# 1 Combining fine-scale social contact data with epidemic modelling

# 2 reveals interactions between contact tracing, quarantine, testing and

# 3 physical distancing for controlling COVID-19

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## 28 Abstract

29 Case isolation and contact tracing can contribute to the control of COVID-19 outbreaks1,2. 30 However, it remains unclear how real-world networks could influence the effectiveness and 31 efficiency of such approaches. To address this issue, we simulated control strategies for SARS-32 CoV-2 in a real-world social network generated from high resolution GPS data<sub>3.4</sub>. We found that tracing contacts-of-contacts reduced the size of simulated outbreaks more than tracing of only 33 34 contacts, but resulted in almost half of the local population being guarantined at a single point in 35 time. Testing and releasing non-infectious individuals led to increases in outbreak size, suggesting 36 that contact tracing and guarantine may be most effective when it acts as a 'local lockdown' when 37 contact rates are high. Finally, we estimated that combining physical distancing with contact 38 tracing could enable epidemic control while reducing the number of quarantined individuals. Our 39 approach highlights the importance of network structure and social dynamics in evaluating the 40 potential impact of SARS-CoV-2 control.

#### 41 **Main**

Non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) are central to reducing SARS-CoV-2 transmission 5-8.
Such responses generally include: case isolation, tracing and quarantining of contacts, use of PPE
and hygiene measures, and policies designed to encourage physical distancing (including closures
of schools and workplaces, banning of large public events and restrictions on travel). Due to the
varying economic and social costs of these interventions, there is a clear need for sustainable
strategies that limit SARS-CoV-2 transmission while reducing disruption as far as possible.

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49 Isolation of symptomatic cases, and guarantine of their contacts (e.g. household members), is a 50 common public health strategy for reducing disease spread<sub>1,2,8</sub>. This approach has been used as 51 part of SARS-CoV-2 control strategies. However, the relatively high reproduction number of the 52 SARS-CoV2 virus in early outbreak stages 10.11, alongside likely high contribution to transmission 53 from presymptomatic and asymptomatic individuals<sub>12</sub>, means that manual tracing of contacts alone 54 may not be a sufficient containment strategy under a range of outbreak scenarios<sub>13</sub>. As countries 55 relax lockdowns and other more stringent physical distancing measures, combining the isolation of 56 symptomatic individuals and guarantine of contacts identified through fine-scale tracing is likely to 57 play a major role in many national strategies for targeted SARS-CoV-2 control14.

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59 It is possible to assess the potential effectiveness of contact tracing by simultaneously modelling 60 disease spread and contact tracing strategies through social systems of individuals<sub>15</sub>. These systems are usually simulated through parameterisation with simple social behaviours (e.g. the 61 62 distribution of the number of physical contacts per individual). Further still, social systems may be simulated as networks that can be parameterised according to assumptions regarding different 63 64 contexts (for example, with different simulated networks for households, schools and workplaces), 65 or using estimated contact rates of different age groups<sub>16</sub>. However, much less is known about 66 how different types of real-world social behaviour and the hidden structure found in real-life 67 networks may affect both patterns of disease transmission and efficacy of contact tracing under 68 different scenarios17,18. Examining contagion dynamics and control strategies using a 'real-world'

network allows for a more realistic simulation of SARS-CoV-2 outbreak and contact tracing
dynamics.

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Here we develop an epidemic model which simulates COVID-19 outbreaks across a real-world network, and we assess the impact of a range of testing and contact tracing strategies for controlling these outbreaks (Table 1). We then simulate physical distancing strategies and quantify how the interaction between physical distancing, contact tracing and testing affects outbreak dynamics.

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78 We used a publicly available dataset on human social interactions collected specifically for 79 modelling infectious disease dynamics as part of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 80 documentary "Contagion! The BBC Four Pandemic". The high-resolution data collection focused 81 on residents of the town of Haslemere, where the first evidence of UK-acquired infection with 82 SARS-CoV-2 would later be reported in late February 202019. Previous analyses of this dataset 83 have shown that it is structurally relevant to modelling disease spread, and hence holds substantial 84 potential for understanding and controlling real-world diseases4. Here, we defined dyadic contacts 85 on a day-by-day basis as at least one daily 5 min period with a distance of 4 m (see Methods), 86 which gave 1616 daily contact events and 1257 unique social links between 468 individuals. The 87 social network defined in this way was strongly correlated (r > 0.85 in all cases) with social 88 networks based on other contact distances (from 1-7 m contact ranges; Extended Data Fig. 1). 89 Similarly, social networks created using different time-periods for weighting the dyadic contacts 90 (Extended Data Fig. 2) were also strongly related to the weighting used here (i.e. number of days 91 seen together). As such, this social network quantification gives a representative indication of daily 92 contact propensities within the relevant transmission range between individuals (see Methods) and 93 also captures various aspects of the patterns and structure presented by different quantifications of 94 this social system.

96 Example outbreaks across the Haslemere social network under different control scenarios are displayed in Fig. 1, with a full animated visualisation in Supplementary Video 1, and a Shiny app is 97 98 available to run individual outbreak simulations (see data sharing). Across all simulations, our 99 epidemic model showed that uncontrolled outbreaks in the Haslemere network stemming from a 100 single infected individual resulted in a median of 75% (IQR = 74%-76%) of the population infected 101 after 70 days (Fig. 2). Isolation when symptomatic resulted in 66% (65%-67%) of the population 102 infected, while primary contact tracing resulted in 48% (46%-50%) infected. Secondary contact 103 tracing resulted in the smallest percentage (16%, 14%-19%) of the population infected after 70 104 days. The number of guarantined individuals was very high under both primary and secondary 105 contact tracing, with a median of 43% (IQR = 32%-52%) of the population guarantined during the 106 outbreak peak with the latter (Fig. 2). Examining temporal dynamics showed that outbreak peaks 107 typically occurred within the first 1-3 weeks, and that interventions reduced the overall size of the 108 outbreaks as well as their growth rate (Fig. 2). The number of people required to isolate or 109 quarantine followed a similar trajectory to the number of cases, although under secondary contact 110 tracing, substantial proportions of the population (27%, 18%-35%) were guarantined even at the 111 end of the simulations (Fig. 2). This is in line with a large-scale recent simulation model of app-112 based contact tracing in the UK<sub>20</sub>, which suggested that contact tracing could be highly effective, 113 but also that it required large numbers of people to be guarantined. Further, in our (optimistic) 114 default parameter settings we assumed that 10% of contact tracing attempts were missed. This, 115 combined with the very large number of guarantined cases under secondary contact tracing (Fig. 116 2), suggests that a majority of the population could receive a notification that they should 117 quarantine within the first 2-3 weeks of an outbreak.

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Sensitivity analysis of the efficacy of contact tracing under the epidemic model is presented in Extended Data Figs 3-6. As expected, outbreak size decreased with the percentage of contacts traced in all scenarios, and increased with the reproduction number, the proportion of asymptomatic cases, the proportion of pre-onset transmission, the delay between onset/tracing and isolation/quarantine, and the number of initial cases (Extended Data Figs 3-6). Outbreak

124 dynamics were strongly affected by outside infection rate across all intervention scenarios, as were 125 the number of isolated and guarantined cases (Extended Data Fig. 6). Our model therefore 126 corroborates with models using simulated social systems and showing that, for a disease such as 127 COVID-19 with high levels of transmission from asymptomatic and presymptomatic individuals, 128 contact tracing is likely to be most effective when the proportion of traced contacts is high, when 129 the delay from notification to guarantine is short<sub>13</sub>, and, most importantly, when the number of 130 starting cases and rate of movement into the network are low. Importantly, however, the tradeoff 131 between the number of cases and the number of guarantined cases was found across the entirety 132 of the parameter space (Extended Data Figs 3-6). Further, increasing the network density through 133 increasing the distance threshold for defining contacts led to broadly similar results across 134 intervention scenarios, albeit with larger numbers of guarantined cases required for outbreak 135 control via contact tracing (Extended Data Fig. 7). Therefore, while more real-world networks are 136 needed to demonstrate how well these results apply to other locations and settings, our results are 137 robust to a range of epidemiological and network parameters.

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139 The number of guarantined cases can be reduced through mass testing and release of individuals 140 who return a negative result. Conversely, if contact rates in the population are high, large-scale 141 test and release strategies could provide greater opportunity for transmission and decrease the 142 effectiveness of contact tracing. We therefore assessed how the testing and releasing of isolated 143 and guarantined subjects might affect the numbers of cases and time spent in isolation and guarantine, using false positive and false negative rates estimated from empirical data21,22 144 (Supplementary Table 1). We estimated that increasing the testing capacity (and therefore testing 145 146 and releasing more quarantined cases) led to substantial increases in outbreak size, especially 147 under secondary contact tracing (median = 50%, IQR = 48%-52%; Fig. 3A). This result occurred 148 despite an optimistic false negative rate of 10%, suggesting that the increase in outbreak size with 149 high testing rates is a result of increased transmission within the network, rather than through 150 releasing infected cases per se. Therefore, secondary tracing may effectively act as a 'local 151 lockdown' rather than a targeted intervention strategy. High levels of testing did not lead to large

reductions in the number of quarantined cases under secondary contact tracing scenarios, and the number of tests required to reduce the numbers of quarantined cases were large, with 68% (63%-71%) of the population requiring tests in a single week during outbreak peaks (Fig. 3A). We cannot be sure to what extent our results will represent larger populations, but the tripartite relationship between the number of cases, the number of quarantined contacts and the number of tests required will apply in the majority of scenarios in which rates of social interaction are high.

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159 A very high notification and guarantine rate for any contact tracing system may have 160 consequences for adherence. Our model is optimistic in its assumption that individuals isolate 161 independently of previous notifications or isolations, and highly optimistic in its assumption of 162 100% adherence to quarantine among traced contacts. In reality a high notification and quarantine 163 rate may result in individuals being less likely to undertake guarantine in the future, which in turn 164 will impact outbreak dynamics. There is a need for more evidence and models to better understand 165 these behavioural dynamics, in order to develop sustainable intervention strategies<sub>23</sub>. One 166 suggested solution to reduced adherence to guarantine is through (digital) targeted guarantine 167 requests to the individuals at highest risk of infection, or to those most likely to spread to others24. 168 To what extent these interventions will be needed, and how well they will work, is not yet clear; 169 however, our study provides a methodological template for network-based research into SARS-170 CoV2 and its potential control strategies.

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Combining contact tracing with other physical distancing measures may allow for outbreak control 172 173 while reducing the number of people in quarantine, and the number of tests required. We 174 simulated physical distancing by reducing the number of weak links in the Haslemere network. We 175 aimed to consider low to moderate levels of physical distancing, so used a model whereby the only 176 interactions with 'rare' contacts are removed. We found that, across all scenarios, physical 177 distancing led to reductions in the number of overall cases (Fig. 3B). Importantly, increasing 178 physical distancing was associated with lower numbers of quarantined cases, which was reduced 179 to as little as 6% (3%-9%) during outbreak peaks under secondary contact tracing (Fig. 3B).

180 Simulating physical distancing using an alternative approach whereby removed 'rare' contacts 181 were reassigned to existing contacts (see methods) yielded similar results to our simpler model, although using this approach, physical distancing led to smaller decreases in outbreak size 182 183 (Extended Data Fig. 8). We do not have information on household structure within the Haslemere 184 dataset, but our physical distancing scenario is analogous to decreasing the level of non-185 household contacts. Therefore it may be that combining measures that reduce non-household 186 contact rates with highly effective contact tracing may be a useful tool for control of SARS-CoV-2 187 spread. However, further work is required to determine exactly what kinds of physical distancing 188 measures would enable effective outbreak control alongside contact tracing. Furthermore, future 189 investigations could also examine how the spread of the disease itself may shape behavioural 190 change interventions (e.g. where large outbreaks spark more severe physical distancing 191 measures), and how this feedback may shape the contagion dynamics and predicted effectiveness 192 of interventions.

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194 Network structure can have substantial effects on epidemic model predictions<sub>25,26</sub>. To investigate 195 this, we used null network models based on the Haslemere data, which maintained the same 196 number of individuals, connections and weights of connections, but shuffled network architecture in 197 different ways (see Methods). The number of cases estimated using the null networks was broadly 198 similar to the real-world network, although this was substantially underestimated in a 'lattice' like 199 network (Fig. 4). Importantly, the rate of guarantine varied substantially among the null networks, 200 especially under secondary contact tracing (Fig. 4). These results demonstrate that the use of 201 network-based simulations of SARS-CoV-2 dynamics requires caution, as even if such models had 202 precise information on the number of individuals and amount of social interactions occurring within 203 a system, the assumed architecture of the social network structure alone can shape predictions for 204 both the extent of spread and the usefulness of control strategies. Furthermore, through providing 205 insight into how changes to network structure influences contagion dynamics, the null network 206 simulation approach gives some indication of how this contagion and associated control strategies 207 may operate in different social environments. For instance, different social structures may arise

when considering particular social settings (e.g. workplaces, commuting), some of which may be
closer to the null networks generated here. Considering this structure will lead to improved
predictions of outbreak dynamics.

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212 There are a number of important limitations to our study and the current availability of empirical 213 data in general. Most importantly, this social network is taken from a single, small town and over a 214 short period of time, and we do not know to what extent the social dynamics will be applicable to 215 larger cities and other contexts and over long periods. Therefore, future large-scale efforts in 216 gathering data on dynamic fine-scale social behaviour over long periods of time (ideally over the 217 entire contagion period) in major cities would be of great benefit for assessing the relative uses of 218 SARS-CoV-2 control strategies, and for understanding how and why interventions implemented in 219 some cities have been relatively more successful than others27. Indeed, the epidemic network-220 based model provided here can be applied generally to more extensive social networks if such 221 data becomes available in the future. Further, the Haslemere data, while rich, does not sample the 222 entire population of Haslemere, and children under the age of 13 were not included in the 223 experiment, which could potentially have an impact on outbreak and social tracking dynamics. 224 Again, such issues are also likely to be prevalent across real-world contact-tracing attempts, as the 225 ability to track children will be limited, particularly with app-based approaches that require a 226 smartphone. It is encouraging that our results broadly align with other, larger-scale simulations of 227 contact tracing which explicitly model these limitations, but lack the fine-scale social tracking data<sub>20</sub>. Therefore, by supplying a general framework for simulating the spread of COVID-19 on 228 229 real-world networks, we hope to promote integration of multiple real-world social tracking datasets 230 with epidemic modelling, which may provide a promising way forward for optimising contact tracing 231 strategies and other non-pharmaceutical interventions.

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#### 301 Methods

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### 303 Social tracking data

304 The Haslemere dataset was generated and described as part of previous work, which gives 305 detailed description of the characteristics of this dataset and town<sub>3,4</sub>. Briefly, the data were 306 collected during the 2017/18 BBC Pandemic project conducted in Haslemere, Surrey, UK. The 307 project involved a massive citizen-science experiment to collect social contact and movement data 308 using a custom-made phone app, and was designed to generate data relevant to understanding 309 directly transmitted infectious disease<sub>3,4</sub>. Of the 1272 individuals within Haslemere that 310 downloaded the app, 468 individuals had sufficient data points at a resolution of 1m over three full 311 days within the focal area for further analysis<sub>3</sub>. All 468 focal individuals were known to have spent 312 >6hrs within 51.0132;-0.7731SW : 51.1195,-0.6432NE (within Postcode GU27), but the dataset 313 used here comprises of de-identified proximity data made available as pairwise distances (~1 m 314 resolution) at 5 min intervals (excluding 11pm-7am)<sub>3</sub>.

315

### 316 Social network construction

317 In our primary analysis, we defined social contacts as events when the average pairwise distances 318 between individuals within a 5 min time interval (calculated using the Haversine formula for great-319 circle geographic distance<sub>3</sub>) are 4 m or less. By doing so, we aimed to capture the majority of 320 relevant face-to-face contacts (i.e. those that may result in transmission) over 5 min periods, particularly given the 1 m potential error3 on the tracking measurement during these short time 321 322 intervals. Furthermore, this 4 m threshold is within typical mobile phone Bluetooth ranges for 323 relatively accurate and reliable detections. Therefore, this contact dataset will also be comparable 324 to proximity-based contacts identified through Bluetooth contact tracing apps, which may be 325 preferred to real-location tracking for privacy reasons. We considered the sensitivity of the network 326 to the contact definition by testing six further social networks from contacts defined using different 327 threshold distances spanning the conceivable potential transmission range within the 5 min 328 intervals (1 m to 7 m thresholds). We first measured the correlation of the network structure (i.e.

pairwise contacts) across the seven networks using Mantel tests. We also measured the
correlation of each individual's degree (number of contacts), clustering coefficient (number of
contacts also connected to one another), betweenness (number of shortest paths between nodes
that pass through an individual), and eigenvector centrality (a measure that accounts both for a
node's centrality and that of its neighbours) across the seven networks.

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335 The Haslemere data is a temporal dataset spanning three full days. While the epidemic model we 336 use is dynamic (see below Methods), the contagion process of COVID-19 operates over a longer 337 time period than three days. To be able to meaningfully simulate longer-term outbreak dynamics, 338 we quantified the data as a static social network in which edges indicate the propensities for social 339 contact between nodes. Temporal information is incorporated by weighting the edges using the 340 temporal contact information, instead of using a dynamic network which would require contact data 341 over a much longer period. In the primary analysis, we weighted the edges as the number of 342 unique days a dyad was observed together (but see Supplementary Information for other temporal 343 definitions). Therefore, the weight score indicates the propensity for each dyad to engage in a 344 social contact event on any given day, whereby 0 = no contact, 1 = 'weak links' observed on the 345 minority of days (one third), 2 = 'moderate links' observed on the majority of days (two thirds), and 346 3 = 'strong links' observed on all days. In this way, the weights of this social network could be 347 included directly, and intuitively, into the dynamic epidemic model (see below). For sensitivity 348 analysis, we also created other weighings for this network, and examined the correlation in dyadic 349 social associations scores (using Mantel tests) with our primary weighting method (described above). Specifically, for the sensitivity analysis, we used edges specified as i) a binary (i.e. 350 351 unweighted) network across all days, ii) a raw (and ranked) count of 5 min intervals in contact, iii) a transformed weighted count (edge weight transformed as  $1 - e^{interval \ count}$ , which approximates 352 353 a scenario where infection risk increases with contact time, but begins to level off after ~30mins of 354 contact between dyads) and iv) a 'simple ratio index' (SRI) weighting that corrects for observation 355 number as SRI score<sub>28</sub>. The SRI score for any two individuals (i.e. A and B) is calculated as:

356

357 (1) 
$$SRI_{A,B} = \frac{Obs_{A,B}}{Obs_A + Obs_B - Obs_{A,B}},$$

358

where *Obs* is the number of 5 min observation periods (the intervals since the start of the day)
within which an individual is recorded within 4 m of another individual.

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### 362 Null network simulation approach

363 We used null networks<sub>29</sub> to understand the network properties that shape predictions of COVID-19 364 spread under different control scenarios. Null networks can also show how contagion may depend 365 on the arrangement of social ties, how it may operate in different social environments, and which 366 simulation approaches may be the most similar to real-world infection dynamics. We created four 367 null network scenarios (Extended Data Fig. 9) with 1000 networks generated under each of these. 368 All of the null network scenarios kept the same number of nodes, edges, and weights of these 369 edges, as the Haslemere network, but were generated under the following nulls: (1) 'edge null' 370 (Extended Data Fig. 9A) considered random social associates, allowing the edges of the network 371 to be randomly allocated between all nodes; (2) 'degree null' (Extended Data Fig. 9B) considered 372 individual differences in sociality but random social links between dyads, so randomly swapped the 373 edges between nodes but maintained the degree distribution of the real network (and was, 374 therefore, even more conservative than a power-law network simulation aiming to match real 375 differences in sociality); (3) 'lattice null' (Extended Data Fig. 9C) considered triadic and tight clique 376 associations, so created a ring-like lattice structure through assigning all edges into a ring-lattice 377 where individuals are connected to their direct neighbours, and their neighbours of the second and 378 third order (i.e. six links per individual), and then we randomly removed excess links (until the 379 observed number of edges was reached); (4) 'cluster null' (Extended Data Fig. 9D) considered the 380 observed level of clustering, so created a ring-lattice structure as described above but only 381 between individuals observed as connected (at least 1 social link) in the real network, added 382 remaining links (sampled from 4th order neighbours), and then rewired the edges until the real-383 world global clustering was observed (~20% rewiring; Extended Data Fig. 9D). These conservative 384 (and informed) null models allowed connections to be arranged differently within the network but

maintained the exact same number of individuals, social connections and weights of these socialconnections at each simulation.

387

#### 388 Epidemic model

389 Building on the epidemiological structure of a previous branching-process model13, we developed a 390 full epidemic model to simulate COVID-19 dynamics across the Haslemere network. Full model 391 parameters are given in Supplementary Table 1. For a given network of individuals, an outbreak is 392 seeded by randomly infecting a given number of individuals (default = 1). The model then moves 393 through daily time steps, with opportunities for infection on each day. All newly infected individuals 394 are assigned an 'onset time' drawn from a Weibull distribution (mean = 5.8 days) that determines 395 the point of symptom onset (for symptomatic individuals), and the point at which infectiousness is 396 highest (for all individuals)12. Each individual is then simultaneously assigned asymptomatic status 397 (whether they will develop symptoms at their onset time), as well as presymptomatic status 398 (whether or not they will infect before their assigned onset time), drawn from Bernoulli distributions 399 with defined probabilities (defaults = 0.4 and 0.2 respectively, see Supplementary Table 1). At the 400 start of each day, individuals are assigned a status of susceptible, infectious or recovered (which 401 would include deaths) based on their exposure time, onset time and recovery time (calculated as 402 onset time plus seven days), and are isolated or quarantined based on their isolation/quarantine 403 time (described below). The model then simulates infection dynamics over 70 days.

404

Possible infectors are all non-isolated and non-quarantined infectious individuals. Each day, all
susceptible, non-isolated, non-quarantined contacts of all infectors within the network are at risk of
being infected. The transmission rate for a given pair of contacts is modeled as:

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409 (2) 
$$\lambda(t, s_i, p_i) = A_{s_i} I_{ei} \int_{t-1}^{t} f(u; \mu_i, \alpha_{p_i}, \omega_{p_i}) du$$

410

411 where t is the number of days since the infector i was exposed,  $s_i$  and  $p_i$  are the infector's

412 symptom status (asymptomatic yes/no, and presymptomatic yes/no, respectively).  $A_{s_i}$  is the scaling

factor for the infector's symptomatic status (Supplementary Table 1) and  $I_{ei}$  is the weighting of the 413 edge in the network (i.e. number of days observed together) between the infector and the 414 415 susceptible individual. The probability density function  $f(u; \mu_i, \alpha_{p_i}, \omega_{p_i})$  corresponds to the 416 generation time, which is drawn from a skewed normal distribution (see 13 for details). Briefly, this uses the infector's onset time as the location parameter  $\mu_i$ , while the slant parameter  $\alpha_{p_i}$  and the 417 scale parameter  $\omega_{p_i}$  both vary according to the infector's presymptomatic transmission status 418 419 (Supplementary Table 1). This enabled us to simulate a predefined rate of presymptomatic 420 transmission, while retaining a correlation structure between onset time and infectiousness, and 421 avoiding a scenario whereby a large number of individuals were highly infectious on the first day of 422 exposure (see Supplementary Table 1 and data sharing for more details). 423 424 Using this transmission rate, the probability of infection between a susceptible-infected pair of 425 individuals *t* days after the infector's exposure time is then modeled as: 426  $P(t, s_i, p_i) = 1 - e^{-\lambda(t, s_i, p_i)}$ 427 (3)428 429 Note that the change in status from "infectious" to "recovered" at seven days after symptom onset does not affect infection dynamics (as transmission rate  $\approx$  0 seven days after onset time in our 430 431 model), but is instead used for contact tracing purposes (see below). To test how the above rate of 432 infection related to the reproduction number  $R_0$  and the observed generation times, we generated 433 empirical estimates of the number of secondary infections in the early outbreak stages of the 434 model. We ran 1000 trial simulations from a random single starting infector and quantified i) the 435 mean number of secondary infections from this case, and ii) the time at which each secondary 436 case was infected. We multiplied the rate of infection by a scaling parameter to get a baseline  $R_0$  of 437 2.8, although we also performed sensitivity analysis (Supplementary Table 1). The mean 438 generation time using this method was 6.3 days (median = 6 days). These basic parameters 439 correspond closely to published estimates 12,30.

440

In addition to the infection rate from within the network, the infection rate from outside the network
is also simulated daily by randomly infecting susceptible individuals with a probability of 0.001
(although we also performed sensitivity analysis of this parameter).

444

We simulated different contact tracing scenarios using contact information from the network, with the aim of evaluating both app-based and manual contact tracing strategies. Primary and secondary contacts of individuals are identified from the network on the day of the infector's symptom onset and, as such, contacts of asymptomatic infectors are not traced. Contacts who have already recovered are excluded. Susceptible contacts are traced with a given probability (0.3-0.9 tested - see Supplementary Table 1). We assume that this probability captures a wide range of reasons why contacts might not be traced, and it thus acts as an intuitive simplification.

452

453 The isolation and/or guarantine time of each individual is determined based on their infection 454 status, their symptomatic status, whether they have been traced, and the control scenario. We 455 consider four control scenarios: i) no control, where no individuals are isolated or guarantined, ii) 456 case isolation, where individuals isolate upon symptom onset after a delay period, iii) primary 457 contact tracing with quarantine, where individuals isolate upon symptom onset (after a delay) and 458 traced contacts are guarantined upon their infector's symptom onset (also after a delay), and iv) secondary contact tracing, as scenario iii) but including contacts of contacts. All isolated and 459 460 quarantined individuals are contained for 14 days.

461

Finally, we simulated a range of testing efforts for SARS-CoV-2. Each individual is assigned a testing time on isolation or quarantine, with the delay between containment and testing sampled from a Weibull distribution. A cap of the maximum number of daily tests is assigned, and each day up to this number of individuals are randomly selected for testing. Test results are dependent on infection and asymptomatic status, with a false negative rate (i.e. the probability that an infectious case will test negative) 0.1<sub>21</sub>, and a false positive rate (i.e. the probability that susceptible case will

test positive) of 0.02<sub>22</sub>. Cases who tested negative were immediately released from

# 469 isolation/quarantine.

470

A set of default parameters were chosen to represent a relatively optimistic model of contact 471 472 tracing, which included a short time delay between symptom onset/tracing and isolation/guarantine 473 (1-2 days), and a high proportion (90%) of contacts traced within this tracked population (default 474 parameters highlighted in bold in Supplementary Table 1). We assumed that the probability of 475 tracing was constant over time, and therefore independent of previous isolation/quarantine events, 476 and that all individuals remained in guarantine for the full 14 days, unless released via testing. We 477 performed sensitivity tests on all relevant parameters (Supplementary Table 1). To examine how 478 infection dynamics were affected by network structure, we ran epidemic simulations on each of the 479 null networks described above. We also ran simulations on networks generated using higher (7m 480 and 16m) distance thresholds for defining a contact. These networks were 20% and 100% more 481 dense, respectively, and therefore provide an estimate of the robustness of our simulations to 482 missing contacts.

483

484 We ran each simulation for 70 days, at which point the majority of new infections came from 485 outside the network (see results), with all scenarios replicated 1000 times. With the null networks 486 (above) and physical distancing simulations (below), we ran one replicate simulation on each of 487 1000 simulated networks. In no simulations were all individuals in the population infected under our 488 default settings. Therefore, for each simulation we report the number of cases per week, and 489 quantify the total number of cases after 70 days as a measure of outbreak severity. To present the 490 level of isolation and guarantine required under different scenarios, we calculate the number of people contained on each day of the outbreak, and average this ove weeks to get weekly changes 491 492 in the daily rates of isolations and guarantines.

493

494 *Physical distancing Simulations* 

495 We simulated a population-level physical distancing effort, whereby a given proportion of the 'weak 496 links' are removed (edges only observed on a single day; Extended Data Fig. 10A-D). This is akin 497 to a simple situation whereby individuals reduce their non-regular contacts (e.g. to people outside of their household or other frequently visited settings such as workplaces). As further 498 499 supplementary analysis, we also carried out a more complex physical distancing simulation, 500 whereby the weak links that were removed were randomly reassigned to existing contacts 501 (Extended Data Fig. 10E-G). This represents a scenario where individuals reduce their non-regular 502 contacts but spend more time with regular contacts.

503

504 The epidemic model code can be accessed at: <u>https://github.com/biouea/covidhm</u>

505

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520 This study used the raw data previously published in Kissler et al. 2018 (made available with full 521 description here: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/479154v1). The data used here are 522 publicly available with the code

## 523

# 524 Code availability

- 525 The code and data used to produce the simulations is available as an R package at:
- 526 https://github.com/biouea/covidhm. A shiny app which runs individual outbreak simulations is
- 527 available at: https://biouea.shinyapps.io/covidhm\_shiny/
- 528
- 529 References
- 530

# 531 Author contributions

- 532 J.A.F. A.J.K. and L.G.S. conceived the study; J.A.F. carried out the social network analysis, with
- 533 input from P.K., S.K., A.J.K and L.G.S; L.G.S. built the epidemic network model with input from
- J.A.F., J.H., S.K., P.K. and A.J.K; J.A.F. and L.G.S. wrote the first draft of the manuscript; All
- authors interpreted the results, contributed to writing and approved the final version for submission.
- 536

# 537 **Competing interests**

538 The authors declare no competing interests


# 539 Tables and Figures

# 540


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# 541 **Table 1** Policy summary

Background	Understanding how isolation, contact tracing and other non- pharmaceutical interventions can combine effectively and efficiently is crucial to COVID-19 control. Such interventions are likely to depend on contact patterns within a population. We developed an epidemic model that simulates COVID-19 outbreaks in a real-world network, and assess the impact of a range of testing, isolation, quarantine and contact tracing strategies for controlling these outbreaks.
Main findings and limitations	We found that isolation, contact tracing and quarantine reduced simulated outbreak size in our local-scale network. Tracing and quarantining contacts of contacts was more effective, but required large numbers of individuals are required to be quarantined. This strategy is therefore often similar to introducing a 'local lockdown'. Testing and releasing quarantined individuals reduced the numbers quarantined, but also the effectiveness of control measures. Combining physical distancing with contact tracing resulted in reduced outbreak size, with fewer individuals required to quarantine. A major limitation of this study is that it is based on pre-COVID-19 data from a sample of individuals from a single town; more data are therefore needed to fully understand potential outbreak dynamics in other settings.
Policy implications	Our findings suggest that effective contact tracing measures may require large numbers of people in a community to be quarantined, with individual-level tracing resulting in scenarios equivalent to broader localised lockdowns. Targeted tracing and quarantine strategies may therefore be more efficient when combined with other control measures such as physical distancing.




Haslemere network with epidemic simulation predictions. A The social network of 468 individuals (grey nodes) with 1257 social links (blue edges) weighted by 1616 daily contacts (edge thickness) and a single starting infector (red). Subsequent panels show progression of the COVID-19 epidemic under the no intervention (**B,C,D**) and the secondary contact tracing (E,F,G) scenarios. Red arrows show an infection route, and squares show isolated/quarantined individuals.



566

Figure 2 Epidemic model predictions of outbreak size and number of people isolated/quarantined under different non-pharmaceutical intervention scenarios in the Haslemere network. A cumulative number of cases, number of people isolated, and number of people quarantined at a given point in time under each scenario. Lines and shaded areas represent median and interquartile range from 1000 simulations. B Example networks from a single simulation of each scenario at day 20 of the outbreak. See figure 1 for network details.

573



575

Figure 3 A Epidemic model simulations of outbreak size and number of people isolated and
quarantined under A different levels of testing and B physical distancing in the Haslemere network.
In A, Tests are plotted per week rather than per day for visualisation purposes. In B The
percentage reduction refers to the number of 'weak links' removed from the networks (see
methods). Lines and shaded areas represent median and interquartile range from 1000
simulations.




Figure 4 A Epidemic model simulations of outbreak size and number of people isolated and
quarantined under different null-network permutations based on the Haslemere network (see
methods for details). Lines and shaded areas represent median and interquartile range from 1000
simulations. B Example networks showing an infection simulation (with secondary contact tracing,
after 20 days) on each null network. See Figure 1 for network details.