? At points Burds describes rural ties as an unwanted burden, a means by which impoverished villages “raided the cash economy,” forcing migrants to subsidize their ailing agriculture (p. 53). Migrants’ families, he suggests, “remained hostage” to ensure that they upheld their responsibilities (p. 61). Elsewhere, however, he acknowledges that “virtually every household” sent away younger members in search of earnings, but almost all returned to the village in later life. He terms the migrants’ remittances a “rational economic choice . . . an investment in a traditional and generally reliable form of social insurance” (p. 133).

The stresses of city life, he suggests, were considerable. Burds uses medical records to argue for a “very high correlation between nonvillage work and nervous disorders among young peasant workers” (p. 129). A high proportion of peasants with psychiatric conditions had worked outside the village in their youth (but then again, so had a high proportion of all other peasants). He illustrates his argument with the case of a young woman who was gang-raped and beaten in the city and lived the rest of her life in a mental hospital. Horrifying as the story is, it provides a poor basis for generalizing about city life or the stresses of nonvillage labor.

Moving from the particular to the general is not this author’s strong suit. Chapter 3
(on passport disputes) and chapter 7 (“A Culture of Denunciation”) both present far-reaching arguments based on fragmentary local records, without asking whether the surviving documents are typical of broader peasant experience. In the “Denunciation” chapter, Burds argues that religious anathematization (of sectarians who left the fold of Orthodoxy) became a means of controlling other kinds of deviance. The examples he presents (pp. 200–207), however, point in quite different directions. With no reference to economic losses, peasants threaten to expel an Old Believer from the commune for his heresy, a husband seeks a divorce from his promiscuous wife, and a brutal police officer punches and kicks a woman who suffers a fit during the Sacred Liturgy. These cases’ relevance to the broader themes of socioeconomic transformation is far from obvious.

Similar difficulties appear in some of Burds’s statistical discussion. He comments that peasant households in the Central Industrial Region “had an average of 1–2 fewer member-workers” than other regions (p. 36), but the accompanying table shows something quite different: an average household size of 6.2 in the Central Industrial Region, compared to 6.3 to 6.9 in the Central Agricultural Region. The only territories with significantly larger households were in the west, south, and southeast, for reasons that go beyond Burds’s analysis.

The problem of anecdotal evidence is especially vexing for historians, who are forever struggling to derive meaning from the fragmentary records that previous generations have left us. Exactly when does a scrap of historical information become an “example,” and when does an example become “telling”? Burds, a talented and diligent researcher, has assembled a vast amount of historical detail, much of it from sources that were untouched by previous studies. He has also foraged in the borderlands of the discipline, seeking a comparative/theoretical framework for his study. His book offers provocative argument and fertile speculation, but the nuances and ambiguities of the story elude him, leaving the reader with a whole that is less than the sum of its parts.

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**Autocracy under Siege: Security Police and Opposition in Russia, 1866–1905.**

By Jonathan W. Daly.


Research into protest movements and revolutionary change has rediscovered the state. (See, e.g., T. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* [Cambridge, 1979]; and P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* [Cambridge, 1985].) The strength of the state and its ability to defend itself are now viewed as primary variables in understanding the success or failure of opposition movements. A state capable of defending itself cannot simply be brought to its knees. Exactly what goes into making a state defensible remains an open question. The efficient use of force is one option; pluralistic flexibility is another. Historically, states were not in a position to choose. They defended themselves with whatever weapons they had available, consistent with their basic character. Plainly, those weapons were correlated in some manner with the character of the insurgent groups they were intended to counter; and the insurgents, for their part, were reacting to the state. It was no accident, therefore, that in the period after the Decembrist uprising of 1825 the Russian secret police grew along with the conspiratorial circles
of the revolutionary movement. The question that suggests itself is whether or not this method of defending the state was efficient. Was the fall of the autocracy related to the activities of the secret police? In a dissertation suggested by Richard Pipes, Jonathan Daly is the first scholar, so far as I am aware, to attempt to furnish a solid foundation for the numerous answers—often implicit (though usually clearly discernible) but always predominantly speculative—that have been offered in response to this question. Daly is certainly not attempting to offer retrospective tactical advice to the autocracy. But the potential implications for our understanding of the events of 1905–6 (and 1917) are surely clear enough. Should the autocracy have acted more decisively?

In attempting to answer this question, Daly goes far back into the past. A brief preface dealing with the foundation years under Nicholas I and the “Great Reforms” of Alexander II is followed by a detailed treatment of the emergency laws of 1881 and the accompanying administrative measures in the police apparatus. The second chapter discusses the personnel of this unusual organization. They were characterized not only by their attractive uniforms but also by their higher than average levels of education and by their extraordinary career possibilities (pp. 49–71). Not all applicants were selected. Exceptional qualifications coupled with intense ambition were required. The paradoxical result was that this openness to intellectual ability among the secret police led to acutely counterproductive “sympathies” for the opposition (p. 71). The members of the political police measured themselves—and not solely because of their objectives—against their opponents. They were eager to devise more effective measures to achieve victory in the struggle. In many respects members of the secret police were the real opponents of the career revolutionaries. It was a natural consequence that, as their numbers grew, they went over to the “offense.” Daly describes the proposals of the police officer Sergei Zubatov to infiltrate the opponents of the autocracy with “mobile surveillance brigades” and “secret informants” (p. 81–82). It is well known that such methods allowed the police to uncover a number of dangerous schemes and to penetrate, on occasion, into the inner circles of the revolutionary parties. (The famous double agent Evno Azef is, naturally, a perfect example for Daly, though the author, for good reasons, cannot devote as much space to him as have recent monographs. See A. Geifman, Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917 [Princeton, N.J., 1993]; and N. Schleifman, Undercover Agents in the Russian Revolutionary Movement: The SR Party, 1902–1914 [London, 1988].) The autocracy could also thank its resourceful officer Zubatov for the idea of founding phony opposition groups designed to dilute the revolutionaries’ efforts (pp. 117–23). Of course, this approach was risky: a strategy that tried to light a “small” fire in the hope of preventing a large-scale conflagration could have unintended consequences. It could also undermine the organization’s own authority. A general strike in Odessa, which might have been prevented, was fateful for Zubatov in the summer of 1903 (pp. 140–41). When one considers that the Interior Minister, von Plehwe, who dismissed Zubatov, was himself soon to fall victim to an out-of-control police agent (Azef), his anger about “police trade unions” does not seem unreasonable. In any case Zubatov’s “reforms” remained incomplete (p. 124). Whether they might have been able to prevent the revolution of 1905 had they been enacted is an issue Daly leaves open. He does make it clear, however, that lack of unity at the highest levels of the government served at the very least to encourage the opposition (p. 154). The examples the author presents of the confusion and incompetence that characterized the reactions of many governors to the unrest provide factual proof of his claim (see, e.g., p. 155). Faced with such descriptions, one can only marvel that the government was able to reassert its authority at the end of the year and thus put a stop to the unrest. (Admittedly, the state was able to make use of the army returning from the Far East at that time.)
Daly’s conclusions remain ambivalent. On the one hand, he concedes that the political police achieved a certain degree of success. For the most part they were able “to hold at bay a large proportion of Russia’s conspiratorial activists” (p. 184) and to prevent them from directing the path of the revolutionary movement. On the other hand, however, Daly believes there were some circumstances that hindered the police in reaching their objectives: a lack of unity and coordination among the many branches of the organization; ineffectiveness, insofar as the political police could only observe and not make arrests; and a general powerlessness in the face of a mass movement that they were unable to channel or direct. In Daly’s view a political police such as the one that existed in tsarist Russia could help the state to combat unrest and conspiratorial groups but was simply not suited for preventing mass social upheavals (p. 185).

This conclusion seems indisputable. But it casts some doubt on the first, more positive half of the balance. Even if the security police were able to take some potential ringleaders out of circulation at key moments, they were never in a position to influence in any essential way the course of the “critical crisis of authority”—it seems doubtful, to say the least, whether one ought to speak of a revolution—of the years 1905–6. The October strikes and the peasant raids occurred just the same, and, in any case, the “liberal” circles remained unaffected. Perhaps there is one conclusion that would have been no less plausible—namely, that the emergency laws of 1881 were almost useless (pp. 38–39).

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The Putilov Works in Saint Petersburg, the Russian empire’s largest and best-known industrial enterprise at the beginning of the twentieth century, had a checkered history. Founded by the state in 1801 as an ironworks for the production of artillery shells, it was sold to private owners in 1842, returned to state ownership after a series of bankruptcies, and eventually purchased by Nikolai Putilov in 1868. Putilov, a former naval ministry official, launched a series of ambitious plans to construct a port facility and railroad connection that burdened the enterprise with crushing debts. After several years of reshuffling loans, he ceded ownership in 1877 to the state.

The period of the enterprise’s greatest growth, 1885–1900, coincided with the empire’s industrial boom. Having bought back shares from the state bank, the company vastly reduced its production of rails in favor of railroad cars, locomotives, ships, and artillery orders. By 1900, it employed 12,440 workers, more than any other factory in Russia. Thereafter, until the 1917 Revolution, it was the empire’s premier military supplier, a veritable “Russian Krupp.” Its strategic importance heightened the significance of unrest among its workers. In January 1905 they struck the enterprise, precipitating the massacre (“Bloody Sunday”) that sparked the revolution of that year. Another strike, in February 1916, led to the state’s sequestration of the enterprise. One of the “hearth[s] of revolution,” the Putilov Works and its labor force figured prominently in the events of 1917.

To Soviet historians Putilov exhibited at least three important characteristics of Rus-
sian industry in the late imperial era. One was that by concentrating such a large number of workers, it facilitated proletarian consciousness and Bolshevik agitation among them. None other than Mikhail Kalinin, the future president of the Soviet government, worked as a lathe operator at Putilov from 1896 until he was arrested as a member of the Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class in July 1899. A second involved the Putilov Company’s participation in a series of rail and locomotive cartels and the presence of bank representatives on the company’s board. These features exemplified monopoly capitalism, supposedly the highest stage of capitalist development, which, in Marxist-Leninist terms, legitimized socialist revolution. Finally, the dependence of Putilov on military orders and the willingness of the state to intervene again and again to prop up the enterprise to ensure military supply implicated Putilov in the fall of tsarism and, of course, vice versa.

As an exercise in business history, Jonathan Grant’s book on the Putilov Company eschews attention to issues involving labor in favor of addressing those that concern the production profile, commercial activities, and profitability of the firm as well as the individual businessmen directing it. Grant takes on not so much Soviet as Western historiography, especially that which has posited a deviant path for Russian industry and industrialists. As articulated by such historians as Thomas Owen and Tim McDaniel, that path led to a dead end because of the structural incompatibility between political autocracy and a functional capitalist economy. Grant rejects this view, asserting that “a contemporary corporation could indeed coexist and prosper under the autocratic state” (p. 150). Overall, his aim is to rescue Putilov in particular and late imperial Russian big business in general from the condescension that has crept into other historians’ accounts, and this is to be applauded.

It is Grant’s contention that at the level of the firm—a level to which Russian historians hitherto have not descended—choices made about sources of capital, investment criteria, and product mix bore striking similarities to analogous firms in the West. For example, he contests Peter Gatrell’s claim that before 1910 “Russia lacked the equivalent of . . . specialist suppliers of armaments” such as Schneider, Vickers, and Krupp because “the relatively small size of the Russian market compelled engineering firms to engage in the manufacture of a broad range of products” (Government, Industry and Rearmament in Russia, 1900–1914 [Cambridge, 1994], p. 215). By this criterion, Grant notes, “even Krupp could not be considered a ‘Krupp’” (p. 66) because it devoted only 30 percent of its output to military goods. He also argues, contra Alexander Gerschenkron, that it was neither the Russian bureaucracy nor banks that were responsible for the plethora of cartel agreements among Putilov and other firms but rather the cooperating firms’ directors.

Occasionally, the author seems to get tangled in his own arguments. He is at pains to demonstrate that “Putilov’s ever increasing business in the private market before 1914 calls into question the notion that armaments became the driving engine for growth in the Russian economy” (p. 144). But further on he notes that the state share, consisting overwhelmingly of armaments, “did occupy a pivotal position in the company’s financial well-being, and that share was increasing up to 1914” (p. 148). Perhaps there is a difference between state orders as a “driving engine” and as “pivotal,” but it is one that was lost on this reviewer. The statement that “the Putilov Company survived in spite of artillery orders, rather than because of them” (p. 149) only adds to the confusion.

In the introduction, the author advertises one of the purposes of the book as being “to illuminate a usable past for Russian business history” (p. 18). This would seem to suggest that his analysis of Putilov might serve as a model for other business historians.
to adopt. But in the epilogue, entirely devoted to the post-Soviet record of Putilov’s successor, the Kirov Factory, the past has become usable for another purpose, namely, to “offer grounds for optimism” for present-day Russian industry (p. 152). “It is time,” he adds, “to rethink interpretations that stress state dependency and artificiality as the chief attributes of Petersburg’s heavy industry firms” (p. 168). It may well be that Putilov was able to survive until 1918 thanks at least in part to its directors’ business acumen. But this does not necessarily mean that Kirov’s present directors are in a position to use that past. It is one thing for an industrial firm to have survived in the context of an autocratic state; it is quite another to suggest that it could do so without an effectively functioning state of any kind.

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There is no consensus in the new historiography of Soviet Communism about the extent to which individuals and groups were “sovietized,” about how to determine what people “really” thought, or about the nature of resistance. Discussion of these issues has been caught up with new evidence about opposition and popular attitudes uncovered in recently declassified secret police summary reports (svodki) on the activities and “moods” of various segments of the population. Broadly speaking, the most skeptical scholars have maintained that these sources say more about a secret police dedicated to uncovering deviation than about the population itself, and they have relied on diaries and other sources to suggest widespread participation in Soviet projects of transformation. Others have advocated critical use of the svodki, making careful distinctions between regional reports and synthetic central compilations, and advocating multiaxial analysis to redress the institutional biases built into the bureaucratic party state. Still others have embraced the new sources to develop a strong, new resistance paradigm in the Soviet field. The best scholars from all three camps, however, can agree that interpreting these sources engages profound methodological issues and many of the deepest assumptions of the historian.

Now Vladimir Brovkin, without making reference to recent debates over these sources or the many issues raised by them, has made his own, distinctive contribution: he has written what purports to be a comprehensive general history of the New Economic Policy (NEP) period (1921–29) based almost exclusively on the Central Committee collection of the former Central Party Archive (fond 17), in which secret police svodki occupy pride of place as the most important sources employed.

Brovkin’s nine chapters separately consider seven groups: the new party elite, youth and the Komsomol, the peasantry, workers, women, and the intelligentsia. The author goes to great lengths in the introduction, and through heavy use of a few terms such as “representations,” to establish that this work is about culture and mentalities. But this is not a work of cultural history. Brovkin’s simple arguments are repeated in each chapter: the new sources prove the deliberate deceitfulness of Communist “representations” and official “discourse,” essentially synonyms for propaganda and the press. The nonparty groups were seething with discontent; they ridiculed, ignored, or opposed the Communist message, and seized chances offered by NEP conditions to act deci-
sively in their own interests. The party’s new elite was a bunch of corrupt, drunken, ignorant “upstarts,” who in their careerist servility swamped the generation of civil war commissars and Old Bolsheviks. Workers’ lives continued much as they had before the Revolution, women’s emancipation was a sham, and the opportunistic new party cadres wanted nothing more than to behave and live like the old masters. However, the Bolsheviks’ attacks on old institutions and restraints did succeed in promoting rampant hooliganism, debauchery, “lawlessness and indecency” (p. 107). Stalin’s revolution from above at the end of the decade was thus a recognition of the party’s failures, a “preemptive strike” by the center against the processes of the 1920s, including the “perceived threat of a new economic union between pro-NEP local party officialdom and prosperous rural and urban entrepreneurs” (p. 222).

Ironically, in Brovkin’s strongly worded interpretive declarations one can detect the long arm of the secret police, as well as many Soviet and late Soviet assumptions. Brovkin’s analysis is so close to his sources that phrases like “low cultural level” or “party of social-climbers and bureaucrats” roll easily off his pen (pp. 48, 248 n. 3). The strength of the author’s conclusions is undercut by what appears to be an unquestioning belief that the most secret sources are the least ideological and the closest to the truth. Even the all-union, synthetic secret police svodki, he claims, “were essentially factual compilations with little or no analysis . . . All the relevant facts for the period in question and where they took place were listed” (p. 58). All indications of pro-Soviet attitudes are attributed to the manipulations of regional party and agitprop committees. The secret police, however, is portrayed as merely “more impolitic” (p. 219) than other agencies, rather than pursuing its own agendas of uncovering and exaggerating dissent. The author is apparently unaware of the work of historians in other fields on police reports and social history, or studies by V. S. Izmozik such as Glaza i ushi rezhima [The eyes and ears of the regime] (Saint Petersburg, 1995) and others suggesting the Soviet secret police was highly ideological in its reporting.

Brovkin, despite one disclaimer (p. 188), thus embraces the secret police reports throughout as the most objective depiction of social reality; indeed, the vigilant “organs” and the historian of resistance share similar desires to uncover omnipresent dissent. But Brovkin also approaches the sources as a platform to advance his own many intuitions about the way the system worked. Sometimes the author speaks for the entire group under discussion (“[p]easants saw through Communist propaganda” [p. 66]), sometimes for the population as a whole: “Only a few . . . dared to make public what everyone knew anyway: . . . that everyone pretended that the country was marching to socialism” (p. 223). Readers of this volume will be hard-pressed to find a single example, aside from a handful of party leaders, of anyone who believed in the regime or its ideology.

Despite its flaws, historians would be remiss to dismiss this work in its entirety. Brovkin has identified an important body of sources. His short, declarative sentences can sometimes be refreshingly blunt, and his material can be read in ways he does not consider. The discussion, heavily weighted toward the rural and provincial Russian republic, highlights the gulf persisting between the urban centers and the vast rural hinterland. The negative information collected on local party cadres and social groups is suggestive of the sheer magnitude of top-level information accumulated by the party that spoke in favor of purification and cleansing. (One does not, however, need top-secret sources to reveal the party’s obsessions with “political illiteracy,” careerism, degeneracy, and a galaxy of infractions of communist “lifestyle”—they are all widely discussed in party journals of the day). This book highlights tensions between center and periphery, especially in the context of the inner-party political conflicts of the era,
in suggestive ways. While Brovkin and his sources alike assume that most of the population was prepolitical (the “vast majority,” he says, “craved entertainment, not politics; for [sic] vodka, sex, and fox-trot rather than for Lenin or the ABCs of communism” [p. 132]), this clashes with his own interesting material on the vigorous, organized, mid-1920s rural drive for autonomous peasant unions and representation in local soviets.

Indeed, one could fruitfully consider this material in light of a long-standing conundrum: the coincidence and relationship between the grassroots, egalitarian, centrifugal social revolution of 1917 and the genesis of one of the most highly centralized and hierarchical systems the world has known. Even as Brovkin deduces mere apathy or antisovietism, he unwittingly suggests that strong echoes of the popular revolution—movements in favor of Soviets without Communists, drives for various forms of local autonomy, and vociferous condemnations of elites and privileges—can be found even in the mid to late 1920s.

History makes for strange bedfellows. Vladimir Brovkin is perhaps best known for his polemics against “revisionists” of the 1970s and 1980s, whom he continues to criticize here for their emphasis on social support for the Soviet regime and “revolution from below.” Meanwhile, much of the historiography, along with many of his avowed targets, have long since embraced theories of resistance that are more or less in sync with his bald conclusion that “the spirit of NEP Russia was of society’s resistance to its recasting by the Communist Party” (p. 219).

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